Jump to content
Goodbye Jesus

Deliberate Manipulation Of The Phenomenal Self Model


DeGaul

Recommended Posts

This thread seems mostly dead. If I was properly prepared then I would probably take you guys through a condensed version of Rosen's arguments here. I would build a foundation from chapter 5 of Life Itself...

 

organization

function

relational modeling

The component

systems from components

entailments in relational systems

function and finality

finality in augmented diagrams

 

Then I'd skip to chapter 9...

 

relational theory of machines

Hardware and software

f: A --> B

 

Then to chapter 10...

 

relational model of organisms

metabolic, repair systems

 

In this way we might see the difference between machines and organisms. It's all about the entailments (implications) associated with these very differently organized systems.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I think that perhaps I can capture Rosen's concerns in a very general way, and follow up with why I think those concerns are both relevant and yet still a bit overblown:

 

Rosen is concerned with relations because Rosen recognizes that structure is not the sole defining property of a thing. The naive reductionist project could be typified as saying that if we can know the building blocks of a thing, then we can know that thing. This is, of course, absurd. Taking an example that perhaps paradox would feel comfortable with, an individual could be imagined who was taught how to put English words together in sentences grammatically but who still does not understand what those words mean. This is the whole syntax/semantics issue.

 

Now, how do we go about solving the syntax/semantics issue? I always used to love what my teacher D.Z. used to tell me, "You can never know if a child really knows how to understand a language until that child first asks a question." What did he mean by that? Well, he was showing the difference between syntax and semantics. Syntax is simply the form of the language, but semantics is the use that the language serves in a larger context. "Meaning is use." was a common phrase that Wittgenstein used. He came to that conclusion by trying to eliminate what he thought was a superstitious attitude toward meaning. Generally, the naive belief about meaning is that there are words (which are things) and they are attached to meanings (which are also things). This rather simplistic view of meaning leads one to ask the question, "If I have word and meanings and my disposal, why don't I just throw away the words and keep the meanings?" The simple answer to this is the meanings aren't things. Meanings are instead are the complex uses of words which obtain within a particular context.

 

Words without a context are nothings. Words exist as words only because meanings exist, and meanings exist only because complex human social relations exist. It is the life of a human community which gives sense to words and it is the dynamic relations between people and objects within that community which generate meaning.

 

This kind of understanding of meaning shines light back on what Rosen was trying to do in biology. In the same way that meanings arise from dynamic human relations, so certain phenomena arise only within the context of "organism". All the processes which make up an organism are themselves involved in a complex set of relations which include not just structure but also relations/interactions across space and time.

 

Thus, a living thing is not just a biological structure, but a dynamic matrix of biological structures which are interacting with other structures across space and time in an emergent system of order.

 

Now, why I think these concerns are a bit over blown at times: Everyone is a naive phenomenologist. As much as experts have a tendency to get lost in the detail of their own field, everyone goes home at night and eats dinner and maybe talks with their friends or their wife. Everyone interacts with the world and accepts the phenomenology of it implicitly. The solution to Rosen's concerns is simply that scientists must become conscious of what they already do unconsciously, which is accept these emergent, relational phenomena as real. We must fight to prevent the "erasing of the world", which all to often happens when scientists step into labs. After all, as Husserl once pointed out, the language of science is parasitic on the common language of the human being. It is within the language of the everyday that we try to find metaphors and turns of phrase to help us understand our scientific discovers. Without language there would be no science, and so it is the dynamic and the relational that comes before the structural and particular.

 

Why don't I see all this as a problem for AI? Mostly because no matter how complex the relations are, they are themselves dependent on the structures. We are more than structure, but that does not mean that we cannot build up something more than structure by starting with structure. Structural models of the mind will lead to functional models of the mind which may lead to us finally understanding the dynamic relations that produce consciousness and thus gaining the capacity to replicate them in a new medium. I don't think any of these insights make it impossible, just a very much bigger project that we perhaps anticipated when our understanding of our own minds was much more simplistic than it is now.

  • Like 2
Link to comment
Share on other sites

DeGaul I believe I'm beginning to zero in on the appropriate level of abstraction here to make a few arguments. But I am short for time this morning. I'll only make this short comment.

 

If we are going to see organization then I think we will likely have to look upward and outward, rather than inward and downward.

 

I'll try to explain myself better this evening.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

DeGaul Hans, I'm going to take a stab at this but instead of writing out one long slab of Rosen's argument I'm going to do it bit by bit so that we can more readily identify where disagreement is occurring. Sound Okay?

 

I think if we are going to reveal the difference between organisms and machines then we must speak about both in a common language. Many intuitively believe that this common language must be capable of capturing the types of organizations that are synonymous with the order we see in these systems. Relational biology as developed by Robert Rosen makes organization the object of its study. It examines organization by inquiring into the entailments (implications) inherent in organized natural systems.

 

That's the first bit. How are we so far? Disagreement? Comments? Questions?

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Legion, since we are proceeding carefully, I'm going to be very exhaustive about my objections. You seem to be saying that Rosen states that organization and order in a system are synonymous. I find that kind of a distinction redundant. Organization and order don't seem to be synonymous to me, they seem to be identical. Order just is the organization present in the system. Perhaps that is what Rosen is saying, but I just don't like the word "synonymous" because it leaves open the possibility of there being some sort of a slight distinction between organization and order, and I'd like to not leave that avenue open.

 

Aside from that slight nitpick, I am in agreement that the crucial point of study is organization. I don't know if I mean that in the same way as Rosen does, however. When studying how the mind works, I start with a basic attitude toward the mind not unlike the attitude of someone trying to understand how a machine works. First, I start with the basic, naturalist assumption:

 

1) Everything that exists can be causally described in an exhaustive manner in the language of physics. (Meaning, a full account of anything can be given in physics which will not need to appeal to anything super-physical or super-natural.)

 

Beyond this assumption, I do allow for the existence of alternative manners of description, the biological being a great example. A biological description would be along the lines of a design based description, meaning we understand the organism not just in terms of material parts, but in terms of the proper functioning of those parts in the organism. Biological description seem to me to focus on the level of function. When we take a design stance toward a living organism, what we are doing is trying to study and predict behavior based on function, which involved looking for different "ends" which purpose it is for the organism to pursue.

 

Briefly, that is where I am at with biology, I'm not entirely sure if Rosen would be on board with me, but I don't think our interests are too far off.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I'm kind of participating here in slow motion DeGaul. Thanks for your patience.

 

1) Everything that exists can be causally described in an exhaustive manner in the language of physics.

Where in contemporary physics do they speak of organization and what language do they use? I hope you're not going to suggest thermodynamics. I imagine a time when physics will one day be able to directly address organization, but at the moment thermodynamics seems to be the best they can do, and I think it falls short.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

No worries Legion, my work schedule is exhaustive right now, so I don't mind the big gaps in discussion. I think I may have not made myself clear in my previous statement. I'm not suggesting that physics discusses organization, far from it. I'm saying that all forms of organization can be described in the reductive language of physics in the form of causal series. I can take any complex organism and describe it in terms of electro-chemical cause and effect sequences, etc. This description will be exhaustive, in the sense that it will offer a full description of the organism or event in the terms in which the description is given. Does that mean that the physical description is exhaustive in the sense that no other description can be given or that no other description is valuable? I don't think so. What the physical description misses is precisely what the organizational description can only give......organization. Just in the same way that a romantic poem give a romantic description that a physical description is incapable of giving. And yet, both descriptions are exhaustive in the sense that both completely describe an event in their own terms.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Degaul are you familiar with autocatalytic sets? Perhaps if we shared this idea then we could speak of their organization. :shrug:

 

 

kauffman.gif

 

 

autocatalyticset.gif

 

 

Two examples of autocatalytic sets. The dotted lines represent catalytic action (efficient cause) and the solid lines indicate reaction pathways (material cause).

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Two examples of autocatalytic sets. The dotted lines represent catalytic action (efficient cause) and the solid lines indicate reaction pathways (material cause).

I'm confused. Is this graph a non-reductive or a reductive representation of a auto-catalytic set?

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Is this graph a non-reductive or a reductive representation of a auto-catalytic set?

I'm not entirely certain Hans. These graphs have been called prototype relational models. They may be a bridge between the reductive and relational approaches.

 

I think they were originally concieved within the context of chemistry. However it has since been observed that these graphs are capable of imaging a variety of different kinds of systems due to the fact that material and efficient causes are manifested in so many ways.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Is this graph a non-reductive or a reductive representation of a auto-catalytic set?

I'm not entirely certain Hans. These graphs have been called prototype relational models. They may be a bridge between the reductive and relational approaches.

 

I think they were originally concieved within the context of chemistry. However it has since been observed that these graphs are capable of imaging a variety of different kinds of systems due to the fact that material and efficient causes are manifested in so many ways.

The way I see it is that as soon as a phenomenon is described in any way, shape, or form, it's a communication that was based on reductive thinking. The only way to teach someone, or explain something to someone, is by breaking down a concept into pieces and transfer the thoughts in words. Even if the words contain many meanings (connotation) besides their definition (denotation), it still represents a reductive process. Graphs, charts, numbers, formulas, models, statues, movies, etc, all are results of a reductive process.

 

And talking about talking. Language is a self-referencing complex system as well, but still we can break it down into words, grammar, definitions, and so on, and we can learn it and reproduce "linguistic skills" by teaching it from childhood. In other words, for a non-linear system, we can represent it in reductive models, and we can reproduce it without the fear that it is impossible.

 

So I still think that we will one day reproduce intelligence. And I also believe that not all scientists are stuck in reductive thinking, considering we wouldn't have any scientists, theoreticians, or mathematicians talking and thinking about complex systems if no one did.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I'm confused about how we are using efficient and material cause here. According to Aristotle, material cause is the stuff something is made of, and efficient cause is the active source of a thing. A person is made of certain elements, but sex is the efficient cause that puts those elements together to form a person. (Sex would also be necessary, but not sufficient for the production of a person.)

 

So, material causes don't really exist without efficient causes. If we were to make an artificial intelligence, then silicone might be the material cause, and the art of computational neurology the efficient cause.

 

I also still fail to see how reductive and relational descriptions are at odds. They are apples and oranges to me. If I'm discussing the material components and simple causal chains at work in a thing, I would be thinking reductively. If I discuss the relations between the different parts in a thing, then I'm thinking relationally. Those seem like two very different ways of discussing a thing, and so I don't see why one excludes or challenges the other. I don't see how one description can lay claim to superiority over another.

 

(But, I'm not going to lie, I'm kind of a few glasses into a bottle of Riesling, so my perception of things is a bit foggy.)

Link to comment
Share on other sites

(But, I'm not going to lie, I'm kind of a few glasses into a bottle of Riesling, so my perception of things is a bit foggy.)

And I had a few really good stouts. :beer:

Link to comment
Share on other sites

The way I see it is that as soon as a phenomenon is described in any way, shape, or form, it's a communication that was based on reductive thinking. The only way to teach someone, or explain something to someone, is by breaking down a concept into pieces and transfer the thoughts in words. Even if the words contain many meanings (connotation) besides their definition (denotation), it still represents a reductive process. Graphs, charts, numbers, formulas, models, statues, movies, etc, all are results of a reductive process.

 

And talking about talking. Language is a self-referencing complex system as well, but still we can break it down into words, grammar, definitions, and so on, and we can learn it and reproduce "linguistic skills" by teaching it from childhood. In other words, for a non-linear system, we can represent it in reductive models, and we can reproduce it without the fear that it is impossible.

Propositions as abstractions

 

I agree that propositional descriptions of phenomena are abstractions. I think even measurements are abstractions. If I take the temperature of a glass of water with a thermometer then I will obtain a single number as a result. Through the abstraction of measurement an arguably complex bundle of phenomena (a glass of water) has given rise to a number. Sociologists will measure or observe in their own way. And all of our varied propositions can be explored from within their respective languages to see how propositions are interconnected.

 

Reasoning within language

 

By utilizing the production rules associated with the syntax of a language we may see how propositions give rise to others and explicitly reason thereby. Some languages accomodate complexity. Here, by complexity, we mean certain paradoxes or loops of inference. Our reasoning is reductive if we disallow languages with this property. After reason has produced hypotheses, these in turn are used to produce predictions, where we project from within language upon a natural system. We are able to say in effect, "If this natural system is observed in a certain way then such and such will be seen."

 

Causality as nature's language

 

When predictions, which have come by way of observation and reason, prove accurate then we have grounds to call our language a model. We may (cautiously) forget about the natural system and inquire into our model alone (which is transparent) for answers about the behavior of the natural system. I think models are examples of understanding. They arise when our own languages are brought into harmony or resonance with nature's language, which is held to be the interconnectedness of phenomena.

 

So I still think that we will one day reproduce intelligence. And I also believe that not all scientists are stuck in reductive thinking, considering we wouldn't have any scientists, theoreticians, or mathematicians talking and thinking about complex systems if no one did.

Let me try and say what I've said before in a different way. I think humans are capable of fabricating both complex and non-complex artifacts. Life and mind would qualify as complex artifacts. But we won't get to complexity by incremental steps. It's not evolutionary; it's revolutionary. I am becoming ever more convinced that if a natural system cannot manifest causal loops then it will be incapable of manifesting life or mind.

 

DeGaul I hope to address you next. I hope to speak of organisms "in the moment" and I will try to concentrate on material causes. In this way I will try to persuade you that organisms are like standing waves in a river, metabolic eddies in the stream of life.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Propositions as abstractions

 

I agree that propositional descriptions of phenomena are abstractions. I think even measurements are abstractions. If I take the temperature of a glass of water with a thermometer then I will obtain a single number as a result. Through the abstraction of measurement an arguably complex bundle of phenomena (a glass of water) has given rise to a number. Sociologists will measure or observe in their own way. And all of our varied propositions can be explored from within their respective languages to see how propositions are interconnected.

 

Reasoning within language

 

By utilizing the production rules associated with the syntax of a language we may see how propositions give rise to others and explicitly reason thereby. Some languages accomodate complexity. Here, by complexity, we mean certain paradoxes or loops of inference. Our reasoning is reductive if we disallow languages with this property. After reason has produced hypotheses, these in turn are used to produce predictions, where we project from within language upon a natural system. We are able to say in effect, "If this natural system is observed in a certain way then such and such will be seen."

 

Causality as nature's language

 

When predictions, which have come by way of observation and reason, prove accurate then we have grounds to call our language a model. We may (cautiously) forget about the natural system and inquire into our model alone (which is transparent) for answers about the behavior of the natural system. I think models are examples of understanding. They arise when our own languages are brought into harmony or resonance with nature's language, which is held to be the interconnectedness of phenomena.

In other words, anything that is described in language will not be complete. It can never be. Any models, diagrams, descriptions, or definitions will ever be enough.

 

Only the things themselves can speak for themselves. Trying to explain or define life or its complexity will always fail. But... life is explained by showing what life is. Life will only by itself speak for what life is. And we are reproducing life every time a child is born. So reproduction of life is possible. The question is, can we do the same artificially?

 

Let me try and say what I've said before in a different way. I think humans are capable of fabricating both complex and non-complex artifacts. Life and mind would qualify as complex artifacts. But we won't get to complexity by incremental steps.

Right.

 

I don't think we can write a software or build a computer that is from get-go conscious, but I do believe we one day will be able to create a thing that is capable of "growing up" like any child does to become conscious over its "life-time."

 

 

It's not evolutionary; it's revolutionary.

I'm not sure what you mean.

 

I am becoming ever more convinced that if a natural system cannot manifest causal loops then it will be incapable of manifesting life or mind.

I'm not following you there, and I suspect its because I haven't studied the things you're talking about. You mean like how Economics work? Like a feed-back?

 

Did I little searching. This is basically Dynamic Systems Theory, which I can see some scientists are considering for AI.

 

For example: Swarm intelligence.

 

Example of Q-learning:

The snail is not programmed to walk. It's programmed to learn how to walk, and is learning the walking by itself.

Q-learning is some form of self-reinforced input-value-output algorithm. Alteration of behavior based on utility.

 

Robotic swarm:

Localized behavior. Linear increase in "bots" (agents), gives exponential increase in performance.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

  • 3 months later...

For Buddhism, the tradition loosens the rigid sense of self and causes the practitioner to identify the world at large as somehow being a part of the self-model of the organism. This sense of unity leads to general release from anxiety as the world seems "as close as I am to myself". The various monotheistic religions achieve a similar effect by causing the self-model to identify an invisible and all-benevolent being which permeates the self-model and cares for and protects it.

I'm late to this particular party but the above quote combined with your remark about humans having in a sense an "excess of consciousness" definitely resonates with me.

 

I sometimes feel like The Man Who Knew Too Much -- in the sense that I am far more aware of how reality actually works than I really find helpful. I've also observed this in others -- particularly in those who are unusually intelligent, intuitive, or both. This can be a burden, a source of stress and angst or just simply depressing. In my experience, people do whatever they have to do to decrease this discomfort. As you point out, Christians trick themselves into feeling the presence of an omnibenevolent Orchestrator in their corner. Many who leave the faith have found tricking themselves into feeling One With The Universe in some way to be an adequate substitute, but I simply find it a different circumlocution, not necessarily more effective than Christianity but I certainly don't begrudge those for whom this particular diversion happens to work.

 

People simply wish to feel less alienated / isolated / alone, want stable, comfortable relationships they can flow with and around without excessive effort or complexity or drama, and want to do things they find meaningful or at least interesting / compelling. This seems so simple in concept but so difficult-to-impossible in practice. I have given up trying to see the universe as something it's not. I once thought of it as basically coherent, kindly disposed towards the well-meaning and sincere, gently admonishing towards the wayward and foolish, etc. Now that I know it's not even remotely warm and fuzzy or accommodating or respectful, I have spent recent years trying to find a way to (not) look at it that won't be defeated by my cussed ability to see clearly. Christianity has long since been discarded; absent some kind of spontaneous "aha moment" I see eastern-style mysticism as no better; I find hedonistic pursuits like just occupying myself with whatever toys I can find the $$ and time to enjoy to be sort of inherently pathetic and pointless. In other words it turns out there is no percentage for me in being onto what's going on just behind that curtain over there.

 

As such I don't necessarily see religion as a nefarious scheme to subjugate mankind. If it works for people, good for them. It's a pity it doesn't work better in practice than it does because if it had even done a half-assed job of protecting me and mine from the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, I probably could have borne with it and gotten by just fine -- particularly if, in addition, relationships were a more reliable source of actual community, loyalty and healthy mutual interdependence.

  • Like 1
Link to comment
Share on other sites

  • 1 year later...

Great summation of metzinger! I just can't accept religion was created to protect anyone other than the leaders of the sheeple . As Voltaire said : religion happened when the first rogue met the first fool . As for consciousness, science has not been able to define or understand consciousness as a merely physical phenomenon yet. In fact the metaphysical is being integrated in by many quantum physicists. But don't worry they will never find a Jesus particle or a Hagee one either!!! That's why I am not an atheist but not a religionist either.

  • Like 1
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Also religion or any other trick isn't necessary for everyone as a reducing valve regardless of IQ or knowledge. Some feel more lost without structure and simplification others do not feel this so much. Ability to handle uncertainty is both a cultural and individual psychological trait. I've always felt religion attracted the structure freaky types for this reason . Ever wonder why at your local hellfire breathing little baptist church there are more engineers and tech types than poets actors and rock stars?

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Guest
This topic is now closed to further replies.
×
×
  • Create New...

Important Information

By using this site, you agree to our Guidelines.