Theism Necessary For Science

[♦ ficino ♦]

Here's an argument for the claim that the scientific enterprise is incoherent without a First Cause. I am picking it up from a review of a recent book about dialogue between modern Aristotelianism/Thomism and analytic philosophy:

https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/49902-new-scholasticism-meets-analytic-philosophy/

The reviewer, Anna Marmodoro, gives a summary of this argument, which is laid out in one of the papers in the reviewed volume, by Edward Feser. By the way, Marmodoro (love the name - "marble made of gold?") and Feser use the term, "principle of sufficient reason." In classical formulations (e.g. Leibniz, Schopenhaur, spinning off from Aristotle), this principle states that there is no fact or truth which lacks a sufficient reason why it should be the way it is and not some other way.

Here's Marmodoro's summary and critique of Feser's argument that science requires a First Cause (the theist takes the further step of replacing First Cause with God):

"Edward Feser, focuses on Aquinas’ principle of causality (PC): ‘if a potency is actualized, that can only be because some already actual cause actualized it’ (p. 19; emphasis in the original). (It would have been interesting to learn more about how Aquinas derives this from Aristotle’s principles.) Feser examines some of the difficulties raised in modern times against PC, and some of the arguments, e.g., the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) that the Scholastics employed to defend it. The Scholastics used PSR in the following way in support of PC:

if PC were false — if the actualization of a potency, the existence of a contingent thing, or something’s changing or coming into being could lack a cause — then these phenomena would not be intelligible, would lack a sufficient reason or adequate explanation. Hence if PSR is true, PC must be true. (p. 37)

Let us pause to examine the inference from PSR to PC. Is it a valid one? PSR is about what makes the world intelligible to us. It involves reasons we give in our explanations of how things are, or how they happen. But the PC is about causes, not reasons. The two sets are not co-extensive. What makes a state of affairs intelligible may be other than its causes. To show that it has to be limited to its causes would require further argument. It would be interesting to hear more from Feser about how the Scholastics could respond to this critique.

Feser goes on to consider what justifies assuming that PSR is true. He reviews a number of existing lines of argument in defense of PSR, ranging from the Scholastics’ to those of contemporary metaphysicians’. He also contributes an argument of his own: if PSR were false, the very possibility of rational justification of one’s views would be compromised. ‘Hence to doubt or deny PSR undercuts any grounds we could have for doubting or denying PSR. . . . To reject PSR is to undermine the possibility of any rational inquiry’ (p. 43; emphasis in the original). The overall conclusion of the chapter is that

All rational inquiry, and scientific inquiry in particular, presupposes PSR. But PSR entails PC. Therefore PC cannot coherently be denied in the name of science. It must instead be regarded as part of the metaphysical framework within which all scientific results must be interpreted. (p. 44)

The validity of the conclusion however depends on the entailment already questioned, about which it would be good to hear more."

 

At this point I have only two comments.

 

1. As I understand them, some Cosmic Inflation theorists would deny Feser's assumptions.  I think Guth and Carroll might deny them.  Vilenkin defended a version of "no first cause necessary for the Big Bang" thesis in the lecture I attended, but I didn't understand his reasoning.

 

2. Calvinist apologists like Francis Schaefer seem inconsistent.  On one hand, they say Protestantism was necessary for modern science because it cleared away the faulty Aristotelian/scholastic "worldview."  On the other hand, they make use of Aristotelian/scholastic thinking in their insistence that science must posit a first cause in order to be intelligible.  I'm not sure that "the heavens declare the glory of God" does all the work in their thinking.  But maybe this isn't really a contradiction in the Calvinist apologetic.
 

[bornagainathiest]

Here's an argument for the claim that the scientific enterprise is incoherent without a First Cause. I am picking it up from a review of a recent book about dialogue between modern Aristotelianism/Thomism and analytic philosophy:

 

https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/49902-new-scholasticism-meets-analytic-philosophy/

 

The reviewer, Anna Marmodoro, gives a summary of this argument, which is laid out in one of the papers in the reviewed volume, by Edward Feser. By the way, Marmodoro (love the name - "marble made of gold?") and Feser use the term, "principle of sufficient reason." In classical formulations (e.g. Leibniz, Schopenhaur, spinning off from Aristotle), this principle states that there is no fact or truth which lacks a sufficient reason why it should be the way it is and not some other way.

 

Here's Marmodoro's summary and critique of Feser's argument that science requires a First Cause (the theist takes the further step of replacing First Cause with God):

 

"Edward Feser, focuses on Aquinas’ principle of causality (PC): ‘if a potency is actualized, that can only be because some already actual cause actualized it’ (p. 19; emphasis in the original). (It would have been interesting to learn more about how Aquinas derives this from Aristotle’s principles.) Feser examines some of the difficulties raised in modern times against PC, and some of the arguments, e.g., the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) that the Scholastics employed to defend it. The Scholastics used PSR in the following way in support of PC:

 

if PC were false — if the actualization of a potency, the existence of a contingent thing, or something’s changing or coming into being could lack a cause — then these phenomena would not be intelligible, would lack a sufficient reason or adequate explanation. Hence if PSR is true, PC must be true. (p. 37)

 

Let us pause to examine the inference from PSR to PC. Is it a valid one? PSR is about what makes the world intelligible to us. It involves reasons we give in our explanations of how things are, or how they happen. But the PC is about causes, not reasons. The two sets are not co-extensive. What makes a state of affairs intelligible may be other than its causes. To show that it has to be limited to its causes would require further argument. It would be interesting to hear more from Feser about how the Scholastics could respond to this critique.

 

Feser goes on to consider what justifies assuming that PSR is true. He reviews a number of existing lines of argument in defense of PSR, ranging from the Scholastics’ to those of contemporary metaphysicians’. He also contributes an argument of his own: if PSR were false, the very possibility of rational justification of one’s views would be compromised. ‘Hence to doubt or deny PSR undercuts any grounds we could have for doubting or denying PSR. . . . To reject PSR is to undermine the possibility of any rational inquiry’ (p. 43; emphasis in the original). The overall conclusion of the chapter is that

 

All rational inquiry, and scientific inquiry in particular, presupposes PSR. But PSR entails PC. Therefore PC cannot coherently be denied in the name of science. It must instead be regarded as part of the metaphysical framework within which all scientific results must be interpreted. (p. 44)

 

The validity of the conclusion however depends on the entailment already questioned, about which it would be good to hear more."

 

At this point I have only two comments.

 

1. As I understand them, some Cosmic Inflation theorists would deny Feser's assumptions.  I think Guth and Carroll might deny them.  Vilenkin defended a version of "no first cause necessary for the Big Bang" thesis in the lecture I attended, but I didn't understand his reasoning.

 

2 points, Ficino.

 

​First, many cosmologists dislike inflationary theory because an unobservable multiverse is a prediction of that theory.

They say that if something is unobservable it cannot constitute are proper prediction, because that prediction can never be empirically verified.  Supporters of inflation counter this by showing how the logic is sound and by pointing out that reality is under no obligation to play by our rules.  The multiverse is not beholden to play by the rules of scientific inquiry.  

 

Secondly, if forthcoming data releases support inflation, cosmologists will be forced to swallow the bitter pill of... "the measure problem".

In a nutshell, a multiverse that is spatially infinite destroys the possibility of making any kind of meaningful statistical prediction.  If all events and all locations are replicated throughout the multiverse an infinite number of times, then anything that is physically possible will happen... not just once, but an infinite number of times.  Since infinity cannot be divided by any integer, there's no way we can assign meaningful probabilities to any event, anywhere.   

 

Science would severely hampered in it's ability to function.  Would this impact the PC and the PSR?

 

2. Calvinist apologists like Francis Schaefer seem inconsistent.  On one hand, they say Protestantism was necessary for modern science because it cleared away the faulty Aristotelian/scholastic "worldview."  On the other hand, they make use of Aristotelian/scholastic thinking in their insistence that science must posit a first cause in order to be intelligible.  I'm not sure that "the heavens declare the glory of God" does all the work in their thinking.  But maybe this isn't really a contradiction in the Calvinist apologetic.

 

[♦ ficino ♦]

Thanks for reading this, BAA, and for your comments.   First - dude, type "in its ability to function" not "in it's ability to function." (:

 

Second, fascinating about implications of a multiverse for our ability to measure data about said multiverse!  I really don't know how to answer the second part of your final question, whether the constraints you mention would impact the PSR.  As to the PC, I can only guess that metaphysicians might be left with material, formal and final causes but perhaps the efficient macro-cause would be dropped.  There might only be meaningful research into, shall we say, micro- efficient causes, i.e. efficient causes for particular universes, like our own and the Big Bang.

[bornagainathiest]

Thanks for reading this, BAA, and for your comments.   First - dude, type "in its ability to function" not "in it's ability to function." (:

 

Second, fascinating about implications of a multiverse for our ability to measure data about said multiverse!  I really don't know how to answer the second part of your final question, whether the constraints you mention would impact the PSR.  As to the PC, I can only guess that metaphysicians might be left with material, formal and final causes but perhaps the efficient macro-cause would be dropped.  There might only be meaningful research into, shall we say, micro- efficient causes, i.e. efficient causes for particular universes, like our own and the Big Bang.

 

Amen to the second!

 

Some kind of notional cut-off might have to be invoked to apply ONLY to the observable universe.  

 

But I can see many eggheads balking at that!  

 

It's (or its) a case of wait and see.  

 

Cheers,

 

BAA

[♦ ficino ♦]

 

Thanks for reading this, BAA, and for your comments.   First - dude, type "in its ability to function" not "in it's ability to function." (:

 

Second, fascinating about implications of a multiverse for our ability to measure data about said multiverse!  I really don't know how to answer the second part of your final question, whether the constraints you mention would impact the PSR.  As to the PC, I can only guess that metaphysicians might be left with material, formal and final causes but perhaps the efficient macro-cause would be dropped.  There might only be meaningful research into, shall we say, micro- efficient causes, i.e. efficient causes for particular universes, like our own and the Big Bang.

 

Amen to the second!

 

Some kind of notional cut-off might have to be invoked to apply ONLY to the observable universe.  

 

But I can see many eggheads balking at that!  

 

It's (or its) a case of wait and see.  

 

Cheers,

 

BAA

 

The formal cause might turn out to be dicey too on any macro level.  Even within biology, if a species' form is not fixed and is not eternal, then explanations that appeal to "form" would not be true under all circumstances, only within a defined set of parameters and time frames.  I don't know whether Calvinists think that explanations from something's "form" are always true, but they might want to say that they are, if "form" gets explained as "blueprint in God's mind for something that He actually creates" or something. 

[bornagainathiest]

http://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/wordpress/?p=4011

 

This article covers the measure problem Ficino and also talks about other problems with inflationary theory.

 

From the p.o.v. of Christian apologetics, the measure problem kills the Fine-Tuned Universe argument stone dead.

No amount of statistics can indicate fine-tuning if the stats themselves are rendered meaningless by the problem of measurement.  

[Orbit]

<helpful> In the interest of clarity, it's always means "it is". Its is used in all other cases (its temperature)

Not trying to be a jerk here </helpful> :-)

[♦ ficino ♦]

http://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/wordpress/?p=4011

 

This article covers the measure problem Ficino and also talks about other problems with inflationary theory.

 

From the p.o.v. of Christian apologetics, the measure problem kills the Fine-Tuned Universe argument stone dead.

No amount of statistics can indicate fine-tuning if the stats themselves are rendered meaningless by the problem of measurement.  

Cool!  If Bill Craig ever gets around to this, he'll misrepresent it.

[bornagainathiest]

 

http://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/wordpress/?p=4011

 

This article covers the measure problem Ficino and also talks about other problems with inflationary theory.

 

From the p.o.v. of Christian apologetics, the measure problem kills the Fine-Tuned Universe argument stone dead.

No amount of statistics can indicate fine-tuning if the stats themselves are rendered meaningless by the problem of measurement.  

Cool!  If Bill Craig ever gets around to this, he'll misrepresent it.

 

 

He already misrepresents a shitload of stuff, so what's new? 

[Deidre]

Theism isn't necessary for science. Except to say, that theists are uncomfortable with science saying "we don't know" in terms of a first cause. Theists constantly feel the need to inject religion/spirituality into this discussion because they don't believe there are tangible explanations. Or they believe that "God" is a tangible explanation, not sure which is worse.

 

Why isn't "we don't have all the answers yet and maybe we never will" not sufficient? Why do we keep entertaining religious nonsense when it comes to science? Idk. Just my thoughts to it.

[♦ ficino ♦]

I think other assumptions are brought in to get from First Cause to theism.  One seems to be that if the universe displays lawlike qualities, such that it can be studied, it must be caused by a rational creator.  A creator that possesses Mind is in their view identical with God.

[Orbit]

I think other assumptions are brought in to get from First Cause to theism.  One seems to be that if the universe displays lawlike qualities, such that it can be studied, it must be caused by a rational creator.  A creator that possesses Mind is in their view identical with God.

That is actually an odd assumption. Why would a first cause have to be a god? It's biased, anthropomorphized  thinking. 

[sdelsolray]

 

 

I think other assumptions are brought in to get from First Cause to theism.  One seems to be that if the universe displays lawlike qualities, such that it can be studied, it must be caused by a rational creator.  A creator that possesses Mind is in their view identical with God.

That is actually an odd assumption. Why would a first cause have to be a god? It's biased, anthropomorphized  thinking.

 

Yes. And what if an intelligent agent (Human or non-human) could be demonstrated to be the Creator, or Facilitator (e.g., genetic engineer), an entity very different from biblegod? What would the religious minded, especially Judeo-Christian believers, make of that? What would they do then?

 

Some would rethink their position based on the new evidence and discard their prior theism.  Others would ignore the evidence and continue with their theism.  Still others would acknowledge the evidence but claim that their god created our creator and adjust their dogma accordingly.

[Neverlandrut]

 

 

http://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/wordpress/?p=4011

 

This article covers the measure problem Ficino and also talks about other problems with inflationary theory.

 

From the p.o.v. of Christian apologetics, the measure problem kills the Fine-Tuned Universe argument stone dead.

No amount of statistics can indicate fine-tuning if the stats themselves are rendered meaningless by the problem of measurement.

Cool! If Bill Craig ever gets around to this, he'll misrepresent it.

Christian apologetics: misrepresenting reality since 1 C.E.