Which Is The Stronger/better Force, Belief Or Knowledge?

[FreeThinkerNZ]

 

Sometimes it gets a little personal, but in the end, we are all just humans trying to do the best we can.

 

 

What nice, neat, and tidy little justification for bad behaviour.

 

"Do or do not. There is no try".

[disillusioned]

Things which can be known require no belief (e.g. no one "believes" in evolution; they either accept it as probable fact or they don't).  Contrariwise, things which must be believed cannot be known (e.g. nobody really "knows" the lord; they just really really believe what they've heard about him is true).  Both may hold a strong place in the lives of humans, but for dramatically different purposes.

 

From one perspective, I agree with this. I understand what you're saying, but I still think there is an inherent contradiction here.

 

You say, for example, "no one "believes" in evolution; they either accept it as probable fact or they don't". I agree that it isn't particularly helpful to speak of belief in scientific theories. I find that it gives the wrong impression. And yet, if we accept a theory as probable fact, then we acknowledge that it could be wrong. This is to say, we are not absolutely certain. Thus, we don't really know it to be true. We just believe it very strongly.

 

Also, as I alluded to before, all of the facts that science reveals to us are predicated on assumptions. The assumptions we make are, ultimately, arbitrary. Hence, at the end of the day, everything boils down to some set of statements which may or may not be true. They are believed, or not. Again, this doesn't mean that all beliefs are equal, or that all assumptions are equal. Some assumptions are necessary and useful, and some are not. Some beliefs are very well supported, and some are not. If a belief is well-supported enough, we cease to call it a belief and begin to call it a fact. But I still don't think that we can draw a firm line between the two.

 

(edit: spelling)

[mwc]

     Am I misunderstanding what is meant by "knowledge" here?  Isn't it just information that people acquire whatever that information might be?  If I sit down and study a pile of dirt I have gained knowledge about that pile of dirt.  That doesn't mean that I actually learned accurate information about that pile of dirt does it?  Or say that I study fire and wood and conclude that the wood somehow contains fire shows, based on all we know today, that my knowledge isn't any good even though I may have made thorough investigation of these things.  You may even write off what I *knew* as a belief but I made observations, gathered data and had facts to draw my conclusions that the wood had fire that was being drawn out or whatnot but clearly this is a reasoning error.

 

     So how can anyone claim, so simply, that knowledge, is better than belief when they haven't yet established whether this knowledge is actually any good compared to the belief?  It may well be worse or something different altogether.  I think there is a flaw in reasoning at work in this very thread from people who simply know "knowledge" is better without even evaluating what that knowledge is or where it comes from.  I think these compliment one another.  Someone believes they can climb a mountain.  They go off and die.  This happens for ages.  Then someone else takes that knowledge and figures out how to actually climb the damn thing.  This person would have never made it had it not been for those other people and could have just been another statistic if they failed making them just another idiot who believed they could do the impossible instead of the one with all the valuable knowledge.

 

          mwc

[ConsiderTheSource]

I assert that knowledge is indeed stronger/better than belief in almost nearly every case.

 

I propose that the best metrics for determining is measuring how often folks use each to determine their individual decision making behaviors and choices, and the number of positive/accurate outcomes that result from each individual behavior

 

Yes, a majority in the world THINK using a belief based mental operating system.  But, even the most "infected" belief based mental operating system uses knowledge for most of the actual individual decision made in their day to day life... because belief fails to produce adequate outcomes in most in individual daily decision making situations.  Folks do not default to their belief set when doing their jobs.  They access their belief set first.... but quickly redirect their energy to their knowledge base.  Try driving a car for the first time using only belief and faith.  In practice, beliefs set are utterly inadequate.  After awhile, a belief set mind becomes partitioned... and the default decision involves accessing knowledge FIRST...and belief sets are the secondary choice for MOST day to day decisions. 

 

So, this begs the question, "why do belief based faith based folks refuse to follow the usual paradigm of accessing knowledge first, and belief sets only when needed on some certain issues"?  Issues such as determining what LGBTQ rights should have, what rights should other faith groups have, and even the one that gets a lot of attention here... "Does god exist, and, if so, is he/she the Christian god?"  Why does the normal order of operations... knowledge first, belief 2nd gets turned on its head when it has proven its validity in life decision over and over and over again?   I submit that the only rational reason is to "maintain membership in a social group".  I can not come up with any rational reason to abandon the usual order of mental operations.

 

So...  a full belief or belief/faith mental operating simple does not exist.  But, a full knowledge based operating systems, where, knowledge is accessed and used first, and belief set is accessed only as a secondary process does exist as knowledge is indeed stronger/better, most effective, more efficient than any belief based mental operating system.  It is just a waste of time and effort putting belief before knowledge if the goal is making positive/accurate decision. 

 

If the point is the maintain membership in one's social group, I get it.... but you have to realize and be "OK" with the damage this does to "out groups", like law abiding folks in the LGBTQ community... just so one can have their social group membership.  And, by default, you have the accept the fact that you lack empathy for folks outside of your group.

[disillusioned]

Hey CTS, can you be more specific about what precisely you mean by "knowledge"? As mwc pointed out, the term can have multiple meanings. I've presented one such, and mwc has presented another. end3 has also presented...something. But you seem intent on drawing a line between "belief" and "knowledge". This may or may not be possible, depending on what you mean by these terms.

 

By the way, I agree with much of your previous post. It seems to me that a pragmatic approach is often best (ie, we go with what seems to work). It seems to me that one major reason why a great many people reject what you are proposing is simply that they are engaging in wishful thinking. When it comes right down to it, many people are more concerned with what makes them happy than with what is actually true (or good, or useful as the case may be).

[ConsiderTheSource]

Hi disillusion,

 

I use a statistical methodology to differentiate between knowledge and belief; as knowledge is not necessarily "static" and in place.  A confidence statement of "knowledge is being 99% confident that something "is true" 99% or more of the time it is measured" would be sufficient for me.  Anything below this standard, or anything not measurable, would fall into one's belief set.

 

Example:  There is a road I have traveled most every Monday through Friday for 24 years.  There is a semi blind corner on this route that intersects another road.  Everyday I have come to that intersection there has never been a stop sign present.  If I applied my 99/99 standard I am willing to conclude that I indeed have Knowledge that no stop sign exists at that intersection.  Yes... "of course" I do not know "for absolute certainty" that come tomorrow that there will not be a stop sign there; but, I am definitely confident at this singular moment in time, that no stop sign exists at that intersection, and I will use this Knowledge during my drive tomorrow.

 

Yes... there is no practical way to do the math and calculate a 99/99 confidence statement for every bit of knowledge in one's mind.  But, most folks have the ability to mentally discern this level of confidence without math.  Turn the doorknob, the door will open; jump off a 200 foot cliff, you will die; drop a glass on concrete, it will break.

 

Most of the decisions we make day to day is because we have 99/99 confidence.  For decisions that have an uncertain outcome it makes sense that we apply all of the 99/99 knowledge "bits" and any outright facts at our disposal IF the goal is to get a likely correct, likely factual, and, most importantly, genuinely honest conclusion and result.  After applying the 99/99 "bits"; than it makes sense to go to our belief set to try to get to the most correct and "best" solution.

 

Faith based belief folk apply their beliefs (which don't even come close to meeting the 99/99 standard in almost all cases) first.... before considering any 99/99 knowledge that is "out there"; and they even ignore the 99/99 knowledge within themselves... knowledge they use all the time for day to day tasks and living.   When it comes to particular stated beliefs of their faith they ignore dozens... maybe hundreds of 99/99 knowledge "bits"....which, if calculated, make the odds of them "being correct anyway" and "reaching the best result" soooooooo small... that the resulting fraction when applied to the mass of an apple would result in something the size of a molecule.  It is this math that exposes the fallacy of applying beliefs first in one's mental order of operations before apply 99/99 knowledge.  Reversing the order of these operations ignores the powerful information contained in most of the 99/99 "bits", as they are tossed out in favor of beliefs with little or no knowledge integrity.   It all leads to unfounded conclusion that are likely quite hurtful to who is impacted by these belief based conclusions.

 

So... once again... I end up with the only reasonable explanation one would apply beliefs first and knowledge second is that they need to in order to protect their membership in a social group.... no matter who outside their group get hurt...with little or no empathy toward these folks living outside their desired social group. 

[sdelsolray]

This thread will remain unfocused (despite some focused posts) until a consensus on working definitions of "belief" and "knowledge" occurs.

[disillusioned]

Hi disillusion,

 

I use a statistical methodology to differentiate between knowledge and belief; as knowledge is not necessarily "static" and in place.  A confidence statement of "knowledge is being 99% confident that something "is true" 99% or more of the time it is measured" would be sufficient for me.  Anything below this standard, or anything not measurable, would fall into one's belief set.

 

Example:  There is a road I have traveled most every Monday through Friday for 24 years.  There is a semi blind corner on this route that intersects another road.  Everyday I have come to that intersection there has never been a stop sign present.  If I applied my 99/99 standard I am willing to conclude that I indeed have Knowledge that no stop sign exists at that intersection.  Yes... "of course" I do not know "for absolute certainty" that come tomorrow that there will not be a stop sign there; but, I am definitely confident at this singular moment in time, that no stop sign exists at that intersection, and I will use this Knowledge during my drive tomorrow.

 

Yes... there is no practical way to do the math and calculate a 99/99 confidence statement for every bit of knowledge in one's mind.  But, most folks have the ability to mentally discern this level of confidence without math.  Turn the doorknob, the door will open; jump off a 200 foot cliff, you will die; drop a glass on concrete, it will break.

 

Most of the decisions we make day to day is because we have 99/99 confidence.  For decisions that have an uncertain outcome it makes sense that we apply all of the 99/99 knowledge "bits" and any outright facts at our disposal IF the goal is to get a likely correct, likely factual, and, most importantly, genuinely honest conclusion and result.  After applying the 99/99 "bits"; than it makes sense to go to our belief set to try to get to the most correct and "best" solution.

 

Faith based belief folk apply their beliefs (which don't even come close to meeting the 99/99 standard in almost all cases) first.... before considering any 99/99 knowledge that is "out there"; and they even ignore the 99/99 knowledge within themselves... knowledge they use all the time for day to day tasks and living.   When it comes to particular stated beliefs of their faith they ignore dozens... maybe hundreds of 99/99 knowledge "bits"....which, if calculated, make the odds of them "being correct anyway" and "reaching the best result" soooooooo small... that the resulting fraction when applied to the mass of an apple would result in something the size of a molecule.  It is this math that exposes the fallacy of applying beliefs first in one's mental order of operations before apply 99/99 knowledge.  Reversing the order of these operations ignores the powerful information contained in most of the 99/99 "bits", as they are tossed out in favor of beliefs with little or no knowledge integrity.   It all leads to unfounded conclusion that are likely quite hurtful to who is impacted by these belief based conclusions.

 

So... once again... I end up with the only reasonable explanation one would apply beliefs first and knowledge second is that they need to in order to protect their membership in a social group.... no matter who outside their group get hurt...with little or no empathy toward these folks living outside their desired social group. 

 

Alright, this is helpful.

 

It seems to me that you are using "knowledge" to mean something akin to "belief with certainty". In other words, as I've pointed out, there comes a point where we no longer have any substantive doubts about a particular belief, and at this point we claim knowledge. On this view, I think you are quite right that knowledge is, almost by definition, stronger than mere belief. Does that mean that it is better? I'm not sure, but it does seem to be more reliable.

 

Also, I think we need to be careful not to forget about the power of wishful thinking. If someone really wants to believe something, and surrounds themselves with others who also really want to believe it, then that person can gradually convince themselves that it is actually true. Furthermore, they will begin to interpret facts in light of this belief, which will create the illusion of certainty. At this point, it seems to them that they have obtained knowledge. Thus I don't think that those who consider their beliefs first are being intentionally irrational. They may just have fooled themselves.

[♦ ficino ♦]

"Justified true belief" seems a pretty good starting def. of knowledge.

 

Some people have stronger beliefs about values, and about what one should do to promote them, than others do.  I remember hearing a story - might be apocryphal - about a Russian soldier during WWII who had to swim a freezing winter river and kept going because he thought to himself that the spirit of Stalin was giving him strength.  Would the dude have drowned without that belief?  Maybe he would have substituted another one, I don't know.  Belief-based communities sometimes seem capable of more focused action than those in which beliefs about values are weak.

[florduh]

Broadly speaking, knowledge is objective truth while belief is subjective truth. That is, knowledgeis typically thought to be that which is true independent of circumstance; it is universally true (non-contingent). Belief, however, is an idea or concept which is held as true to the individual who holds it, and not necessarily to anyone (or everyone) else.

 

 

http://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/1295/what-is-the-difference-between-knowledge-and-belief

[mymistake]

Do I know X is true?  I do if, and only if, I can verify X with facts.

 

 

Example:

I know my keys are in my pocket.  I can reach into my pocket at any time and pull them out.  I know they are my keys because I can test various keys on the chain and they fit my car, my house, my truck, my tool shed and so on.  Verifying with fact creates knowledge.

 

 

Now on the other hand I can believe something that conflicts with fact.  I can believe I have my keys in my pocket but upon sticking my hand in I discover they are only assorted coins.  Or I can pull out a set of keys and discover they are not mine.  (Just how drunk was I at that party?)

[♦ ficino ♦]

My understanding, pilfered from Plato's Meno, is that we all have beliefs. Some beliefs are true beliefs. When we can give an account of why the true beliefs are true, including an account of the cause, we can consider them knowledge.

 

When they have to do with what Socrates calls "the greatest things," i.e. deep values, then it gets tricky to offer an account or justification of the truth of the beliefs.  That's why Socrates makes difficulties over what he knows.

[disillusioned]

My understanding, pilfered from Plato's Meno, is that we all have beliefs. Some beliefs are true beliefs. When we can give an account of why the true beliefs are true, including an account of the cause, we can consider them knowledge.

 

When they have to do with what Socrates calls "the greatest things," i.e. deep values, then it gets tricky to offer an account or justification of the truth of the beliefs.  That's why Socrates makes difficulties over what he knows.

 

This is interesting, but it does lead to the question of who judges the validity of the account that we give. If it is to be judged only by the individual claiming the knowledge, then this seems to me to mean that all knowledge is subjective. If it is to be judged by others, then we must ask who gets to make the judgement, and how we can know that their judgement is valid.

[♦ ficino ♦]

 

My understanding, pilfered from Plato's Meno, is that we all have beliefs. Some beliefs are true beliefs. When we can give an account of why the true beliefs are true, including an account of the cause, we can consider them knowledge.

 

When they have to do with what Socrates calls "the greatest things," i.e. deep values, then it gets tricky to offer an account or justification of the truth of the beliefs.  That's why Socrates makes difficulties over what he knows.

 

This is interesting, but it does lead to the question of who judges the validity of the account that we give. If it is to be judged only by the individual claiming the knowledge, then this seems to me to mean that all knowledge is subjective. If it is to be judged by others, then we must ask who gets to make the judgement, and how we can know that their judgement is valid.

 

Good further step, D!

 

The Calvinist:  the Bible judges.  I mean, the Westminster Confession judges.  I mean, my denomination judges.  I mean, I judge.

 

The pragmatist (John Dewey, Charles Peirce, Llewellyn?... ) we go with what works as long as it works. When it doesn't, we roll up our sleeves and look for a better one. The "we" are all of us engaged in working on the problem.

 

The Catholics:  Holy Mother Church.  In ecumenical councils or when the Pope speaks ex cathedra.  But those hardly ever happen.  So otherwise, I judge.

 

Muslims: the prophet Mohammed, peace be upon him, already said it.  And our sages explain it.  Except when they don't. So my imam tells me.  Except when he doesn't.  So I judge.

 

Hasidic Jews:  our lawgiver Moses received the Torah from Ha Shem (= G-d) and our sages explain it.  Except when they don't.  So my rabbi tells me.  I ask him about buying a washing machine.  His brother in law sells them.  Except when they don't work.  Oy vey, I am to judge, you're telling me? 

 

Ironhorse:  I believe.

 

(You can tell I'm rooting for the pragmatists.)

[♦ ficino ♦]

 

My understanding, pilfered from Plato's Meno, is that we all have beliefs. Some beliefs are true beliefs. When we can give an account of why the true beliefs are true, including an account of the cause, we can consider them knowledge.

 

When they have to do with what Socrates calls "the greatest things," i.e. deep values, then it gets tricky to offer an account or justification of the truth of the beliefs.  That's why Socrates makes difficulties over what he knows.

 

This is interesting, but it does lead to the question of who judges the validity of the account that we give. If it is to be judged only by the individual claiming the knowledge, then this seems to me to mean that all knowledge is subjective. If it is to be judged by others, then we must ask who gets to make the judgement, and how we can know that their judgement is valid.

 

Seriously, D, the best I can think of is intersubjective agreement among the players in whatever "game" of language we're looking at.  One of Socrates' bees in bonnet, as portrayed by Plato, is claims of experts to special knowledge, not about crafts/sciences, where he doesn't contest expertise, but about virtue and the good. Soc is shown deflating their expertise to teach that. Then Plato puts in his mouth lots of arguments that a procedure of reasoning, practiced by a few of morally pure character, can yield the required knowledge to make them experts about what is good for humanity (Soc doesn't claim such knowledge himself). So the result is a political structure that many see as totalitarian.

 

I don't advocate that!

 

In "games" where judgments are made based on following what I'll loosely called the scientific method, most of the onlookers, who benefit from the application of the researchers' findings, are fine with deferring to experts.  Never in my lifetime do I remember science denial - or perhaps better, ideologically-driven pseudo-science - as coming so freely into mainstream discourse in America as it has in recent years.  They say Soviet science had elements of such pseudo-science, depending on whom Stalin liked at a given time.

 

About judgments over value-laden matters, I think again the best we get is intersubjective agreement, and the agreement is never universal about how to apply basic principles.  Hence democracy as the worst of all political systems, except for all the others that have been tried.

[disillusioned]

Good stuff ficino.

 

One of my key points of contention with Christians in the past has been related to this question. As you point out, different creeds claim to have The Truth^TM as spoken by God. I want to know how they know it is true. It seems to me that their position invariably reduces from "This is God's will" to "This is what I think". Perhaps it would be best for them just to speak for themselves, as the rest of us do.

 

You also raise a very good point about what I'll call different realms of truth. Scientific truth, as you say, shouldn't really be contested by most people. It works. We make machines that work because of it. As long as it works, most people don't really worry too much about why. When it stops working, we look for a better solution. This is pragmatism in action. The rise of science denial is certainly concerning, but I think that the majority are still happy to be reasonable about such things.

 

When it comes to morals/values/virtue etc, we are faced with a different problem. You say "X is good". I say "how do you know?". This is where I begin to wonder about the limits of pragmatism. I'm not sure that "X seems to work" means the same thing as "X is good". You could, of course, make some sort of argument to the effect that "X is good", but then I can always ask how I can know that your argument is valid. We are coming dangerously close to the Munchhausen trilemma.

 

Perhaps you're right, all we can get is a kind of intersubjective agreement. A pseudo-democratic approach to truth, if you will.

[♦ ficino ♦]

When it comes to morals/values/virtue etc, we are faced with a different problem. You say "X is good". I say "how do you know?". This is where I begin to wonder about the limits of pragmatism. I'm not sure that "X seems to work" means the same thing as "X is good". You could, of course, make some sort of argument to the effect that "X is good", but then I can always ask how I can know that your argument is valid. We are coming dangerously close to the Munchhausen trilemma.

 

Perhaps you're right, all we can get is a kind of intersubjective agreement. A pseudo-democratic approach to truth, if you will.

I'm not a political theorist, so I'm just going off the top of my head.  I am wondering whether "is X good?" questions can in fact be broken down into a series of questions about "is X likely to work?"  If we start off by conceiving of "good" as basically "beneficial," then we have to ask, "for whom, when, in what respect," and so on.  Actually, a lot of this is debated as portrayed in Plato's Protagoras, where Protagoras makes a lot of good points.

 

For example: is it good for the US Federal Reserve to keep interest rates very low?  That question needs to be broken down, and a set of facts needs to be assembled before the value questions can even be addressed.  People who scream, "we'll have inflation, raise interest rates!" need to produce evidence that inflation is occurring now and speeding up.  So far, that evidence has been wanting.  here we get back to the technical experts issue:  do the generality of economists have more credibility in describing the rate of inflation at present than do, say, guys who offer anecdotes about people they know?  See this very question in relation to the contentions of Dallas Fed chief Richard Fisher:

 

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/21/business/economy/richard-fisher-leave-the-fed.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0

 

On the other hand, when we get to "is inflation over x% bad?" we can still pull in facts but we start to drift into contesting who gets what sort of benefits at what time. 

 

At that point, I confess I don't know how much any of us are debating what is true.  I can argue, it is the case that it is beneficial to rich people to give away to the poor all that they own and follow religious cult leaders, but the "it is the case" part of this seems tied to judgments about further goals (non-attachment, or whatever). Is it better to have the inner peace brought by non-attachment than to struggle and gain mastery over millions?  I think so, but it's beyond me how to prove that this is the case.  All I can think of is to appeal to intersubjective agreement among the generality of people.

 

Maybe Hume's notion that moral norms are grounded in right sentiment is a promising one, but it seems to wind up in circularity.  Aristotle said that Plato's "the good" was so abstract that it was devoid of content. 

 

So I am postulating that a pragmatist approach may not be bad.  We see what works in helping people to live happy and fulfilled lives, and we tilt toward those things.

 

----------------

 

Adding:  I think most of us need ethical norms. We can't keep reconfiguring our belief structure for each decision.  I do think most of humanity agrees on some basic ethical principles, which come up in many traditions.  A good deal of the disagreement revolves around taboos, and who gets to impose their taboos on whom.  Here, can we do better than relying on the power that comes from the barrel of a gun?

[disillusioned]

You're right ficino, these are very difficult questions to answer. I think that often what ends up happening is that the question "is X good?" can only be answered from a specific perspective. As you say, questions like "is inflation over x% bad" can often be answered by saying "only for some people." It may also be the case that when asking these questions we should not only consider what is good for humankind, but for our environment and surroundings as well.

 

One of the things that I find somewhat concerning about pragmatism is that it can lead to complacency. If we've found something that seems to work, it can be very tempting to just be satisfied with that instead of continuing to attempt improvements. For example, if I'm playing chess and I win 10 games in a row using the same opening, I could be tempted to say "well, this opening is working, I'll just keep playing it". But the fact that I'm winning doesn't mean that my opening is fundamentally strong. I could just be playing a weak opponent. Perhaps my opening works, but this doesn't mean I can't do better. Also, by practicing different openings I will ultimately become a stronger chess player. This is illustrative of my concern with reducing "is X good?" to "does X work?". X might work, but maybe Y works better. Also, just because X seems to work doesn't mean that we should take it too far.

 

This doesn't mean that pragmatism shouldn't be used, but I do think we need to be careful with it.

[♦ ficino ♦]

My knowledge of pragmatism is only second hand, so I don't know whether the limitations in thinking that you describe are inherent in it.  It would seem not.  Maybe Llewellyn or others can weigh in there.

 

If pragmatism involves scoping out what works, it doesn't seem to follow that the human imagination and sense of wonder need be ignored.  In the chess example, someone might just find it much more cool to puzzle out a different, more powerful opening.  And that step would put everyone in the position to see whether it in fact does work better. 

 

Then, too, a pragmatist need not be blind to aesthetic and other values.  Llewellyn posted a poem by Dewey.  Dewey could have limited himself to saying the same thing in a treatise.

[disillusioned]

If pragmatism involves scoping out what works, it doesn't seem to follow that the human imagination and sense of wonder need be ignored.  In the chess example, someone might just find it much more cool to puzzle out a different, more powerful opening.  And that step would put everyone in the position to see whether it in fact does work better. 

 

I agree with this entirely. My point was not to say that pragmatism needs to lead to complacency, but rather that we should be careful that we don't use pragmatism as an excuse to fall into complacency.

 

As you said in a previous post, a pragmatic approach to questions such as "is X good" may not be bad. If we can see what seems to let people live happy, fulfilled and safe lives, we can aim for those things. But I don't think we need to stop there. I still very much want to ask why certain things are better than others. Sometimes the answers to these questions are simple. For example, it's easy to see that being fed is better than starvation. But if someone says that having electricity is better than not having electricity, I think we are justified in asking why. And in attempting to answer this, I think we need to do a bit better than saying "electricity makes people happy". People can be made happy by things that are not at all good for them. Moreover, saying "electricity is useful" doesn't quite suffice in my view either. The nature of humankind is that we can find a use for just about anything. Moreover, not all things that are useful are good. The atomic bomb was useful. I'm not sure that I'm willing to call it "good".

 

In my view, pragmatism is an approach that we can take to help us make some progress. It is a powerful approach. But I don't think it is the only valid approach, and I'm still not sure it works in all situations. Perhaps Llwellyn can convince me otherwise.

 

I agree with you, by the way, that ethical norms are, generally, helpful. That they are not absolutely objective does not necessarily mean that they are invalid or useless.

[♦ ficino ♦]

I am still not ready to allow that basic laws of thought, such as A = A, or the law of non-contradiction, are rules of thumb that are always up for revision on each occasion.  But maybe on the quantum level - how the hell do I know?!

 

As I remember from Bertrand Russell's The Problems of Philosophy, he proposed that all true statements are true either because they are reducible to tautologies or because they are verified by sensory data.  If we say that we know what an even number is, for example, we know it not because we have experienced all even numbers in the world, but because its definitional statement is an analytic proposition. How do we justify a claim that the narrator of a story is not identical to the author?  That seems to have more to do with definitions, part of genre, itself a construct, than it does with sensory data.

 

How to justify the truthfulness of the analytic proposition?  I'm thinking that its justification lies somewhere in the nature of language ("langue"?), which in turn is "justified", if we can say that at all, by its effects.  The caveman who violates laws of logic may not survive, or his family may not survive.  A tiger is a tiger is a tiger.

 

So maybe pragmatism can handle justifying analytic propositions somehow.

 

I should shut up and study this stuff, but too many other things I'm already working on.

[disillusioned]

I have a great deal of respect for Russell (which may or may not have been obvious already...). I like his definition of truth. Some statements may be formally proven (ie, shown to reduce to tautologies in a particular system) and some may be justified by our senses. I have no issue with this. But once again, this brings us back to the question I was asking before. If a statement is proven formally, then we are justified in asking how we know that the rules of our system are correct. If a statement is justified by our senses, then we can ask how we know that we can trust our senses. In either case, it seems to turn out that what we thought was knowledge is actually really just a firmly held belief. This is what I was referring to earlier when I spoke of there not being a firm line between knowledge and belief. Again, however, it does seem to mean that knowledge is, in a very real sense, stronger than some of our other beliefs.

 

As for needing to re-evaluate the laws of logic in every situation, I agree, this would be less than helpful. I think we can use these laws irrespective of whether or not they have a basis beyond the human mind. It seems to me that whatever system we decide to use must contain some rules. Otherwise our games will be...uninspiring. The issue that I see is that more than one system may be valid. Intuitionism, for example, does not include the law of excluded middle. It also does not include its negation. Thus, proofs in intuitionist logic have been compared to building houses using only nails, with no screws being included. Such houses do nothing to show that screws don't exist, or that they aren't useful; they merely show that they aren't absolutely necessary. Not all houses must be built using the same tools. But it does seem to me that we will make more progress on a particular house if we are not choosing to use a whole new set of tools every single day.

[♦ ficino ♦]

it seems to turn out that what we thought was knowledge is actually really just a firmly held belief. This is what I was referring to earlier when I spoke of there not being a firm line between knowledge and belief. Again, however, it does seem to mean that knowledge is, in a very real sense, stronger than some of our other beliefs.

I think it's important to be clear on what work is being done by "firmly held." It can't be a qualifier of the subject's internal state of conviction. The madman has beliefs that he firmly holds are true. Rather, what matters is that the subject can explain the reason why the belief is true. The person who knows the reason is in a position to integrate that belief with other ones and build up a system, so that s/he has understanding of a field. That person can make further predictions, can repeat successful procedures more reliably, and so on. That person can also engage in intersubjective agreement with others. That's all part of language.

 

As for needing to re-evaluate the laws of logic in every situation, I agree, this would be less than helpful. I think we can use these laws irrespective of whether or not they have a basis beyond the human mind. It seems to me that whatever system we decide to use must contain some rules. Otherwise our games will be...uninspiring. The issue that I see is that more than one system may be valid. Intuitionism, for example, does not include the law of excluded middle. It also does not include its negation. Thus, proofs in intuitionist logic have been compared to building houses using only nails, with no screws being included. Such houses do nothing to show that screws don't exist, or that they aren't useful; they merely show that they aren't absolutely necessary. Not all houses must be built using the same tools. But it does seem to me that we will make more progress on a particular house if we are not choosing to use a whole new set of tools every single day.

Yes, I remember when we learned how to construct reductiones ad absurdum in Logic, our teacher told us it's not elegant to overuse reductio proofs when there are other ones that can establish the same conclusion more economically.

 

I think we may agree that lots of people can give justifications of particular true beliefs of theirs. This is one reason why I oppose TAGers who say that the unbeliever cannot properly know anything. (They put too much weight on "properly".) As for how to justify the laws of logic themselves, I think we may be in agreement that by the nature of the case, they cannot be justified without using laws of logic in the justification. So they are axiomatic. And they are necessary parts of the framework of language and/or other systems of representation. And perhaps we're agreed that the laws of logic show their mettle as they enable us to draw inferences that stand up in case after case, over centuries and across cultures.

[disillusioned]

I think it's important to be clear on what work is being done by "firmly held." It can't be a qualifier of the subject's internal state of conviction. The madman has beliefs that he firmly holds are true. Rather, what matters is that the subject can explain the reason why the belief is true. The person who knows the reason is in a position to integrate that belief with other ones and build up a system, so that s/he has understanding of a field. That person can make further predictions, can repeat successful procedures more reliably, and so on. That person can also engage in intersubjective agreement with others. That's all part of language.

 

Excellent analysis.

 

I think we've made some really good progress here. I'm not sure if this is what the OP had in mind, but nevertheless, here we are. CTS? Others? Care to weigh in?

[ConsiderTheSource]

I don't have a lot to add.  All I know is that when decision points are processed through one's belief set before they are processed through one's knowledge set very odd, often inaccurate, and biased conclusions are the result. 

 

Any ideas on how we can get folks to process in the most effective.... the "correct" order?