Clergicide:

[Asimov]

Clergicide, in continuing our discussion, I would like to point out why I think the usage of belief as unjustified acceptance of the truth of something as inconsistent.

 

Here is how I view the spectrum:

 

Faith<-------Belief-------->Knowledge

 

If you were to draw a Venn Diagram, you would have truths on one side and beliefs overlapping on the other side...the overlap would be knowledge.

 

From observances of our discussion, I think the way you define belief is the way I define faith. Now, the reason why I think your usage of belief as inconsistent, is because of the lack of a neutral word.

 

Faith is clearly acceptance of something regardless of evidence or logic...and that is in the dictionary, btw.

 

Belief is accepting something as true (with or without justification).

Knowledge is accepting something as true, that is true, with justification that it is true.

 

This is basic epistemology.

 

If you disagree, I would like you to explain and rebut my definition of knowledge:

 

A justified true belief.

 

1. I believe x.

2. x is true.

3. I am justified in believing x.

 

Could you explain how we can have knowledge if we don't accept it as true? Could you explain how we can have knowledge if we cannot provide valid reasons for our accepting it as true?

 

Could you explain to me what is wrong with analyzing what we think we know and seeing if we can justify those beliefs and if those justified beliefs lead to a valid conclusion?

[Clergicide]

Clergicide, in continuing our discussion, I would like to point out why I think the usage of belief as unjustified acceptance of the truth of something as inconsistent.

 

Let’s see what we can do to reach a concession on these ideas.

 

Here is how I view the spectrum:

 

Faith<-------Belief-------->Knowledge

 

If you were to draw a Venn Diagram, you would have truths on one side and beliefs overlapping on the other side...the overlap would be knowledge.

 

We’ll need to establish exactly what the spectrum is before I can accurately construct a visual representation. It will look different depending on if we’re examining the basis for holding things true, or if we’re looking at the degrees of validity in holding things true.

 

The problem with that Venn Diagram is that where belief and truth overlap represents the few times opinions have panned out to be correct. Guessing correctly.

 

Truth can be viewed a couple ways. If truth is what has been observed, tested, and proven valid, then truth and knowledge are the ‘same’ circle. If truth is the actual state of matter, and we’re accepting that knowledge is incomplete, then truth is more like a circular target, and knowledge are points trying to approach the center. Belief, as a point, may appear on the target, but regardless of the position away from the center, even if the position is outside the target, that point is taken as the bulls-eye.

 

From observances of our discussion, I think the way you define belief is the way I define faith. Now, the reason why I think your usage of belief as inconsistent, is because of the lack of a neutral word.

 

The neutral words meaning ‘to think or infer without certain or strong evidence’ are: Surmise, Conjecture.

 

Faith is clearly acceptance of something regardless of evidence or logic...and that is in the dictionary, btw.

 

Which is why it’s synonymous with belief. Four of Nine possible definitions of faith are articulated with the word ‘belief’. This one in accordance to your definition of faith: belief that is not based on proof: He had faith that the hypothesis would be substantiated by fact.

 

This example is perfect at illustrating how faith/belief are a personal conviction of the truth of something. If this example was simple conjecture then it would be written ‘He is testing his hypothesis to see if his conjecture can be confirmed.’ This is also an example of bad science, bias encroaches when you presuppose, or have a personal investment in, the outcome.

 

Belief is accepting something as true (with or without justification).

Knowledge is accepting something as true, that is true, with justification that it is true.

 

What makes the last two statements of that definition of knowledge correct? What you’re pointing out is that that ‘something’ has been objectively tested and confirmed. Belief is different, because it’s a subjective proposition, and it’s at least uncertain if others will concur.

 

This is basic epistemology.

 

If you disagree, I would like you to explain and rebut my definition of knowledge:

 

A justified true belief.

 

1. I believe x.

2. x is true.

3. I am justified in believing x.

 

Um..1 and 2 are fine, but 3 is where it stops making sense. If you are ‘justified’ then x has been demonstrated or proven to be valid. So at the moment of justification you no longer believe it, you know it. Justification is what belief is lacking, once belief has that it becomes something else, something we call knowledge. Those two words are incompatible, and throwing true into the mix is just freaky.

 

The other problem with suggesting that knowledge is a belief that's been justified is the assertion that what is known started as a belief. In a few cases that may be true, but the root could be a conjecture, it could be experience, or something readily observable.

 

Could you explain how we can have knowledge if we don't accept it as true? Could you explain how we can have knowledge if we cannot provide valid reasons for our accepting it as true?

 

Why would I argue with what knowledge is? Something is known when it’s validated by evidence and proof, and we regard it as true because of that. I’m not comfortable with the word ‘true’, I prefer factual, but I can work with it.

 

Could you explain to me what is wrong with analyzing what we think we know and seeing if we can justify those beliefs and if those justified beliefs lead to a valid conclusion?

 

Are you going metaphysical on me again? Philosophy on ‘perception as the basis for knowledge’ is largely mental masturbation, and I see no reason to flirt with it. We’ve established rules of logic, reason, and tools by which to objectively determine reality. If you want to apply those to confirm for yourself what is considered fact, then knock yourself out. If you want to undermine the basis for knowledge by using certain philosophical precepts, then that’s a weird road you’re going to have to explore on your own.

[Asimov]

Here is how I view the spectrum:

 

Faith<-------Belief-------->Knowledge

 

If you were to draw a Venn Diagram, you would have truths on one side and beliefs overlapping on the other side...the overlap would be knowledge.

 

We’ll need to establish exactly what the spectrum is before I can accurately construct a visual representation. It will look different depending on if we’re examining the basis for holding things true, or if we’re looking at the degrees of validity in holding things true.

 

We are looking at the spectrum of belief, but I'll make my major points later on.

The problem with that Venn Diagram is that where belief and truth overlap represents the few times opinions have panned out to be correct. Guessing correctly.

 

No it doesn't. That isn't knowledge, Clergicide. Guessing correctly is just a guess and not knowledge.

 

Truth can be viewed a couple ways. If truth is what has been observed, tested, and proven valid, then truth and knowledge are the ‘same’ circle. If truth is the actual state of matter, and we’re accepting that knowledge is incomplete, then truth is more like a circular target, and knowledge are points trying to approach the center. Belief, as a point, may appear on the target, but regardless of the position away from the center, even if the position is outside the target, that point is taken as the bulls-eye.

 

Truth is the quality of a statement being logically valid.

 

Knowledge is a state of awareness of such truths and having valid reasons as to why they believe them.

 

Faith is clearly acceptance of something regardless of evidence or logic...and that is in the dictionary, btw.

 

Which is why it’s synonymous with belief. Four of Nine possible definitions of faith are articulated with the word ‘belief’. This one in accordance to your definition of faith: belief that is not based on proof: He had faith that the hypothesis would be substantiated by fact.

 

Or we could look at the synonyms of belief and see:

 

"2. assurance. Belief, certainty, conviction refer to acceptance of, or confidence in, an alleged fact or body of facts as true or right without positive knowledge or proof. Belief is such acceptance in general"

 

Which again fits with what I've been saying.

 

This example is perfect at illustrating how faith/belief are a personal conviction of the truth of something. If this example was simple conjecture then it would be written ‘He is testing his hypothesis to see if his conjecture can be confirmed.’

 

Conjecture meaning '1. the formation or expression of an opinion or theory without sufficient evidence for proof.'?

 

Sounds like belief to me.

 

What makes the last two statements of that definition of knowledge correct? What you’re pointing out is that that ‘something’ has been objectively tested and confirmed. Belief is different, because it’s a subjective proposition, and it’s at least uncertain if others will concur.

 

Belief is a subjective proposition. Truth is not. Knowledge combines the two.

 

Um..1 and 2 are fine, but 3 is where it stops making sense. If you are ‘justified’ then x has been demonstrated or proven to be valid. So at the moment of justification you no longer believe it, you know it.

 

Yes, that is the point, in breaking the term knowledge down you can state whether or not something is knowledge and whether or not something is belief.

 

If you propose "I know that 'Asimov is human'". I will ask you to support it. If you cannot support the statement that I am human then you do not hold knowledge. Even if it is true that I am a human, the very fact that you cannot support your own proposition means that you do not hold knowledge.

 

It is just coincidence that I happen to be human and that you happen to believe it.

 

Justification is what belief is lacking, once belief has that it becomes something else, something we call knowledge.

 

Yes...

 

Those two words are incompatible, and throwing true into the mix is just freaky.

 

I'm not equating the two and I don't understand where you think I'm equating knowledge with belief.

 

The other problem with suggesting that knowledge is a belief that's been justified is the assertion that what is known started as a belief. In a few cases that may be true, but the root could be a conjecture, it could be experience, or something readily observable.

 

Knowledge is a cognitive process of reasoning. So far, I see no difference between conjecture and belief, experience provides us with information that we can use in order to know something. Every bit of reasoning we do starts out as an idea or a concept. If we think that concept is true, then we are demonstrating a belief. If we think that concept is true, we can demonstrate its truth and this can be validated as true, then we have knowledge.

 

Something is known when it’s validated by evidence and proof, and we regard it as true because of that. I’m not comfortable with the word ‘true’, I prefer factual, but I can work with it.

 

Facts are empirical bits of data that we use in order to form knowledge.

 

"Something is known when it’s validated by evidence and proof, and we regard it as true because of that."

 

This appears to be circular...it's known when it's validated by evidence and proof, and we know it because it's been validated by evidence and proof.

 

Knowledge is individual. You don't know something unless you can offer valid reasoning as to why you regard it as true.

 

Are you going metaphysical on me again? Philosophy on ‘perception as the basis for knowledge’ is largely mental masturbation, and I see no reason to flirt with it. We’ve established rules of logic, reason, and tools by which to objectively determine reality. If you want to apply those to confirm for yourself what is considered fact, then knock yourself out. If you want to undermine the basis for knowledge by using certain philosophical precepts, then that’s a weird road you’re going to have to explore on your own.

 

Where did I say that "perception is the basis for knowledge'?

[Clergicide]

The problem with that Venn Diagram is that where belief and truth overlap represents the few times opinions have panned out to be correct. Guessing correctly.

 

No it doesn't. That isn't knowledge, Clergicide. Guessing correctly is just a guess and not knowledge.

 

I’m not saying it’s knowledge, I’m saying it’s guessing correctly. Belief isn’t based empirical evidence so the probability of it being accurate is low. So on a Venn diagram the overlap is necessarily only belief, that against all odds, has turned out to be true.

 

Truth can be viewed a couple ways. If truth is what has been observed, tested, and proven valid, then truth and knowledge are the ‘same’ circle. If truth is the actual state of matter, and we’re accepting that knowledge is incomplete, then truth is more like a circular target, and knowledge are points trying to approach the center. Belief, as a point, may appear on the target, but regardless of the position away from the center, even if the position is outside the target, that point is taken as the bulls-eye.

 

Truth is the quality of a statement being logically valid.

Knowledge is a state of awareness of such truths and having valid reasons as to why they believe them.

 

No, truth is the actual state of matter. It is the actuality, or reality.

 

Knowledge and belief are the basis for regarding something as true. We hold it true because…. And the answer for both is very different in nature. The circular target is the best explanation I have.

 

 

Faith is clearly acceptance of something regardless of evidence or logic...and that is in the dictionary, btw.

 

Which is why it’s synonymous with belief. Four of Nine possible definitions of faith are articulated with the word ‘belief’. This one in accordance to your definition of faith: belief that is not based on proof: He had faith that the hypothesis would be substantiated by fact.

 

Or we could look at the synonyms of belief and see:

 

"2. assurance. Belief, certainty, conviction refer to acceptance of, or confidence in, an alleged fact or body of facts as true or right without positive knowledge or proof. Belief is such acceptance in general"

 

Which again fits with what I've been saying.

 

Conviction, and certainty are what makes the term belief unique from conjecture. Not only is there no evidence to support the position, but this also shows an unreasonable attachment to the position.

 

 

 

What makes the last two statements of that definition of knowledge correct? What you’re pointing out is that that ‘something’ has been objectively tested and confirmed. Belief is different, because it’s a subjective proposition, and it’s at least uncertain if others will concur.

 

Belief is a subjective proposition. Truth is not. Knowledge combines the two.

 

Ack! No, knowledge is a proposition too, it’s just grounded in more than unreasonable conviction.

 

 

Um..1 and 2 are fine, but 3 is where it stops making sense. If you are ‘justified’ then x has been demonstrated or proven to be valid. So at the moment of justification you no longer believe it, you know it.

 

Yes, that is the point, in breaking the term knowledge down you can state whether or not something is knowledge and whether or not something is belief.

 

I would say that only in examining why something is held true can we determine whether or not it is a belief or knowledge or a conjecture.

 

If you propose "I know that 'Asimov is human'". I will ask you to support it. If you cannot support the statement that I am human then you do not hold knowledge. Even if it is true that I am a human, the very fact that you cannot support your own proposition means that you do not hold knowledge.

 

Correct, if I cannot prove it then it is not based in knowledge.

 

It is just coincidence that I happen to be human and that you happen to believe it.

 

This is that overlap we talked about.

 

 

Justification is what belief is lacking, once belief has that it becomes something else, something we call knowledge.

 

Yes...

Those two words are incompatible, and throwing true into the mix is just freaky.

 

 

I'm not equating the two and I don't understand where you think I'm equating knowledge with belief.

 

‘Justified true belief’ is what you said was a definition of knowledge. But the phrase makes no sense. It’s like saying Real Homemade Processed Food.

 

 

The other problem with suggesting that knowledge is a belief that's been justified is the assertion that what is known started as a belief. In a few cases that may be true, but the root could be a conjecture, it could be experience, or something readily observable.

 

Knowledge is a cognitive process of reasoning. So far, I see no difference between conjecture and belief, experience provides us with information that we can use in order to know something. Every bit of reasoning we do starts out as an idea or a concept. If we think that concept is true, then we are demonstrating a belief. If we think that concept is true, we can demonstrate its truth and this can be validated as true, then we have knowledge.

 

The difference is the level of conviction by most definitions. Belief tends to lend itself to those ‘faith’ type meanings.

 

The rest of the explanation of belief omitted from your reference is “CERTAINTY indicates unquestioning belief and positiveness in one's own mind that something is true: I know this for a certainty. CONVICTION is settled, profound, or earnest belief that something is right: a conviction that a decision is just”

 

That’s a bit more than simple conjecture.

 

 

Something is known when it’s validated by evidence and proof, and we regard it as true because of that. I’m not comfortable with the word ‘true’, I prefer factual, but I can work with it.

 

Facts are empirical bits of data that we use in order to form knowledge.

 

"Something is known when it’s validated by evidence and proof, and we regard it as true because of that."

 

This appears to be circular...it's known when it's validated by evidence and proof, and we know it because it's been validated by evidence and proof.

 

Knowledge is individual. You don't know something unless you can offer valid reasoning as to why you regard it as true.

 

Whoops, I was in a conference call while I was writing this. Knowledge is holding something true because it’s been validated by evidence and proof, is what I actually meant. And truth scientifically is only a point we can approximate.

 

 

Are you going metaphysical on me again? Philosophy on ‘perception as the basis for knowledge’ is largely mental masturbation, and I see no reason to flirt with it. We’ve established rules of logic, reason, and tools by which to objectively determine reality. If you want to apply those to confirm for yourself what is considered fact, then knock yourself out. If you want to undermine the basis for knowledge by using certain philosophical precepts, then that’s a weird road you’re going to have to explore on your own.

 

Where did I say that "perception is the basis for knowledge'?

You said “analyzing what we think we know” which is from that school of thought. It appears I misunderstood you.

[♦ ficino ♦]

Clergicide, what if we substituted "opinion" for "belief"? Would you agree that people have various opinions, that these opinions possess varying degrees of epistemic certainty, that a true opinion, for the truth of which one can give a reasoned account (a justification), counts as knowledge?

 

People who work on ancient Greek philosophy tend to translate the word "doxa" sometimes as opinion, sometimes as belief. The Theaetetus is a famous discussion of what we mean by knowledge. No definition finally wins the day, but the closest we get is "justified true belief." You can translate that also as "justified true opinion."

 

Socrates' general method in the putative early dialogues of Plato is to get his interlocutor to examine whether the interlocutor's system of beliefs or opinions is coherent. In every case, it's not. So the interlocutor knows that one or more of his own beliefs/opinions must be false. A belief or opinion that stands up under repeated investigation and scrutiny, like Socrates' belief that it's better to suffer injustice than to inflict injustice, comes the closest to knowledge of anything Socrates is willing to admit. I say this to draw a distinction between belief/opinion and knowledge, not necessarily to agree with the views about suffering that Plato attributes to Socrates.

 

The point I'm making is that Asimov has to be right about belief, faith and knowledge. I think you have to distinguish between belief/opinion and faith. otherwise, it becomes hard to give an account of what happens when some piece of our thought set becomes qualified to be held as knowledge.

 

Augustine says things like the atheist has faith, too, as for example when he sits down and has faith that the chair will support him and not collapse. I say that this is not an example of the theological virtue of faith; it's an example of belief/opinion, and of a pretty strong opinion, I may add. Augustine and Christians like him fall into an equivocation fallacy when they trot out examples of strongly supported opinions like this and claim they are examples of what they mean by faith.

[Clergicide]

Clergicide, what if we substituted "opinion" for "belief"? Would you agree that people have various opinions, that these opinions possess varying degrees of epistemic certainty, that a true opinion, for the truth of which one can give a reasoned account (a justification), counts as knowledge?

 

People who work on ancient Greek philosophy tend to translate the word "doxa" sometimes as opinion, sometimes as belief. The Theaetetus is a famous discussion of what we mean by knowledge. No definition finally wins the day, but the closest we get is "justified true belief." You can translate that also as "justified true opinion."

 

Is it a Christian's opinion that there is a God? Or is there more to it than that? Of course there is. Yes, we can reduce the meaning of belief to opinion...kind of. But that's not the context we're looking for. That form of belief is like saying "I believe the bus arrives at 5pm." it's a way saying I think this, but in a non-commital fashion. You've seen the Christians that come here, do you hold that this is what they mean by they believe? Of course not, that would be silly.

 

Justified true opinion...listen to yourself. We have lots of working definitions of what knowledge is, and they are far more sensible than that.

 

Socrates' general method in the putative early dialogues of Plato is to get his interlocutor to examine whether the interlocutor's system of beliefs or opinions is coherent. In every case, it's not. So the interlocutor knows that one or more of his own beliefs/opinions must be false. A belief or opinion that stands up under repeated investigation and scrutiny, like Socrates' belief that it's better to suffer injustice than to inflict injustice, comes the closest to knowledge of anything Socrates is willing to admit. I say this to draw a distinction between belief/opinion and knowledge, not necessarily to agree with the views about suffering that Plato attributes to Socrates.

 

Oh how I despise philosophy. What I'm reading from this however is that belief collapses under close scrutiny, and challenges. Probably because a belief isn't grounded in proof...hmm? And a belief that stands up to repeated investigation approximates knowledge.

 

I would say that this belief that has been tested repeatedly and is still observabley correct is no longer a belief it all. After this rigourous testing it is now categorically 'knowledge'. I would further add this knowledge actually approximates truth.

 

The point I'm making is that Asimov has to be right about belief, faith and knowledge. I think you have to distinguish between belief/opinion and faith. otherwise, it becomes hard to give an account of what happens when some piece of our thought set becomes qualified to be held as knowledge.

 

There's no reason at all that he has to be correct. Belief and Faith can very easily be interchangeable terms and still have no bearing on what knowledge is. Both terms could cease to exist altogether, and we could still qualify the whole gambit of thought right up to the point it is considered knowledge. If you think this isn't the case, please explain why not.

 

Augustine says things like the atheist has faith, too, as for example when he sits down and has faith that the chair will support him and not collapse. I say that this is not an example of the theological virtue of faith; it's an example of belief/opinion, and of a pretty strong opinion, I may add. Augustine and Christians like him fall into an equivocation fallacy when they trot out examples of strongly supported opinions like this and claim they are examples of what they mean by faith.

 

Of course they do. It's the same fallacy as using belief to mean opinion in a theological discussion where that clearly isn't the agreed upon meaning. Which is pretty much my point.

[Asimov]

1. I’m not saying it’s knowledge, I’m saying it’s guessing correctly. Belief isn’t based empirical evidence so the probability of it being accurate is low. So on a Venn diagram the overlap is necessarily only belief, that against all odds, has turned out to be true.

 

2. No, truth is the actual state of matter. It is the actuality, or reality.

 

Knowledge and belief are the basis for regarding something as true. We hold it true because…. And the answer for both is very different in nature. The circular target is the best explanation I have.

 

1. No, on a Venn diagram the overlap is knowledge.

 

2. Reality is the actual state of matter. Truths are logical propositions congruent with reality.

 

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/truth

Definition 2

 

The basis for regarding something as true is logic.

 

The “we hold it true because…” is the justification.

 

Example:

 

I hold x true because I feel it in my heart that it is true….is a demonstration of faith.

 

I hold x true because these lines of evidence indicate consistency with my belief, even though I can’t prove it…is a demonstration of belief.

 

I hold x true because ‘if p, then q. P, therefore Q’…is a demonstration of knowledge.

 

Conviction, and certainty are what makes the term belief unique from conjecture. Not only is there no evidence to support the position, but this also shows an unreasonable attachment to the position.

 

Why? Can we not have conviction and certainty in regards to knowledge or conjecture? And if there is evidence to support the position, but it can’t be proved (such as in science and other inductive claims) then we still hold to the idea because it best fits the evidence? We call that justified belief. The only problem is that we cannot validate our conclusions as true in a deductive manner.

 

Ack! No, knowledge is a proposition too, it’s just grounded in more than unreasonable conviction.

 

Knowledge isn’t a proposition, knowledge is what we have when we’ve justified our propositions and have validated them. Conviction isn’t mutually exclusive from knowledge.

 

I would say that only in examining why something is held true can we determine whether or not it is a belief or knowledge or a conjecture.

 

Conjecture and belief are the same thing, but yes.

 

Justification is what belief is lacking, once belief has that it becomes something else, something we call knowledge.

 

Yes...

Those two words are incompatible, and throwing true into the mix is just freaky.

 

Know, because justification only serves to show why we believe what we believe. We still need to validate our conclusions in order to show that they are true.

 

I see…so “just freaky” is an adequate rebuttal to thousands of years of epistemological study.

 

‘Justified true belief’ is what you said was a definition of knowledge. But the phrase makes no sense. It’s like saying Real Homemade Processed Food.

 

No it isn’t. I’ve defined my terms. You then state that my definition of knowledge is incompatible based on how you define your own terms.

 

Shifting the goalposts.

 

Belief: Acceptance of the truth of something.

Justification: Logical deduction.

True: Congruent with reality.

 

The difference is the level of conviction by most definitions. Belief tends to lend itself to those ‘faith’ type meanings.

 

Again, how does the level of conviction change anything? I am really 100% certain that 1+1=2. That is extreme conviction. I can justify my belief that 1+1=2 and it is true that 1+1=2.

 

Only in religious circles does belief lend itself to “faith type meanings”

 

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/belief

Definitions 3 or 4.

 

The rest of the explanation of belief omitted from your reference is “CERTAINTY indicates unquestioning belief and positiveness in one's own mind that something is true: I know this for a certainty. CONVICTION is settled, profound, or earnest belief that something is right: a conviction that a decision is just”

 

That’s a bit more than simple conjecture.

 

So? It still isn’t incompatible. Like I said, you can be 100% certain of anything and it can be true or false.

 

Whoops, I was in a conference call while I was writing this. Knowledge is holding something true because it’s been validated by evidence and proof, is what I actually meant.

 

I see nothing in any definition which indicates conformity to what you have just said.

 

Merriam-Webster defines it:

 

1 a : awareness or understanding esp. of an act, a fact, or the truth

 

 

Clergicide, what if we substituted "opinion" for "belief"? Would you agree that people have various opinions, that these opinions possess varying degrees of epistemic certainty, that a true opinion, for the truth of which one can give a reasoned account (a justification), counts as knowledge?

 

I would consider that a semantical fallacy. Opinion is belief.

[♦ ficino ♦]

Clergicide, what if we substituted "opinion" for "belief"? Would you agree that people have various opinions, that these opinions possess varying degrees of epistemic certainty, that a true opinion, for the truth of which one can give a reasoned account (a justification), counts as knowledge?

 

I would consider that a semantical fallacy. Opinion is belief.

 

My italics. Asimov, where's the fallacy? I treated opinion and belief as having the same meaning.

[Asimov]

Clergicide, what if we substituted "opinion" for "belief"? Would you agree that people have various opinions, that these opinions possess varying degrees of epistemic certainty, that a true opinion, for the truth of which one can give a reasoned account (a justification), counts as knowledge?

 

I would consider that a semantical fallacy. Opinion is belief.

 

My italics. Asimov, where's the fallacy? I treated opinion and belief as having the same meaning.

 

My bad, ficino. I'll be careful to read more clearly next time.

[Clergicide]

1. No, on a Venn diagram the overlap is knowledge.

 

2. Reality is the actual state of matter. Truths are logical propositions congruent with reality.

 

Truth is both, unfortunately.

 

If we accept that truth is the actual state of matter(Webster's 2A(2)), then Webster's knowledge 2C sounds very much like what you say of truth: the circumstance or condition of apprehending truth or fact through reasoning:

 

Why? Can we not have conviction and certainty in regards to knowledge or conjecture?

 

You can, but it's not inherent in the definition is the point.

 

 

I see…so “just freaky” is an adequate rebuttal to thousands of years of epistemological study.

 

Ah, herein lies the real problem. I haven't been approaching this discussion from the epistemological standpoint. As a school of thought in philosophy, it has it's own unique working definition of belief that doesn't match the one in the standard lexicon. The same is true of 'justified true belief', which may be a well reasoned construct within the epistemological context. The meanings of both are context specific, and as such I cannot objectively refute them. This is why I wanted to avoid making this a philisophical discussion, and see if objective sense could be made of these ideas, rather than deferring to established schools of thought.

 

Give me the evening to study what I can on epistemology and I will see if it's possible to ressurect my argument from within it's context.

[Asimov]

Give me the evening to study what I can on epistemology and I will see if it's possible to ressurect my argument from within it's context.

 

By all means.

 

philosophypages.com is a good website.

 

They have this to say on knowledge:

 

http://philosophypages.com/dy/k9.htm#know

[Clergicide]

 

A justified true belief.

 

1. I believe x.

2. x is true.

3. I am justified in believing x.

 

 

What I've discovered thus far is that:

 

If Asimov's belief that x is inferred from a falsehood, then JTB is falsified altogether.

 

If Asimov is justified in believing x, but x is false, and x' is true, then JTB is falsified altogether.

(x' is another instance of x unknown to Asimov)

[Asimov]

 

A justified true belief.

 

1. I believe x.

2. x is true.

3. I am justified in believing x.

 

 

What I've discovered thus far is that:

 

If Asimov's belief that x is inferred from a falsehood, then JTB is falsified altogether.

 

If Asimov is justified in believing x, but x is false, and x' is true, then JTB is falsified altogether.

(x' is another instance of x unknown to Asimov)

 

Do you have any problems with those?

[Clergicide]

 

A justified true belief.

 

1. I believe x.

2. x is true.

3. I am justified in believing x.

 

 

What I've discovered thus far is that:

 

If Asimov's belief that x is inferred from a falsehood, then JTB is falsified altogether.

 

If Asimov is justified in believing x, but x is false, and x' is true, then JTB is falsified altogether.

(x' is another instance of x unknown to Asimov)

 

Do you have any problems with those?

 

No, but I thought you might. If knowledge is JTB, then every instance instance of JTB should yield a 'known'. Here I've provided possibilities where JTB will not yield a 'known'. So epistemologically truth, belief, and justification are not sufficient for knowledge.

[Asimov]

No, but I thought you might. If knowledge is JTB, then every instance instance of JTB should yield a 'known'. Here I've provided possibilities where JTB will not yield a 'known'. So epistemologically truth, belief, and justification are not sufficient for knowledge.

 

I don't see how you make that connection.

[Clergicide]

No, but I thought you might. If knowledge is JTB, then every instance instance of JTB should yield a 'known'. Here I've provided possibilities where JTB will not yield a 'known'. So epistemologically truth, belief, and justification are not sufficient for knowledge.

 

I don't see how you make that connection.

 

Which part are you questioning?

[Asimov]

No, but I thought you might. If knowledge is JTB, then every instance instance of JTB should yield a 'known'. Here I've provided possibilities where JTB will not yield a 'known'. So epistemologically truth, belief, and justification are not sufficient for knowledge.

 

I don't see how you make that connection.

 

Which part are you questioning?

 

"So epistemologically truth, belief, and justification are not sufficient for knowledge."

[Clergicide]

No, but I thought you might. If knowledge is JTB, then every instance instance of JTB should yield a 'known'. Here I've provided possibilities where JTB will not yield a 'known'. So epistemologically truth, belief, and justification are not sufficient for knowledge.

 

I don't see how you make that connection.

 

Which part are you questioning?

 

"So epistemologically truth, belief, and justification are not sufficient for knowledge."

 

The counter-examples are proof of that. In those counter-examples you have truth, belief and justification, but you do not have knowledge.

[Asimov]

No, but I thought you might. If knowledge is JTB, then every instance instance of JTB should yield a 'known'. Here I've provided possibilities where JTB will not yield a 'known'. So epistemologically truth, belief, and justification are not sufficient for knowledge.

 

I don't see how you make that connection.

 

Which part are you questioning?

 

"So epistemologically truth, belief, and justification are not sufficient for knowledge."

 

The counter-examples are proof of that. In those counter-examples you have truth, belief and justification, but you do not have knowledge.

 

How?

[Clergicide]

No, but I thought you might. If knowledge is JTB, then every instance instance of JTB should yield a 'known'. Here I've provided possibilities where JTB will not yield a 'known'. So epistemologically truth, belief, and justification are not sufficient for knowledge.

 

I don't see how you make that connection.

 

Which part are you questioning?

 

"So epistemologically truth, belief, and justification are not sufficient for knowledge."

 

The counter-examples are proof of that. In those counter-examples you have truth, belief and justification, but you do not have knowledge.

 

How?

 

LOL I guess you want more of an example than the logical statement that represents it. The second one is the easiest.

 

If Asimov is justified in believing x, but x is false, and x' is true, then JTB is falsified altogether.

(x' is another instance of x unknown to Asimov)

 

You look out the window and you see a tree. So you propose:

 

There is a tree over there.

 

You directly observe this tree. Only that, unkown to you, the tree is synthetic in every detail, but is a perfect replica of the real thing. Behind that tree, unseen by and unknown to you, is a real tree. You believe there is a tree over there, by direct observation you are justified in believing so, and there is in reality a tree over there. This is a JTB, but it is not an example of knowledge.

[Asimov]

If Asimov is justified in believing x, but x is false, and x' is true, then JTB is falsified altogether.

(x' is another instance of x unknown to Asimov)

 

Ok, so:

 

1. I believe x.

2. x is false.

3. I am justified in believing x.

 

That is not knowledge.

 

The true part would be an objective statement, if it's not a tree and I perceive it to be one then my information is wrong.

 

There is a tree over there.

 

That's an ambiguous statement.

 

You directly observe this tree. Only that, unkown to you, the tree is synthetic in every detail, but is a perfect replica of the real thing. Behind that tree, unseen by and unknown to you, is a real tree. You believe there is a tree over there, by direct observation you are justified in believing so, and there is in reality a tree over there. This is a JTB, but it is not an example of knowledge.

 

Yea, but you could be looking at a forest of trees and say "there is a tree over there". If the tree you are speaking of in the forest is the only fake one, the happenstance of there being actual trees over there is irrelevant since you are intending a specific tree.

 

 

IOW, it is only coincidence that you are right.

[Clergicide]

If Asimov is justified in believing x, but x is false, and x' is true, then JTB is falsified altogether.

(x' is another instance of x unknown to Asimov)

 

Ok, so:

 

1. I believe x.

2. x is false.

3. I am justified in believing x.

 

That is not knowledge.

 

The true part would be an objective statement, if it's not a tree and I perceive it to be one then my information is wrong.

 

X is true because in reality there is a tree over there. Your false perception of a tree is entirely the point. The rules are outlined: 1. believe there is a tree over there. 2 it is true there is a tree over there 3. by direct observation you are justified in believing there is a tree over there.

 

Whether you were decieved or not is moot. The conditions of JTB have been met. The fact that you were decieved just eliminates it as an instance of knowledge.

 

There is a tree over there.

 

That's an ambiguous statement.

 

It's a simple proposition. And it's fair.

 

You directly observe this tree. Only that, unkown to you, the tree is synthetic in every detail, but is a perfect replica of the real thing. Behind that tree, unseen by and unknown to you, is a real tree. You believe there is a tree over there, by direct observation you are justified in believing so, and there is in reality a tree over there. This is a JTB, but it is not an example of knowledge.

 

Yea, but you could be looking at a forest of trees and say "there is a tree over there". If the tree you are speaking of in the forest is the only fake one, the happenstance of there being actual trees over there is irrelevant since you are intending a specific tree.

 

It's not irrelevant. The proposition wasn't specific to 'that tree'. In your example you are aware of other real trees in proximity to the fake one, which makes it a JTB and an instance of knowledge. You've identified that if we remove all the real trees it is simply a justifed belief. Adding a real tree makes it true, and an instance of knowledge. Adding a real tree that is unobserved and unkown, makes it true, but not instance of knowledge.

 

IOW, it is only coincidence that you are right.

 

A lucky guess isn't a satisfactory instance of knowledge. And that's the point. It is epistemologically unacceptable to have knowledge as a result of luck.

 

The proposition was concocted to exploit that exact weakness of JTB. If JTB is knowledge is true, then no such proposition should be possible. But they are. Gettier who first exploited it, has far more complicated counter-examples. His are pretty cool because they allow you attack all 3 conditions.

[Asimov]

X is true because in reality there is a tree over there. Your false perception of a tree is entirely the point. The rules are outlined: 1. believe there is a tree over there. 2 it is true there is a tree over there 3. by direct observation you are justified in believing there is a tree over there.

 

But you aren't because you don't directly observe a tree over there. You observe a fake tree in front of a real tree.

[Clergicide]

X is true because in reality there is a tree over there. Your false perception of a tree is entirely the point. The rules are outlined: 1. believe there is a tree over there. 2 it is true there is a tree over there 3. by direct observation you are justified in believing there is a tree over there.

 

But you aren't because you don't directly observe a tree over there. You observe a fake tree in front of a real tree.

 

It doesn't matter. You directly observed something directly observable as a tree, and that's strong enough evidence for justification.

[Asimov]

It doesn't matter. You directly observed something directly observable as a tree, and that's strong enough evidence for justification.

 

According to whom?