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I Had A Thought About Miracles And I Want Some Comments


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Extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof

 

I've heard of another version, not as "elegant" but I think it's more specific:

 

"...no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish..."

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Extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof

 

I've heard of another version, not as "elegant" but I think it's more specific:

 

"...no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish..."

That was Hume if I'm not mistaken. His positions have been shown to be invalid. Here is a good start - Hume's Abject Failure

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That was Hume if I'm not mistaken. His positions have been shown to be invalid. Here is a good start - Hume's Abject Failure

Standford's Philosophy department's view on Earman's argument:

Bayesian Analyses of Hume's Argument Concerning Miracles

 

There are various versions of Bayes's theorem. For example, John Earman (1993:307n4) employs the following:

 

Pr(H/E&K) =

Pr(H/K) × Pr(E/H&K)

Pr(E/K)

 

“The reader is invited to think of H as a hypothesis at issue; K as the background knowledge; and E as the additional evidence. Pr(H/E&K) is called the posterior probability of H. Pr(H/K) and Pr(E/H&K) are respectively called the prior probability of H and the (posterior) likelihood of E.”

 

Bayesian analyses are prominent among the several recent and allegedly novel interpretations of Hume's argument against the justified belief in miracles. However, since there is no consensus on just what Hume's argument is, or exactly what he is trying to establish, it is impossible that any Bayesian analysis, let alone a “Bayesian proof” of that argument, or a recasting of the argument in terms of some version of Bayes's theorem, will not beg crucial issues of interpretation. In so doing, such analyses, in and of themselves, will also beg fundamental epistemological issues concerning, for example, evidence. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how recasting Hume's argument in a Bayesian form can clarify the structure or substance of the argument without presupposing what the argument is.

 

On the interpretation of Hume's argument given above, a Bayesian analysis sheds no light whatsoever on the structure or substance of the argument, and can do nothing by way of either supporting or refuting the argument. Indeed, any Bayesian analysis of the question of justified belief in miracles must be otiose until the difficult and essential questions concerning “evidence” in relation to an allegedly miraculous occurrence are resolved — at which point any Bayesian analysis will add little except the technical complexity of a formal apparatus that may or may not “clarify” the structure of Hume's argument.

 

The balancing of probabilities is of no use until it is decided what goes into the balance — that is, what constitutes the evidence that is to be subject to the balancing of probabilities. The point is this; apart from independent philosophical arguments — arguments that would in effect undermine the relevance of a Bayesian analysis to the question of the credibility of reports of the miraculous — no such analysis can, in principle, prove that no testimony can (or cannot) establish the credibility of a miracle. So-called Bayesian analyses of Hume's argument are not analyses of Hume's argument at all — but superfluous representations of it.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/miracles/

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Extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof

 

I've heard of another version, not as "elegant" but I think it's more specific:

 

"...no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish..."

That was Hume if I'm not mistaken. His positions have been shown to be invalid. Here is a good start - Hume's Abject Failure

I looked up the book, read a few portions and commentaries, and I'm not sure what you mean by "invalid." He states that Hume was "unoriginal" but does not go so far as to say "miracles happen" or to state what miracles have happend. He also does not get into what kind of evidence would be acceptable, and that is precisely what is at question above.

 

Perhaps you could elaborate (as Ouroboros has done by using the Beysian Analyses of Hume's argument concerning miracles. It seems you like the title of the book, but you are misusing the book by attributing to it your own opinions, which it does not seem to support.

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That was Hume if I'm not mistaken. His positions have been shown to be invalid. Here is a good start - Hume's Abject Failure

Standford's Philosophy department's view on Earman's argument:

Bayesian Analyses of Hume's Argument Concerning Miracles

 

There are various versions of Bayes's theorem. For example, John Earman (1993:307n4) employs the following:

 

Pr(H/E&K) =

Pr(H/K) × Pr(E/H&K)

Pr(E/K)

 

“The reader is invited to think of H as a hypothesis at issue; K as the background knowledge; and E as the additional evidence. Pr(H/E&K) is called the posterior probability of H. Pr(H/K) and Pr(E/H&K) are respectively called the prior probability of H and the (posterior) likelihood of E.”

 

Bayesian analyses are prominent among the several recent and allegedly novel interpretations of Hume's argument against the justified belief in miracles. However, since there is no consensus on just what Hume's argument is, or exactly what he is trying to establish, it is impossible that any Bayesian analysis, let alone a “Bayesian proof” of that argument, or a recasting of the argument in terms of some version of Bayes's theorem, will not beg crucial issues of interpretation. In so doing, such analyses, in and of themselves, will also beg fundamental epistemological issues concerning, for example, evidence. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how recasting Hume's argument in a Bayesian form can clarify the structure or substance of the argument without presupposing what the argument is.

 

On the interpretation of Hume's argument given above, a Bayesian analysis sheds no light whatsoever on the structure or substance of the argument, and can do nothing by way of either supporting or refuting the argument. Indeed, any Bayesian analysis of the question of justified belief in miracles must be otiose until the difficult and essential questions concerning “evidence” in relation to an allegedly miraculous occurrence are resolved — at which point any Bayesian analysis will add little except the technical complexity of a formal apparatus that may or may not “clarify” the structure of Hume's argument.

 

The balancing of probabilities is of no use until it is decided what goes into the balance — that is, what constitutes the evidence that is to be subject to the balancing of probabilities. The point is this; apart from independent philosophical arguments — arguments that would in effect undermine the relevance of a Bayesian analysis to the question of the credibility of reports of the miraculous — no such analysis can, in principle, prove that no testimony can (or cannot) establish the credibility of a miracle. So-called Bayesian analyses of Hume's argument are not analyses of Hume's argument at all — but superfluous representations of it.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/miracles/

Thanks.

 

The first thing they seem to be saying is Hume has no argument. The second thing they say is not that Earman's reasoning is wrong, but rather that we need to define evidence first. Well Okay. That is pretty obvious. I don't see how their words are very insightful.

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Extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof

 

I've heard of another version, not as "elegant" but I think it's more specific:

 

"...no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish..."

That was Hume if I'm not mistaken. His positions have been shown to be invalid. Here is a good start - Hume's Abject Failure

I looked up the book, read a few portions and commentaries, and I'm not sure what you mean by "invalid." He states that Hume was "unoriginal" but does not go so far as to say "miracles happen" or to state what miracles have happend. He also does not get into what kind of evidence would be acceptable, and that is precisely what is at question above.

 

Perhaps you could elaborate (as Ouroboros has done by using the Beysian Analyses of Hume's argument concerning miracles. It seems you like the title of the book, but you are misusing the book by attributing to it your own opinions, which it does not seem to support.

I did provide an explanation of conditional probability in a reply Valkyrie0010. It explains the notion of conditional probability with out resorting to probability theory. Intuitively the idea is straight forward. Understanding the notion of a conditional probability is fundamental to understanding Baye's Theorem and Bayesian Inference. The simplest statement of the Theorem can be found here. Notice the form used by Earman includes background knowledge otherwise it is the same.

 

Here is a more structured analysis. You will notice no where do we have specific numbers plugged in because the idea behind the argument can be made with out the numbers.

 

(1) P(M/E&K) = (P(M/K) × P(E/M&K))/P(E/K)

P(M) = equals the marginal probability a miracle occurred, which is what we are interested in

P(E) = equals the marginal probability of some new evidence occurring, this is the probability some evidence would occur all by itself with or with out a miracle

P(K) = equals the marginal probability of the state of affairs being as we find it, an example of background information would be that there exists the supernatural

 

Marginal probability is simply the probability something occurs independently of anything else occurring and is not of much interest to us since it does not further the discussion.

 

P(X/Y) = of course equals the probability of X given Y has occurred. This is a form that captures what would happen given some dependency of X on Y.

 

Looking at (1) you can see that P(M/E&K) will increase either with P(E/K) becoming smaller or (P(M/K) × P(E/M&K)) becoming larger so logically the book does support my point, which is that the probability of the miracle needs to be evaluated in context and not simply by question begging(can't happen because it is impossible :lol: ). Now I agree (1) does not do much for us beyond demonstrating that Hume was being simplistic. For example, how do we get P(M/K), we can't really. Still it shows the dependence on outside information beyond P(M).

 

 

Here take a look at the Odd's Form of Baye's Theorem. (scroll down)

 

I can place (1) into the odds form.

(2) P(M|E&K)/P(~M|E&K) = P(M/K)/P(~M/K) × P(E|M&K)/P(E|~M&K)

 

If P(M|E&K)/P(~M|E&K)>.5 then it is more likely the miracle will occur given E and K. The reason this form is valuable is because we can see that P(M/K)/P(~M/K) can be dominated by P(E|M&K)/P(E|~M&K). It is important to note that P(E|M&K)/P(E|~M&K) is about the likelihood of the evidence occurring with a miracle or with out a miracle. In a nut shell this captures the idea that you can not just claim some idea like "the disciples all hallucinated" and leave it at that. You have to evaluate how likely it(hallucination) is to have occurred.

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Here take a look at the Odd's Form of Baye's Theorem. (scroll down)

 

I can place (1) into the odds form.

(2) P(M|E&K)/P(~M|E&K) = P(M/K)/P(~M/K) × P(E|M&K)/P(E|~M&K)

 

If P(M|E&K)/P(~M|E&K)>.5 then it is more likely the miracle will occur given E and K. The reason this form is valuable is because we can see that P(M/K)/P(~M/K) can be dominated by P(E|M&K)/P(E|~M&K). It is important to note that P(E|M&K)/P(E|~M&K) is about the likelihood of the evidence occurring with a miracle or with out a miracle. In a nut shell this captures the idea that you can not just claim some idea like "the disciples all hallucinated" and leave it at that. You have to evaluate how likely it(hallucination) is to have occurred.

Have you read, Michael Martin's book, "Atheism: A Philosophical Justification"?

 

The following analysis of the use of Baye's Theorem is illustrative (but not from the book). You surely realize that the probability distribution depends on assigned probabilities?

 

One thing to point out, besides the fact many people throw around probability incorrectly, but in the area of statistics we have to keep in mind the only real alternative is a frequentist approach (parametric testing can be used to, but it applies to unique cases of non-distributions). The frequentist inference is limited, however, to the design of the analysis, to put it simply. If there can be a distribution derived from data, then we can use our statistical methods. Bayesian inferences, on the other hand, can be applied to conditional statements that have nothing to really do with distributions. It is in this view we have to keep in mind the utter subjectivity of the claims.

 

Now, what makes Bayesian inferences useful is the fact we can take "educated guesses" from people who actually know what they're talking about. When we lack data, it is good to be able to rationalize what kind of probability we might expect. It is in this way that expert opinion can be utilized in an analysis, even though it is not technical in any sense of data (and the differences once we have data really show Bayesian to be no better than frequentist models).

 

I would not want people to walk away from this thinking Bayesian inferences or conditional probabilities are incorrectly applied outside of distribution (of frequency) data, but what appears to also be in short supply is justification for priors. I think McCormick's closing statements really brought that point home with the circularity that seems apparent in these monotheistic arguments. It's ultimately like trying to make an inductive argument without a knowledge-set (data) and making an inference anyway by referencing itself. It's not reasoning!

 

IOW, you think there's a god and assign a probability for miracles of 100%.

 

I think there is no god and assign a probability for miracles of 0%.

 

You get the answer you want, I get the answer I want. It is meaningless or, as the comment above points out, "It's not reasoning."

 

You can't prove miracles, or gods, or the supernatural based solely on statistical methods, and I urge you to read the book I listed above.

 

Please don't abuse yourself by following the saying, "If you can't dazzle them with brilliance, baffle them with bullshit."

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That was Hume if I'm not mistaken. His positions have been shown to be invalid. Here is a good start - Hume's Abject Failure

Standford's Philosophy department's view on Earman's argument:

Bayesian Analyses of Hume's Argument Concerning Miracles

 

 

The balancing of probabilities is of no use until it is decided what goes into the balance — that is, what constitutes the evidence that is to be subject to the balancing of probabilities. The point is this; apart from independent philosophical arguments — arguments that would in effect undermine the relevance of a Bayesian analysis to the question of the credibility of reports of the miraculous — no such analysis can, in principle, prove that no testimony can (or cannot) establish the credibility of a miracle. So-called Bayesian analyses of Hume's argument are not analyses of Hume's argument at all — but superfluous representations of it.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/miracles/

Thanks.

 

The first thing they seem to be saying is Hume has no argument. The second thing they say is not that Earman's reasoning is wrong, but rather that we need to define evidence first. Well Okay. That is pretty obvious. I don't see how their words are very insightful.

Did you not understand what is written above? Did you read it? Earman's analysis using Bayesian probability is worthless, meaningless and does nothing towards establishing the credibility of a miracle.

 

Kind of like you.

 

It still comes down to probability which in the case of miracles depends on evidence.

 

We're back to evidence, and you have none.

 

It comes down to this: You have presented us with a blank that you would fill with whatever you wish and expect us to accept it.

 

 

________________________________ is True.

 

Just because you put something in there doesn't make it true.

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Here take a look at the Odd's Form of Baye's Theorem. (scroll down)

 

I can place (1) into the odds form.

(2) P(M|E&K)/P(~M|E&K) = P(M/K)/P(~M/K) × P(E|M&K)/P(E|~M&K)

 

If P(M|E&K)/P(~M|E&K)>.5 then it is more likely the miracle will occur given E and K. The reason this form is valuable is because we can see that P(M/K)/P(~M/K) can be dominated by P(E|M&K)/P(E|~M&K). It is important to note that P(E|M&K)/P(E|~M&K) is about the likelihood of the evidence occurring with a miracle or with out a miracle. In a nut shell this captures the idea that you can not just claim some idea like "the disciples all hallucinated" and leave it at that. You have to evaluate how likely it(hallucination) is to have occurred.

Have you read, Michael Martin's book, "Atheism: A Philosophical Justification"?

 

The following analysis of the use of Baye's Theorem is illustrative (but not from the book). You surely realize that the probability distribution depends on assigned probabilities?

 

One thing to point out, besides the fact many people throw around probability incorrectly, but in the area of statistics we have to keep in mind the only real alternative is a frequentist approach (parametric testing can be used to, but it applies to unique cases of non-distributions). The frequentist inference is limited, however, to the design of the analysis, to put it simply. If there can be a distribution derived from data, then we can use our statistical methods. Bayesian inferences, on the other hand, can be applied to conditional statements that have nothing to really do with distributions. It is in this view we have to keep in mind the utter subjectivity of the claims.

 

Now, what makes Bayesian inferences useful is the fact we can take "educated guesses" from people who actually know what they're talking about. When we lack data, it is good to be able to rationalize what kind of probability we might expect. It is in this way that expert opinion can be utilized in an analysis, even though it is not technical in any sense of data (and the differences once we have data really show Bayesian to be no better than frequentist models).

 

I would not want people to walk away from this thinking Bayesian inferences or conditional probabilities are incorrectly applied outside of distribution (of frequency) data, but what appears to also be in short supply is justification for priors. I think McCormick's closing statements really brought that point home with the circularity that seems apparent in these monotheistic arguments. It's ultimately like trying to make an inductive argument without a knowledge-set (data) and making an inference anyway by referencing itself. It's not reasoning!

 

IOW, you think there's a god and assign a probability for miracles of 100%.

 

I think there is no god and assign a probability for miracles of 0%.

Your mystery source is wrong in their comments regarding the Bayesian analysis being completely subjective. The initial prior can be based on a frequentist calculation. Followed by a series of Bayesian calculations to update the posterior using new evidence. Bayesian methods have value as learning algorithms. Also, note the line I bolded. Estimated priors are used and do have value.

 

In any event, even with out a frequency based number the reasoning which defeats Hume's allegations are correct. As I stated clearly in my response. Martin says (page 191 of Atheism: A Philosophical Justification) that assuming P(E|M&K) > P(E|~M&K) is unwarranted, but he misses the point that just allowing for the fact that this is true invalidates Hume's reasoning. Martin is basically agreeing the structure is correct and then attempts to defeat the argument by attacking the knowability of the terms of the equation. Okay, Hume is still wrong, and so we can move on to deal with Martin's objection, which is just on the nature of evidence.

 

Now some people just beg the question (typically people on the internet), others try and tackle the evidence question straight on (for example Scholars).

 

 

You get the answer you want, I get the answer I want. It is meaningless or, as the comment above points out, "It's not reasoning."

 

You can't prove miracles, or gods, or the supernatural based solely on statistical methods, and I urge you to read the book I listed above.

 

Please don't abuse yourself by following the saying, "If you can't dazzle them with brilliance, baffle them with bullshit."

No one is claiming proof. We are talking about building arguments using plausible reasoning.

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Your mystery source is wrong in their comments regarding the Bayesian analysis being completely subjective. The initial prior can be based on a frequentist calculation. Followed by a series of Bayesian calculations to update the posterior using new evidence. Bayesian methods have value as learning algorithms. Also, note the line I bolded. Estimated priors are used and do have value.

 

Well, yes, of course. Keep in mind that "estimated priors" are 1) sometimes a matter of opinion or 2) sometimes disputed based on evidence.

 

In any event, even with out a frequency based number the reasoning which defeats Hume's allegations are correct. As I stated clearly in my response. Martin says (page 191 of Atheism: A Philosophical Justification) that assuming P(E|M&K) > P(E|~M&K) is unwarranted, but he misses the point that just allowing for the fact that this is true invalidates Hume's reasoning. Martin is basically agreeing the structure is correct and then attempts to defeat the argument by attacking the knowability of the terms of the equation. Okay, Hume is still wrong, and so we can move on to deal with Martin's objection, which is just on the nature of evidence.

 

When you call Hume wrong, I think you are oversimplifying the matter considerably. If you are saying that Hume's advocacy of the strong skeptical position with respect to the use of testimony to substantiate (or prove) miracles is absolutely wrong, then you are suggesting that any claim about any silly "supernatural" event must be consider "proof" of said event. Even you wouldn't go that far. And using Beyesian probability doesn't make the reliability of testimony any better. The argument becomes circular because the probability estimates use the estimates of reliability, but that is precisely what is in dispute!

 

Now some people just beg the question (typically people on the internet), others try and tackle the evidence question straight on (for example Scholars).

 

Ok.

 

 

You get the answer you want, I get the answer I want. It is meaningless or, as the comment above points out, "It's not reasoning."

 

You can't prove miracles, or gods, or the supernatural based solely on statistical methods, and I urge you to read the book I listed above.

 

Please don't abuse yourself by following the saying, "If you can't dazzle them with brilliance, baffle them with bullshit."

No one is claiming proof. We are talking about building arguments using plausible reasoning.

 

Fair enough.

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Guest Valkyrie0010

Clay,

 

Now I am not a math guy at much at all so statistics is a little beyond me, but the problem I see, and please tell me if I am misunderstanding this. Harking back to what I believe shyone said about the existence of god and miracles.

 

Lets say that there is a god up there, of course that increases the probability of miracles, but to which favor. It could be Allah or Vishnu or whatever. What proof do you have that the entity works in your favor.

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Clay,

 

Now I am not a math guy at much at all so statistics is a little beyond me, but the problem I see, and please tell me if I am misunderstanding this. Harking back to what I believe shyone said about the existence of god and miracles.

 

Lets say that there is a god up there, of course that increases the probability of miracles, but to which favor. It could be Allah or Vishnu or whatever. What proof do you have that the entity works in your favor.

Okay, good question. I agree that just acknowledging the existence of the supernatural alone does not tell us what characteristics this supernatural may have. For example, I believe the Kalam Cosmological Argument and the Teleological Argument both provide very plausible evidence that there is indeed a sentient Creator of the universe. This means there is some kind of supernatural. Now how do we know any further characteristics of this Creator?

 

If you are truly pursuing an evidence based path then this is where you need to start digging into the actual claims. I feel for example that the Moral Argument shows that God is moral. I also believe the case for the Resurrection can be made strongly and that while you can not prove the Resurrection was a supernatural event, you can make a good case for the supernatural being the best explanation for the event.

 

It is important to note that some people look at Christianity and think that finding one flaw invalidates the entire religion. I think this is silly and unsound reasoning. True, if that one flaw was that you were convinced the Resurrection did not occur then this would invalidate the entire religion, but if the flaw were not being able to square the Noah story with science then IMO this is silly. I look at the picture in total. I look at the picture in total, just like I would any difficult analysis. It is common and normal for us in our lives to make decisions and judgments based on incomplete knowledge. It should not surprise us that we don't understand every single detail of God, His ways and His total plan. Just because you can not understand the Noah story you don't toss out all the other evidence you have.

 

There is no more important question to ask ourself then the question of God and His plan.

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Guest Valkyrie0010

Clay,

 

Now I am not a math guy at much at all so statistics is a little beyond me, but the problem I see, and please tell me if I am misunderstanding this. Harking back to what I believe shyone said about the existence of god and miracles.

 

Lets say that there is a god up there, of course that increases the probability of miracles, but to which favor. It could be Allah or Vishnu or whatever. What proof do you have that the entity works in your favor.

Okay, good question. I agree that just acknowledging the existence of the supernatural alone does not tell us what characteristics this supernatural may have. For example, I believe the Kalam Cosmological Argument and the Teleological Argument both provide very plausible evidence that there is indeed a sentient Creator of the universe. This means there is some kind of supernatural. Now how do we know any further characteristics of this Creator?

 

If you are truly pursuing an evidence based path then this is where you need to start digging into the actual claims. I feel for example that the Moral Argument shows that God is moral. I also believe the case for the Resurrection can be made strongly and that while you can not prove the Resurrection was a supernatural event, you can make a good case for the supernatural being the best explanation for the event.

 

It is important to note that some people look at Christianity and think that finding one flaw invalidates the entire religion. I think this is silly and unsound reasoning. True, if that one flaw was that you were convinced the Resurrection did not occur then this would invalidate the entire religion, but if the flaw were not being able to square the Noah story with science then IMO this is silly. I look at the picture in total. I look at the picture in total, just like I would any difficult analysis. It is common and normal for us in our lives to make decisions and judgments based on incomplete knowledge. It should not surprise us that we don't understand every single detail of God, His ways and His total plan. Just because you can not understand the Noah story you don't toss out all the other evidence you have.

 

There is no more important question to ask ourself then the question of God and His plan.

 

I think while we are on opposite sides of the fence, as of this moment. We have found common ground.

 

Yeah I agree don't toss the baby with the bath water always.

 

It is also the reason the resurrection has been my main focus as far as Christianity.

 

I have been trying to get this accross to you and maybe you responded but I will try again.

 

How do you determine the supernatural without religion. Because religions are equal in supernatural. How do you break the stalment in the unscertainable between one saying god raised jesus from the dead and one saying satan(or the equilvent of) tricked them or something.

 

We would have no evidence of that either way. And the part about satan fits. How do you disprove that would be my question.

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[1]It is important to note that some people look at Christianity and think that finding one flaw invalidates the entire religion.

 

[2]There is no more important question to ask ourself then the question of God and His plan.

1. Xtianity or the book on which it is based?

 

2. Why?

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What is the moral argument? I don't believe I've heard a well defined argument for why God is necessarily moral. If anyone has a link or would like to explain that would be great :).

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How do you determine the supernatural without religion. Because religions are equal in supernatural. How do you break the stalment in the unscertainable between one saying god raised jesus from the dead and one saying satan(or the equilvent of) tricked them or something.

 

We would have no evidence of that either way. And the part about satan fits. How do you disprove that would be my question.

I thought I answered. I don't understand your point I guess.

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What is the moral argument? I don't believe I've heard a well defined argument for why God is necessarily moral. If anyone has a link or would like to explain that would be great :).

The Moral Argument is an argument for the existence of God. It can take the form of a Syllogism.

 

1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist

2) Objective moral values do exist

3) Therefore, God exists

 

Google "moral argument".

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What is the moral argument? I don't believe I've heard a well defined argument for why God is necessarily moral. If anyone has a link or would like to explain that would be great :).

The Moral Argument is an argument for the existence of God. It can take the form of a Syllogism.

 

1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist

2) Objective moral values do exist

3) Therefore, God exists

 

Google "moral argument".

Can you say "circular logic"?

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Guest Valkyrie0010

How do you determine the supernatural without religion. Because religions are equal in supernatural. How do you break the stalment in the unscertainable between one saying god raised jesus from the dead and one saying satan(or the equilvent of) tricked them or something.

 

We would have no evidence of that either way. And the part about satan fits. How do you disprove that would be my question.

I thought I answered. I don't understand your point I guess.

I was beginning that you did, but thanks for pointing it out. Dense on my part.

But answers can be disagreed on.

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1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist

This is begging the question.

 

Objectivity can exist without a person creating or vouching for it.

 

Besides, human intelligence and reason can arrive at objective realizations of nature.

 

To treat people the way you want to be treated is a commonsense formula, based on reason. It's an objective rule because it makes sense, not because it is forced down on us from dreamland.

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Guest Valkyrie0010

What is the moral argument? I don't believe I've heard a well defined argument for why God is necessarily moral. If anyone has a link or would like to explain that would be great :).

The Moral Argument is an argument for the existence of God. It can take the form of a Syllogism.

 

1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist

2) Objective moral values do exist

3) Therefore, God exists

 

Google "moral argument".

 

I think this would be a good example of how your second premise does not need the first

 

 

But also in general if there was truely objective values as I think you see them as, then why is it that there are different cultural views on things like killing, and thievery

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How do you determine the supernatural without religion. Because religions are equal in supernatural. How do you break the stalment in the unscertainable between one saying god raised jesus from the dead and one saying satan(or the equilvent of) tricked them or something.

 

We would have no evidence of that either way. And the part about satan fits. How do you disprove that would be my question.

I thought I answered. I don't understand your point I guess.

It's actually a very good point, and one that I have raised repeatedly in one form or another.

 

When the comment is made that the "supernatural" is "outside of the physical universe", I note that this phrase, which one Christian said has been "accepted by many philosophers" is actually only used in one context: Religion.

 

The other meaning of the above is that all religions claim to have a handle on the supernatural, so if one religion claims a supernatural feat or revelation, how can any other religion claim that the feat or revelation is not supernatural?

 

I know the Christian answer to "How do you tell if Satan or God delivered a message (or committed some act): Matt: 7:16. By their fruit you will recognize them.

 

But that does not settle the stalemate between two different religions, does it?

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What is the moral argument? I don't believe I've heard a well defined argument for why God is necessarily moral. If anyone has a link or would like to explain that would be great :).

The Moral Argument is an argument for the existence of God. It can take the form of a Syllogism.

 

1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist

2) Objective moral values do exist

3) Therefore, God exists

 

Google "moral argument".

 

I think this would be a good example of how your second premise does not need the first

 

 

But also in general if there was truely objective values as I think you see them as, then why is it that there are different cultural views on things like killing, and thievery

OrdinaryClay might appreciate this video as well - artistic, sympathetic, and approaches it from his worldview before explaining Morality as a secular social construct.

 

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I know the Christian answer to "How do you tell if Satan or God delivered a message (or committed some act): Matt: 7:16. By their fruit you will recognize them.

And so far, I think Buddhists have the best track record. They've done some bad things too, but it seems like they've done far less harm than most other religions.

 

Christians are not without guilt. Their fruit is not always that pretty.

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The Moral Argument is an argument for the existence of God. It can take the form of a Syllogism.

 

1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist

2) Objective moral values do exist

3) Therefore, God exists

 

Google "moral argument".

 

I don't think this was what he was talking about. However, this syllogism does not work.

 

The problem first problem is with premise 1. God's existence cannot be shown to have any connection to "objective" moral values. By definition, "objective" means mind independent

 

1. (Philosophy) existing independently of perception or an individual's conceptions
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/objective

 

The problem is that if god is authoring morals then morals are being authored by a mind and therefore not objective, they are merely subject to god instead of society or the individual.

 

The other premise is questionable too, indeed I would argue that the notion of morality being independent of a mind, or mental contsruct is inherently meaningless. Morality and ethics are always a matter of choosing behavior as it relates to other individuals and society. Without people or society (I.E. minds) there is no such thing as morality.

 

None of this is really an argument against god though, I just think the topic of ethical philosophy has nothing to do with god at all.

 

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