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Goodbye Jesus

Deliberate Manipulation Of The Phenomenal Self Model


DeGaul

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I never had any doubt about your qualifications, and I don't judge people based on their degree. :grin: But it's an impressive background, no doubt.

 

Personally, I was a software developer for 30 years. I lost count of how many systems I have developed. Most of the systems involved large relational databases and very complex algorithms. Automatic booking agents, rules engines, now lately, a system that tracks and create model portfolios in mutual funds (this is currently a no-pay job because it's a start-up). Amongst other things...

 

A couple of years ago I decided to sell my part in a business, which I helped start, and now I'm back in school.

 

It would be quite devastating for my business partner if it's true that we can't create anticipatory AI. :(

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I'm pretty impressed by your resume as well Ouroboros. I find the whole project of software development amazing. (I secretly wanted to be more involved with programming, which is how I got involved with an ill-fated graduate research course in set theory, but that is another story....) I too am amazed that people are not more impressed with the state of computer science today. Have you heard about Roboroach? That is amazing. Researchers created a neural interface with a roach, using computer generated impulses to control the mobility of the roach, moving it around like a radio controlled car. And at the University of Reading, scientists are controlling a robot with a neural net composed of actual rat neurons!

 

Paradox, I think you have a strange and limited sense of self. Of course a "self" doesn't expand in volume, because the self isn't a thing. Self-hood is a neurological process of the brain, and as a neurological process it does, indeed, grow with time in both content and character. You seem to be confusing "self" with "subjectivity". I find it likely that you fall into the camp of people who believe that the subjective and the objective are ontologically separate, while I hold that the subject/object divide is an epistemological one. But, without going into detail on that score, let me point to the face that it is possible for the self to be entirely destroyed in an individual. Take people who suffer from Cotard's syndrome. Patients will often stop using the first person in their language and, if directly asked, will say that they do not exist. These people have lost the neurological capacity to self-model and so do not recognize a self.

 

But, truthfully, I'm completely done with arguing with you. As near as I can tell, you refuse to make reference to any hard studies in the field of neuroscience. You refuse to site any information about known brain disorders effecting sense of self. The main cognitive philosopher you have referred to is John Searle, who is widely accepted as knowing little to nothing about actual neuroscience and is not very well respected among cognitive philosophers as a competent source. You reject the idea of gradations of conscious experience, seemingly out of hand, given that a lot of research in neuroscience supports the idea that such gradation exists, and you seem to think that brain tissue is somehow "magical". On top of that, your comment about Wittgenstein shows that you have not the least understanding of his project as a philosopher, or his significance as a logician. I really have nothing more to say to you, I'm afraid. We must just accept that we are at odds with each other, and leave it at that.

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which is how I got involved with an ill-fated graduate research course in set theory, but that is another story....

Sets are fun. That's a big part of my programming since it involves work with relational databases.

 

I too am amazed that people are not more impressed with the state of computer science today. Have you heard about Roboroach? That is amazing. Researchers created a neural interface with a roach, using computer generated impulses to control the mobility of the roach, moving it around like a radio controlled car. And at the University of Reading, scientists are controlling a robot with a neural net composed of actual rat neurons!

Yes, it sounds familiar.

 

A year ago or so I saw a program about the research in exoskeletons, and how they used nerves from a worm (if I'm not mistaken) to get the right motion in the arms and legs. I also heard that the nerves that control the muscles are a lot "smarter" than we thought before. The brains sends more of a "extend muscle" signal, and the localized nerves at the site of the muscles will say how it is done. Fascinating stuff. In another life I might have been in that field instead... you know the feeling. :grin:

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Paradox, I think you have a strange and limited sense of self. Of course a "self" doesn't expand in volume, because the self isn't a thing. Self-hood is a neurological process of the brain, and as a neurological process it does, indeed, grow with time in both content and character. You seem to be confusing "self" with "subjectivity". I find it likely that you fall into the camp of people who believe that the subjective and the objective are ontologically separate, while I hold that the subject/object divide is an epistemological one. But, without going into detail on that score, let me point to the face that it is possible for the self to be entirely destroyed in an individual. Take people who suffer from Cotard's syndrome. Patients will often stop using the first person in their language and, if directly asked, will say that they do not exist. These people have lost the neurological capacity to self-model and so do not recognize a self.

 

But, truthfully, I'm completely done with arguing with you. As near as I can tell, you refuse to make reference to any hard studies in the field of neuroscience. You refuse to site any information about known brain disorders effecting sense of self. The main cognitive philosopher you have referred to is John Searle, who is widely accepted as knowing little to nothing about actual neuroscience and is not very well respected among cognitive philosophers as a competent source. You reject the idea of gradations of conscious experience, seemingly out of hand, given that a lot of research in neuroscience supports the idea that such gradation exists, and you seem to think that brain tissue is somehow "magical". On top of that, your comment about Wittgenstein shows that you have not the least understanding of his project as a philosopher, or his significance as a logician. I really have nothing more to say to you, I'm afraid. We must just accept that we are at odds with each other, and leave it at that.

 

DeGaul, I can take a few snide comments (and have had a large number of them), but not your being repeatedly misrepresentative of the views I have put forward and condescendingly presumptuous about what you believe the extent of my relevant knowledge is (and your comment a few posts ago, <<You have no grasp of how the human mind works or of the science of neurobiology, especially how it relates to the evolution of the human mind>> didn't go unnoticed).

 

And once again you don't fully address my criticisms, but just trot out your 'self-model' as dogma that I am supposed to accept and around which I should mould my conceptions.

 

I have never understood why so many people are bewitched by Wittgenstein -- or, for that matter, any philosopher who wastes their time trying to present a rigorously analysed understanding of the true meaning of propositions; and I do not stand alone in that view.

 

Your comment

 

<<Self-hood is a neurological process of the brain, and as a neurological process it does, indeed, grow with time in both content and character. You seem to be confusing "self" with "subjectivity">>

 

is unsubtantiated and, as I made clear, at odds with your earlier

 

<<The Self-Model is a neurological process by which the human organism develops a concept of being in a world and of having a specific place in that world called "self".>>

 

The concept of self is, at its basis, nothing more than a cognitive reference. It doesn't make any difference what strange effects the brain generates to distort the way it is finally processed by the mind, it remains there as a base upon which the individual recognises his condition and responsibilities. The latter are higher forms of processsing; the reference I am referring it is not -- it is basic, essential, elemental, without form or stucture. And since many neuroscientists seem blinded - by their studies and research agenda - to that fact, it is hardly surprising that neuroscience does not get the kind of exalted status that you like to give it, by philosophers of the mind.

 

In a similar vein, you have not so much as mentioned the so-called binding problem in cognition, or set out how it might be resolved. I suggest it will not be resolved by models that reduce cognition to discrete units of data, because even in an entirely empirical analysis, the thought process is far more holistic than this.

 

To illustrate, you might give some thought to the idea that, if you wish to create a brain-like A.I. system, you will need to create some component that can produce the various forms of brain wave, and in particular it seems you would need to create a component resembling the thalamus:

 

<<Role in attentive focus [of gamma brain waves]

 

The suggested mechanism is that gamma waves relate to neural consciousness via the mechanism for conscious attention:

 

The proposed answer lies in a wave that originating in the thalamus, sweeps the brain from front to back, 40 times per second, drawing different neuronal circuits into synch with the precept, and thereby bringing the precept into the attentional foreground. If the thalamus is damaged even a little bit, this wave stops, conscious awarenesses do not form, and the patient slips into profound coma.>>

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gamma_wave

 

For more on research into gamma waves, see

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A43006-2005Jan2.html

 

Since I am a committed holist and you seem otherwise, I agree that you and I are best agreeing to disagree and leaving it at that.

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Ah Paradox, so you're a committed holist huh? Cool. Does this distinguish you from reductionists or some other group?

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Ah Paradox, so you're a committed holist huh? Cool. Does this distinguish you from reductionists or some other group?

 

Yes, from reductionists.

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Paradox, I have been snide with you, but only because your representation of my own views is childish, and your dismissal of the evidence that I do provide borders on the blind. I am well aware of the binding problem, and yes, I know about gamma waves. I fully admit that this is a problem, but that is a detail oriented problem, one that requires more thought and research, not a problem which is devastating to my view, as you seem to think.

 

Again and again you seem to be accusing me of some sort of reductionism, but I am not a reductionist in any sort of metaphysical sense. I am not saying the conscious states aren't real or unique, nor am I saying that conscious states are really units of data. What I am saying, I feel I have been very clear about, but let me try and say it without the (rather useful) jargon of neurophilosophy:

 

1: Consciousness is a function of the brain. (This seems like a reasonable and established "fact" of neuroscience. Few scientists would deny it.) Consciousness is episodic and the content of consciousness can be altered by altering the brain.

2: The "self" is a reference point in consciousness. The "self" has content (the Ego) which plays an active role in decision making and which call also become altered by damaging the brain in certain ways, even to the point of erasing the sense of self altogether.

3: From 1 and 2, we can derive that if the sense of self can be erased but consciousness continue in a patient suffering from a disorder (Cotard's syndrome), then the self is not a necessary component of consciousness. Conscious beings can exist without "selves".

4: 1, 2, and 3 help us to establish that the content and character of consciousness are not identical across all cases. In this sense, we can say that consciousness is a graduated phenomena, capable of existing in different forms and different levels of richness.

 

I have said I'm done arguing, and I'll keep to that as best I can. You can look up the research for yourself, if you care to. I have been rude to you, and I'll be the first to admit it is for somewhat personal reasons: I see a younger version of myself in you. As I've mentioned, I had my start in Thomistic philosophy, and there once was a time when I really identified with that more "continental" attitude in philosophy. I used to turn a sneer at the works of philosophers like Paul and Patricia Churchland, Daniel Dennet, Thomas Metzinger, etc. I thought eliminative materialism was a joke and that people who bought into it were just blinded by science. But, what I came to see, is that philosophers who don't give the appropriate deference to the empirical sciences are not noble protectors of a holistic view of the human being, they are just old academics who are getting left behind.

 

Wittgenstein, along with Frege, have really been the fathers of analytic philosophy, and have spawned the last great hope for philosophy. Wittgenstein was not interested in the true meaning of propositions, he was interested in the logic of linguistic behavior and how it is possible to "mean" anything at all. The reason that Wittgenstein is devastating to metaphysics is because his work shows that linguistic behavior is just like any other animal behavior, and that truth is a function of propositions. Putting truth back in its rightful place, as a function of propositions, destroys the "Truth with a capital 'T'" of metaphysicians and shows metaphysics for what it is, simple confusion.

 

I have stated that I don't believe you have the relevant knowledge of the field of neuroscience to debate your point, but I wasn't saying it as an insult, I was saying it with a sense of dismay. The future of science and philosophy lie together.....or rather, I should say the hope of philosophy lies with science. Philosophy must take up its role as a project of logical clarification and meaning in relation to the field of science, or science will simply leave philosophy behind. (Which would be sad for science, as it would suffer a loss of clarity in losing philosophy, but it would soldier on. The world finds itself less inclined to need philosophers at all these days.)

 

We will not agree. I accept that, and in that spirit I really do wish to end the debate, but I do want you to understand that that spirit of what I have been saying has not been meant to be condescending but has been grounded in a sense of genuine bewilderment. I do not understand your seeming resistance to the theoretically reductive project of the sciences, and I am forced to remain in a state of bewilderment.

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"But, what I came to see, is that philosophers who don't give the appropriate deference to the empirical sciences are not noble protectors of a holistic view of the human being, they are just old academics who are getting left behind. "

QFT.

 

Everything else you said is true too, but I had to quote that because it's something I realized a while back as well. Some philosophers are stuck in their ideas and won't look at what real empirical data suggests. Philosophy without data is just speculation. Philosophy at its greatest is when it glues together the things we do know about reality, not when it tries to contradict reality out of some idealistic view.

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Everything else you [DeGaul] said is true too

 

Strange, there was me thinking that every paragraph written was just more of his unsubstantiated, condescending dogma.

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Strange, there was me thinking that every paragraph written was just more of his unsubstantiated, condescending dogma.

Yes, it is strange that you thought that. I'm glad we can agree on something.

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Ouroboros, I think you might like this episode of Big Thinkers. It is on Daniel Dennet and comes in three parts and youtube. Great show, really. Very well put together.

 

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But guys seriously. Paradox is right in my opinion. Reductionism will utterly fail to understand life or mind.

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But guys seriously. Paradox is right in my opinion. Reductionism will utterly fail to understand life or mind.

So the whole does not exist of the parts and the interaction of them? Does holism mean that the whole exists without the parts and the parts are non-essential to the whole?

 

And what about the gamma waves? Are they not parts of the whole? Or are the gamma waves some example of a "whole without parts"?

 

I'm all for looking at the whole and not just single parts, but it doesn't negate that the parts make up the whole.

 

I'm not a reductionist in the sense that it seems to be described here. I'm a "holist" in the sense that I believe we have to look at the whole. But the whole consists of parts. The parts exist and interacts and cause the whole. Or are you suggesting that the "whole" exists independent of the parts? Does the parts come together as a result of the "whole" pre-existing in some meta-physical level? Does this mean that the matter that is in the brain comes together because the mind exists in a different sphere? How is that "holistic"? That sounds dualistic to me and not looking at it as one whole.

 

If you remove all the braincells in my head, will my consciousness, thoughts, memories, all that is me still exist independent?

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All I'm saying Hans is that the answers to for why organisms are different form rocks or why minds do what they do are not to be found in chemistry or contemporary physics.

 

Do you find it beyond possibility that physics is due for a revolution and that this revolution could come from biology?

 

I think if we are going to analyze the relation between wholes and parts then we would do well to concentrate on the concept of function.

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All I'm saying Hans is that the answers to for why organisms are different form rocks or why minds do what they do are not to be found in chemistry or contemporary physics.

Sure. It is more complicated than just what they bring to the table.

 

But i do not think AI research is assuming that.

 

Do you find it beyond possibility that physics is due for a revolution and that this revolution could come from biology?

I'm reluctant to attempt to put all fields of science into just one single science.

 

I'm not sure why only psysics or biology must answe all questions. I have studied some sociology and psycology and find many truths in those fields as well. Even anthropology brings light to the debate. And let's not forget math and computer science that spans over many areas at once.

 

I think if we are going to analyze the relation between wholes and parts then we would do well to concentrate on the concept of function.

if you look at whole of a person, he or she is only a part in a larger whole. Can the answe to the human mind only be found in some super-science that only look at the Universe as a "whole"? At what level is a "whole as a part of a larger whole" big enoung to understand what that thing is? Is the concept of a vehicle only understood if we include the cows in the field, the broken windows in the buikdings, and the clouds in the sky while you are driving by?

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Legion, I'm not sure what you (or paradox) mean by "reduction". Reductionism is a relation that pertains between theories. If my desire is to "reduce" consciousness, it is only in the sense that theories about consciousness are reducible to theories in physics or chemistry, etc. The phenomenon of consciousness obviously can't be reduced in any metaphysical sense. (If we can say that metaphysics can even MAKE sense.) But, Ouroboros has a point, in what sense is the whole more than the parts? If we can't clearly answer that question, then we can't begin to even make sense of standing on one side or another of the issue. Now, I hold that the key to understanding both life and consciousness has to do with coming to understand the ways in which the parts of complicated systems interact with one another. In the field of neuroscience, this is actually a pretty well established fact. Look particularly at the work of Wolf Singer. Singer's work shows that a great deal of evidence supports the idea that it is the synchronization of oscillatory activity in the brain which leads to the binding of distributed brain processes. That consciousness arises from the synchronized activity of a multitude of fully determined and unconscious electro-chemical reactions may seem unappealing to many people, but that doesn't make it any less factually the case, as near as we can tell.

 

I do admit, Legion, that it would be simple hubris to deny the possibility that we could be on the verge of a revolution in physics. Perhaps we are. (Incidentally, that is why I mentioned the idea of non-algorithmic computers, an interesting idea being worked on by some very smart, very creative programmers.) Still, even allowing for a fundamental change in physics, I don't think that would solve the ultimate problem of wholes/parts. There seems to me to be only two ways of thinking about this: Either you accept that it is increased complexity of interaction that creates qualitatively new properties out of parts brought together into an organized whole (Metzinger coined the term "virtual organs", which I really like.) or you subscribe to the idea that there must be some sort of "top down" effect at work, not unlike a Platonic form or something along those lines. I subscribe to the first option, allowing for the idea that complexity and interaction can give rise to qualitatively new properties which will belong to the system as a whole, but not to the parts. As for all the Platonists in the world, I know they still exist, but I think they will find their opinions less and less relevant over time, if they aren't entirely obsolete already.

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Very few reductionists actually admit to being reductionists, as this thread has shown. In the case of the mind, the telling concession by the A.I. protagonists is that, on their assumptions, data (significantly, the plural of datum) are the content of experience. If they weren't such, there would have to be some subjective conditioning, characterising sentience, that is entirely removed from any form of input.

 

Unfortunately, as I have already said, each datum is not a quantum of experience; it is either a one or a zero, which in itself is meaningless in experiential terms. If one wants to make more sense of the significance of data, one cannot but take a top-down approach.

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Hans, DeGaul, I don't claim to understand all of this yet. All I know is this. I worked towards AI for years, but became increasingly disillusioned about the capabilities of computers. At about the zenith of this disillusionment I encountered Stuart Kauffman's idea of autocatalytic sets and I saw the glimmer of something new. Futher exploration of Kauffman's work introduced me to the work of Robert Rosen and that's where I've been ever since. My intuition screams at me that Rosen is on to some very important ideas. However I have been unable as yet to turn this intuition into crystaline understanding. I don't feel overly stupid for this, because I know some fairly intelligent people who have had difficulty with it as well.

 

Sometimes I feel like saying this to those who aspire to create computational AI and artificial life... Go read Rosen's book Life Itself and get back to me when you've understood it.

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Hans, DeGaul, I don't claim to understand all of this yet. All I know is this. I worked towards AI for years, but became increasingly disillusioned about the capabilities of computers. At about the zenith of this disillusionment I encountered Stuart Kauffman's idea of autocatalytic sets and I saw the glimmer of something new. Futher exploration of Kauffman's work introduced me to the work of Robert Rosen and that's where I've been ever since. My intuition screams at me that Rosen is on to some very important ideas. However I have been unable as yet to turn this intuition into crystaline understanding. I don't feel overly stupid for this, because I know some fairly intelligent people who have had difficulty with it as well.

 

Sometimes I feel like saying this to those who aspire to create computational AI and artificial life... Go read Rosen's book Life Itself and get back to me when you've understood it.

I read only a part of Rosen's book, I found it curious that he used math and reductionist approach to explain his ideas. He can't use the same tools and methods as a reductionist to point finger at the reductionist.

 

Honestly, I believe the whole reductionist v holist problem is artificial and a false dichotomy. No scientist is a true reductionist in the vulgar sense that I hear about. And no holist is not to some or large degree also a reductionist.

 

AI research involves multiple fields of science, not just one. Some of those sciences are soft and not hard sciences like chemistry. Psychology, sociology, and even anthropology are influencing the field. So the "they're just damn reductionist and will fail" argument isn't true.

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Very few reductionists actually admit to being reductionists, as this thread has shown. In the case of the mind, the telling concession by the A.I. protagonists is that, on their assumptions, data (significantly, the plural of datum) are the content of experience. If they weren't such, there would have to be some subjective conditioning, characterising sentience, that is entirely removed from any form of input.

 

Unfortunately, as I have already said, each datum is not a quantum of experience; it is either a one or a zero, which in itself is meaningless in experiential terms. If one wants to make more sense of the significance of data, one cannot but take a top-down approach.

No, what you don't understand is that I'm not a reductionist, neither a holist, I am both. It is too limiting and silly childplay to argue "do you only look at the details or are you only looking at the whole?" You have to do both.

 

If you want to analyze some particular traffic situation on a freeway, you have to consider the road, weather conditions, the cars, type of cars, sizes, weights, drivers, and much more. I doubt that the surveyor claims that the traffic can only be analyzed by looking at the color of the cars, or that the holist claims that the traffic can only be understood from the overall motion and direction the traffic is going and not in any details at all.

 

The whole consist of all the parts. But they're still parts.

 

This reductionist v holist is just a red herring to derail the whole discussion. It reminds me about the "macorevolution v microevolution" argument from Christians. They just can't understand that there is a non-discontinuous different between the concepts and neither can exist without the other.

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Honestly, I believe the whole reductionist v holist problem is artificial and a false dichotomy. No scientist is a true reductionist in the vulgar sense that I hear about. And no holist is not to some or large degree also a reductionist.

 

 

This is a point concerning method, not final belief. If my investigations as to, say, the workings of the cell lead me to look ever outwards from the contents of the cell, and not inward into them, in order to comprehend the ultimate reasons why a cell can sustain its functions (notwithstanding entropy, in light of the second law of thermodynamics), you could justiably call me a holist.

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Legion, I'm not sure what you (or paradox) mean by "reduction". Reductionism is a relation that pertains between theories.

My impression is that this artificial conflict between "reductionism" and "holism" is nothing but an attempt to create a wedge where there is none. No holist can look at the whole without also looking at the details, and I doubt there are any true reductionists in the world who think that everything can be explained with only one detail.

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Very few reductionists actually admit to being reductionists, as this thread has shown. In the case of the mind, the telling concession by the A.I. protagonists is that, on their assumptions, data (significantly, the plural of datum) are the content of experience. If they weren't such, there would have to be some subjective conditioning, characterising sentience, that is entirely removed from any form of input.

 

Unfortunately, as I have already said, each datum is not a quantum of experience; it is either a one or a zero, which in itself is meaningless in experiential terms. If one wants to make more sense of the significance of data, one cannot but take a top-down approach.

No, what you don't understand is that I'm not a reductionist, neither a holist, I am both. It is too limiting and silly childplay to argue "do you only look at the details or are you only looking at the whole?" You have to do both.

 

If you want to analyze some particular traffic situation on a freeway, you have to consider the road, weather conditions, the cars, type of cars, sizes, weights, drivers, and much more. I doubt that the surveyor claims that the traffic can only be analyzed by looking at the color of the cars, or that the holist claims that the traffic can only be understood from the overall motion and direction the traffic is going and not in any details at all.

 

The whole consist of all the parts. But they're still parts.

 

This reductionist v holist is just a red herring to derail the whole discussion. It reminds me about the "macorevolution v microevolution" argument from Christians. They just can't understand that there is a non-discontinuous different between the concepts and neither can exist without the other.

 

If we were talking exclusively about disentangling causes and effects among given phenomena, and not trying to establish what those phenomena imply in a broader context, you might just have a point.

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I read only a part of Rosen's book, I found it curious that he used math and reductionist approach to explain his ideas. He can't use the same tools and methods as a reductionist to point finger at the reductionist.

I don't believe the use of mathematics to model natural systems implies reductionism. Please Hans. I would almost beg you. Read the whole thing, and help us (you and me) understand it. What chapters did you read?

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This is a point concerning method, not final belief. If my investigations as to, say, the workings of the cell lead me to look ever outwards from the contents of the cell, and not inward into them, in order to comprehend the ultimate reasons why a cell can sustain its functions (notwithstanding entropy, in light of the second law of thermodynamics), you could justiably call me a holist.

The most, or perhaps all, AI researchers seem to be holists. How else would we explain that it's popular now to use theories from anthropology today? How is it that it's known that the AI has to learn, not be programmed, the knowledge it will deal with? And how is it that they're becoming aware of the importance of affect for artificial consciousness? Are those examples not examples of looking outside the cell only?

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