What Epistemic System Do You Adhere To?

[Asimov]

I just have to say, fascinating thread Asimov!

 

Thanks, Merlin! And thanks for clearing things up, what you said was what I was trying to say.

[Samurai Tailor]

Not quite. You can say that a=b and b=a(i.e., both men have 10 coins in their pocket) but I think the leap to b=c is unjustified. If c is 'getting the job,' then you cannot say that b=c. The requirements for the job are utterly unrelated to spare change. It's based on other things - skill and dedication to the job in an honest work environment. Now you could try to say that the coins are some kind of award given to quality workers and that having 10 of them is an exceptional ammount(a high score, if you will), but I truly fail to see how the coins in a man's pocket are a direct link to employment/promotion. It's a leap of logic, not a proof of it. To me, it's like saying that 'because I got what I prayed for, Jesus exists.' Nevermind the fact of a dozen other provable naturalist explanations for said 'prayer' being answered. It's making a link where none exists.

A = Jones

B = the man with 10 coins in his pocket

C = the man who got the job

 

A = B because Jones has 10 coins in his pocket

A = C because Jones got the job

B = C because the man with 10 coins got the job

I'd like to tentatively suggest that 'rational' is another word for 'common sense.' I.E. if something is 'irrational' it goes against our collective experience on how the world works.

I would not like to accept that suggestion because it seems to entail that theism (or astrology or believing in ghosts) is rational.

I.E. a famous 'irrational but true' moment is the idea that sometimes wanting a thing is better than having a thing - pardon the Star Trek theft. It's 'irrational' because it goes against our collective assumptions - having something is pleasing, wanting something is not - and yet it is often true, for very good reasons... when you just want something you don't see it's flaws until you get it home.

I am not sure I follow. Is the wanting/having business rational?

Another definition I'd like to suggest for 'rational proof' would be 'a set of facts that have clear links of influence from one to the next.'

Sounds like an additional layer of ambiguity. Lay-folk have enough trouble with existing formal definitions of proof.

[Ssel]

The word "rational" has even more to it than is being discussed here. It has been used a great deal in society to signify beneficial thinking. What many people think is beneficial can be scary.

 

What is wrong with using the word "logical" as in "logical proof"? It seems that is what is being aimed toward anyway.

 

----------------------------------------------------------------

 

And if the issue is finding and adhering to the real truth, wouldn't this apply?...

 

A “Staff of Truth”

 

1) Always consider all possible sides of an issue.

2) Always consider the probabilities of each side.

3) Simplify when possible but let nothing be left out

4) Maintain a “big picture” which the new issue must fit into, add to, or alter.

5) Avoid fear of accepting a truth due to its implications

6) Regard reality, whatever that turns out to be, with favor

7) Often re-examine prior conclusions so as to seek out any new doubt

8) Strive for absolute doubtless concepts

9) Seek new information for as long as time allows before any conclusion

10) Conclude ONLY when a conclusion is truly required

11) When possible experiment so as to increase the probability of a thought being accurate

12) Seek absolute accuracy with strong conviction

13) Include as part of every conclusion “It appears from what all I currently understand that …”

14) Consider every possibility by examining 1)consistency 2)completeness 3)relevance

15) Remember that lusting for a conclusion is the ONLY error of the mind.

16) Keep in mind that at any time you might have to revise what you have proclaimed as truth

17) Depend only upon that which you are most certain.

18) Keep in mind that every thought is a matter of probability based on current information

[charley]

Allright, Ssel. You are an atheistic burning bush. I am in awe. That is just the kind of pragmatism that I was trying to express in an earlier post. In short, any discussion of logic goes astray when it is not goal oriented, as you have illustrated. That's because what anyone considers proof or soundness at any step of the wat depends on what someone wants out of the whole thing. As you said:

 

What many people think is beneficial can be scary.

 

That is the crux of the matter. I don't want what many consider to be of the highest value, like spiritual grace and what-have-you. Each person can find their own examples. In short, logic doesn't stand on it's own very long outside of a group of people with similar world views. People are just driven by animal desires, in my opinion. And I honor and serve that by offering pornography to those eighteen and older at one of my websites :

 

EIGHTEEN AND OLDER ONLY, PLEASE!

 

....not quite on topic, but a good deal......yes, I know. I'm just an obnoxious salesman....

[Asimov]

Well Samurai Tailor, thanks for the discussion, I'm going to have to talk it over with my buddy about it and see what he has to say.

 

Theism is rational, that doesn't mean it's true. It's perfectly rational to want to have someone looking out for you, and assurances for when you die. I don't see the problem with that.

[♦ ficino ♦]

Hi, all. Happy New Year! Back to Asimov's OP, I am probably closer to Protagoras than to dogmatic rationalists. I've never established an epistemological position that I was ready to articulate in full and defend in debate. As close as I come these days is to trust the evidence of my senses and to accept analytic propositions, if I believe and understand the premises that undergird the given tautological system (as in math). That's why I don't accept the infallibility of the Bible: too many contradictions. I guess I could try to allegorize or metaphorize everything in the Bible and make the result consistent, but why bother - why not just go to the truths of which I'd be saying that the Bible offers metaphors or allegories and stick with those truths? Or those expressions of what's likely to be true.

 

 

 

 

The Gettier Problem, examples taken directly from the 1963 paper:

 

Case I

 

Smith has applied for a job, but has a justified belief that "Jones will get the job". He also has a justified belief that "Jones has 10 coins in his pocket". Smith therefore (justifiably) concludes (by the rule of the transitivity of identity) that "the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket".

 

In fact, Jones does not get the job. Instead, Smith does. However, as it happens, Smith also has 10 coins in his pocket. So his belief that "the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket" was justified and true. But it does not appear to be knowledge.

 

 

 

I never heard of the Gettier Problem. To me, too, it seems incorrectly worded because there's a disguised equivocation fallacy.

Beliefs about singular future events cannot be justified. Beliefs about future events can be justified by inductive logic if the events are part of a system whose causes are understood; I am justified in believing the sun will rise tomorrow. [Obviously my knowledge in such a case is not certain, for tomorrow morning could serve as a counterexample - the earth could be blown up by a Death Star or something such.] Either Jones' or Smith's getting the job, though, is a singular future event. I would deny Smith has justified belief either way, because there's too much likelihood that his grounds for belief in Jones' getting the job are uncertain. The most he can have is an opinion that is likely to prove correct.

He only has a belief that turns out to be true - it's not a justified belief. It's not an application of the transitive property because the term "justified" is equivocal; it has a strong sense with regard to Jones' present possession of ten coins but a very weak sense with regard to his future job status.

So I think a fallacy of equivocation infects the example.

 

I have not studied enough modern logic to know what people do with Aristotle's Sea Battle example in De Interpretatione. I have always admired it, though. Aristotle denies that propositions about singular future events are true or false. If this position won't stand up, I still deny that Smith has justified true belief.

 

As much as I don't care for statisticians...

 

Knowledge is based on the relevant highest probability of the current information available.

 

It is derived at, via the mind, by identifying what is relevant, then assessing probable consistencies.

 

2 + 2 = 4 is merely an inductive assessment due to the extremely low evidence presented to the contrary verses the extremely high presented evidence in favor.

 

In short, there are no 100% facts except in the sense that for sake of a logical construct something is declared as fact.

 

I also disagree with Ssel when he said that we know that 2 + 2 = 4 with high probability, that we know it via induction. I would say the proposition is analytic. No one examines all available cases and then concludes that probability is on the side of the equation's being right. Instead, we understand the terms within the tautological system of natural numbers and their operations, no? If someone says that there are cases where 2 + 2 do not equal 4, absent some altering qualification, I'd say that person annihilates all discourse. Going from base 10 to, say, base 2 does not pose a counterexample because the convention of the system is that we're using base 10 unless we say otherwise. But maybe there's some branch of higher mathematics where one can deny the equation without contradiction.

 

I also think an important distinction should be made between knowledge and minds. The intellectual content of a computer file is not reducible to the computer.

 

The best treatment I've come across of what is involved when we have justification of a belief is Schopenhauer's dissertation, which he revised several times: On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. He was talking about under what conditions we have sufficient reason to believe something. He broke down the field into four kinds of propositions: those about 1) experience, i.e. our sense perceptions; 2) logical relations; 3) mathematical relations; 4) judgements of value, about the object of willing. Later people like Russell collapsed 2 and 3, which seems on target to me.

 

I know I have much more to learn about all this, but this is my view so far.

 

Stimulating thread!

[thomas]

 

Definitions:

 

Knowledge: Justified True Belief, we can say we know something if it is true, if we believe it, and if it is justified.

 

Take, for instance:

 

1) it is true that Khan lives in Washington.

2) I believe that Khan lives in Washington.

3) I am justified in believing that Khan lives in Washington.

 

Do you agree with this definition? I think it is an accurate assessment of what knowledge is. So let's build upon this foundation.

 

 

 

If I don't know who Khan is, if I don't know where (or what) Washington is, and if I don't know what it means to live somewhere, then "Khan lives in Washington" is meaningless to me. But of course, if I have information (about Khan, Washington and what it means to live somewhere), then I can understand "Khan lives in Washington" in a context, and then it may become very valuable information.

 

In the same way it is common practice in information techonology to distinguish between data and information. Data are the characters with no meaning in themselves, while information is the broader picture people get in their heads, when data are understood in a context of other information.

 

In order to give an example of what knowledge is, I think it is important to have more data involved, so we (maybe) can give an example of how data become information.

 

My point of view is, that knowledge is a model (description) of reality. Such a model is very complex and contains among other things ways to determine if new data should be trusted or dismissed.

 

Knowledge is never without flaws, and therefore it is in my view possible to be justified in a belief although the belief turns out to be wrong. But if the knowledge is accurate enough for its purpose, it can be used in advance to evaulate concequences of different actions.

 

 

 

 

The Gettier Problem, examples taken directly from the 1963 paper:

 

Case I

 

Smith has applied for a job, but has a justified belief that "Jones will get the job". He also has a justified belief that "Jones has 10 coins in his pocket". Smith therefore (justifiably) concludes (by the rule of the transitivity of identity) that "the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket".

 

In fact, Jones does not get the job. Instead, Smith does. However, as it happens, Smith also has 10 coins in his pocket. So his belief that "the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket" was justified and true. But it does not appear to be knowledge.

 

 

 

 

This just shows that it is possible (by luck) to believe true things for the wrong reasons. But no knowledge is without flaw. I think Smith has some knowledge although he is wrong about who gets the job and only is lucky about the 10 coins.

 

 

 

 

Knowledge is based on the relevant highest probability of the current information available.

 

It is derived at, via the mind, by identifying what is relevant, then assessing probable consistencies.

 

2 + 2 = 4 is merely an inductive assessment due to the extremely low evidence presented to the contrary verses the extremely high presented evidence in favor.

 

In short, there are no 100% facts except in the sense that for sake of a logical construct something is declared as fact.

 

 

I think this depends on the old philosophical discussion between rationalists and empiricists.

 

If we only think about knowledge as build on obersvations, then I can only agree. Probabilities are involved in finding out which model best fit the observations. But at the same time, we are also concerned, that we don't want too complicated models with unproven factors. If a new factor is introduced in a model, then there need to be significant better probabilities. Else we normally prefer to live without that factor.

 

For example the green house effect is to a certain degree able to explains the changes in the climate (the probability for the seen changes in climate is higher in a model including a green house effect than in a model without it). But at the other hand, the green house effect is not very very good at explaining the changes. The probability is only somewhat better. So the green house effect is not (by normal scientific standards) considered to be proven.

 

But that was the empirical side of the question. Rationalists have always claimed, that we are born with some categories in our minds, from where we can deduce some knowledge. Actually it is an old discussions if the ruels for addition (2+2=4) basically are build on expeirience or are derived from such innate categories.

 

I have not made up my mind in this question.

[Ssel]

But that was the empirical side of the question. Rationalists have always claimed, that we are born with some categories in our minds, from where we can deduce some knowledge. Actually it is an old discussions if the ruels for addition (2+2=4) basically are build on expeirience or are derived from such innate categories.

You are right that there are 2 types of concerns.

 

1) Observation of reality

2) Model of reality

 

In order to create a model, the mind declares relevant boundaries of importance, it objectizes what is observed. When it declares fixed boundaries and properties to what it is observing, small errors of presumption are introduced.

 

As you pointed out, the model has a purpose and if it is good enough, then it is good enough.

 

But in the midths of creating a model, definitions and declarations are formed as the axiomatical base for the model.

 

When the model becomes very complete such that no observations seem to challenge its validity, then the model and its definitions and declarations become confident (high probability).

 

The "2 +2 = 4" is a model. The elements are declared and defined. It is exactly correct because of these declarations. But does the model actually always fit reality? This can only be assessed via statistical observation.

[Mike D]

I, personally tend to think that a mixture of Empiricism and Rationalism tend to be the best in an epistemic system.

This sounds like me too.

 

Does logic fall under rationalism? I remember having a debate with a Christian and I told him I tend to be an empiricist above all, and he made the statement "so you reject logic"? I guess meaning he thought the use of one nullifies or is an automatic rejection of the other. (or more likely in an attempt to make me look foolish). I disagreed, I don't need to experience 1 apple plus 1 apple to know that 1+1=2. I think empiricism and logic are essentially the same thing in that they are both representations of the same physical reality, but neither are 100% foolproof because they both depend on human reasoning to either interpret observations or make predictions. I think one can be used to either validate or invalidate claims made using the other i.e. the person who claims they observed someone walking on water vs. someone who predicts that under a certain condition a human can walk on water.

[Ssel]

I once talked to a young man about the color red. He asked how he could know that what he was seeing as red was the same as what others were seeing as red.

 

How do you know that red is really red?

 

How do you know that your name is really your name?

 

People today often confuse declared definitions with qualities of reality.

 

I tried to explain to the young man that if everyone points to something and says "that is red", then they are defining that whatever color he is seeing, is what is to be called "red". He argued that maybe the color that he is seeing is a different color.

 

 

Your name is first something that is declared by someone else. But how do you know that is really what was declared? You can look at the evidence and see a high probability. But often your name is a matter of self-declaration. Your name becomes your name because you declared it to be so. The name that you declared might or might not be the same as the name declared by others for you.

 

What they each boil down to is the acceptance of a definition. In the case of the redness, reality has no quality of redness, it has qualities that we name redness. In the case of your name, a if the definition of a name is accepted as "what other people refer to you as", then a self-declaration might not work, but as soon as someone is observed referring to you by a particular name, then probability comes into play. It is probably your name simply because that is what most people use to refer to you.

 

By confusing the definitions, all reasoning can be destroyed. By refining definitions reasoning becomes more useful. But a definition is not a quality of reality. It is only a declaration for the use of a word.

 

The empiricist is focusing on declared definitions and models then often demanding that they absolutely fit reality. Within the model, the logic is absolutely correct because it is an idealized model.

 

The rationalist is focusing on reality and questioning if the definitions and model truly fit or whether it is a matter of probability. Everything becomes a question of probability once applied to reality and not merely the proposed model.

 

Logical proofs begin with definitions and declarations. This is to allow a logical construct of thought to build. The logic does not prove reality to be anything until the entire model, including the declarations, seems to fit with reality with high confidence.

 

Logical proofs, within themselves, can be 100% fact. But whether they truly represent something in the real world can only be speculated.

 

How do you know that an apple is really an apple?

[Mike D]

How do you know that an apple is really an apple?

Well references or labels are really meaningless unless we have a common understanding of what underlying object or value the reference or label represents or is assigned to. The object we call an apple could really be called anything we want as long as we agree that going forward the label "X" represents the value of the particular object we now call an apple.

 

As far as how do I know an apple is really an apple? I guess it depends if that knowledge is meant for me only, or if it is meant for me to convey to you. Unless I hallucinate, I know an apple is an apple because I see an object that we call an apple and it agrees with all my past observations of what I understand to be an apple. As for you however, I guess there's no way to be 100% sure that the label "apple" which is assigned to the underlying physical object that I see is the same physical object you see. But it seems highly unlikely that the object I see sitting on top of a table and call and apple would be a different object to you, perhaps an orange. If some people see an orange where I see an apple, why don't other people see a sofa or a dump truck or some other object? I guess how much you question this stuff depends on how much of an extreme skeptic one wants to be.

 

And as you can probably tell I am no philosopher, these are simply my uneducated opinions based on my limited knowledge of, (coincindentally perhaps) the nature of knowledge.

[Ssel]

And as you can probably tell I am no philosopher, these are simply my uneducated opinions based on my limited knowledge of, (coincindentally perhaps) the nature of knowledge.

Perhaps so, but you are hitting the nail squarely on the head.

Well references or labels are really meaningless unless we have a common understanding of what underlying object or value the reference or label represents or is assigned to. The object we call an apple could really be called anything we want as long as we agree that going forward the label "X" represents the value of the particular object we now call an apple.

This is exactly the point to agreed upon definitions and declarations BEFORE any proof or debate.

 

Unless I hallucinate, I know an apple is an apple because I see an object that we call an apple and it agrees with all my past observations of what I understand to be an apple.

And this is the part that points out that once an idea is accepted, it is a matter of perception and thus a guess of probability that the idea actually fit reality.

 

Perception is the veil between reality and the mind.

[charley]

..whew!...I read a few entries on this thread, attempting to place myself in the mind of each poster...and I began to feel uncomfortable. Just to make sure, I looked down at the base of my chair to see if I was maybe floating off the ground....and then I reached out and pressed my hand against the wall to see if it would pass through it...and why not...just making sure.....

Your name is first something that is declared by someone else. But how do you know that is really what was declared? You can look at the evidence and see a high probability. But often your name is a matter of self-declaration. Your name becomes your name because you declared it to be so. The name that you declared might or might not be the same as the name declared by others for you.

 

Well, I guess that could be true if you never heard people call out your name...or maybe they just call you by the name you call yourself when you're around...and then when you're not around call you be another name...."skypilot", perhaps....

 

Hey, I hope I didn't make anyone mad, and I can take a joke as gladly as make one. I just think you guys are splitting way too many hairs over the application of a few general principles. Since no one can know everything, models are made of processes an order to predict whatever may occur and develop technologies. These are different than theories, in that theories are based on the testing of a hypothesis A hypothesis is formed in a distinct manner for clarity of "...when A is done to B, C happens..." Then if and when the exact same experiment is tested again by a diverse group of people, it is likely to be the basis of a theory. Those are the working principles of the last few posts.

[Ssel]

Since no one can know everything, models are made of processes an order to predict whatever may occur and develop technologies. These are different than theories, in that theories are based on the testing of a hypothesis A hypothesis is formed in a distinct manner for clarity of "...when A is done to B, C happens..." Then if and when the exact same experiment is tested again by a diverse group of people, it is likely to be the basis of a theory. Those are the working principles of the last few posts.

Exactly!

[charley]

Ssel !! -

 

On my wavelength again! Obviously, you value getting things done with your thinking as do I. To understand what I mean, contrast that to it's opposite of, as Jeff Foxworthy says, "fixin' to get ready" to get something done....hmmm....do I need to provide other examples?...I'm sure I don't..!

[Ssel]

Succinctness

 

Sight requires contrast, even if it is mental sight.