Pragmatist Defense Of Religious Faith

[♦ ficino ♦]

Llewellyn, I thought of you when I saw this review of a book by Michael Slater. Slater, says the reviewer, seeks to develop a pragmatist defense of the legitimacy of religious faith. From the review: "Thus if some philosophers are drawn to satisfying their 'metaphysical needs' by embracing one of these religious traditions, and if it turns out 'that pragmatism can be a valuable resource for defending traditional, realistic forms of religious faith,' (171) then it's not surprising that such a philosopher would attempt to elaborate that defense."

 

http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/56257-pragmatism-and-the-philosophy-of-religion/

 

The reviewer, G. Scott Davis of Univ. Richmond, thinks that from the followers of Dewey, Slater should have emphasized Richard Rorty more than he did. I won't go into the details, but I get the impression that a pragmatist defense of theism would try to show that it works well to provide a framework for sharing and living by important values that sustain communities of people. Davis thinks Rorty is useful for theists; "He is simply arguing that if and when a believer invokes clerical authority in justification for some act or policy that would otherwise be considered cruel or unjust, he has overstepped the bounds of democratic acceptability."

 

!!! Yeah, I should say so.

 

Then, says Davis, Slater moves on to Wm. James, Peirce and their disciples, who, Davis thinks, provide Slater more material for his project of defending theism. I get the impression that Slater likes these guys because they are against Cartesian essentialism and they reject the "reductive determinism" that was holding sway in science in the late 19th cent.

 

I have to say that I don't see much in this review that leads me to think that Slater grapples with the question, "Well, is it true?" But perhaps I'd need to be more up on pragmatism to appreciate even the role that such a question plays in these thinkers' attempts to legitimatize religion. The reviewer, Davis, gives the example of how we tend to see purpose behind nature. OK...

 

If someone can convince me that pragmatism provides a framework for a robust defense of the rationality of picking one set of religious dogmas to follow, and rejecting other sets of dogmas, I'll give it another look.

[Llwellyn]

I read William James "Will to Believe" and I was not convinced -- the check did not clear for me.  I haven't read Dewey's "A Common Faith," and I'm not sure if I can agree that it is worthwhile to try to put Christianity to use -- even for pragmatic ends.  It's really hard for me to imagine a requirement that religion alone meets, so it's hard for me to think of pragmatic reasons to take a religious stance or to subscribe to religious truths.  I'm not sure that we have any "metaphysical needs."  I can speak personally and say that I haven't felt a need like that arise in the past five years.  Some people may need to consume religion, and that's ok I guess.  I have no taste for it.

[♦ ficino ♦]

Yes, some people have experiences that they can't explain and think they are supernatural. Then they use a religious framework to explain them. I suspect the effect of the experience will fade away unless it's stroked and worked on within such a framework. Then it's reshaped by memory, using adopted language and symbols, and the person carries on in the religious framework as long as "it works for them."