Series of causes

[♦ ficino ♦]

Hello all, especially those who know much more about physics than I ... 

 

An important issue in Thomistic proofs of God is the appeal to series of causes that are ordered "per se." DON'T CLICK OFF YET!!

 

I read on another board that there are no "per se" ordered series of causes at the micro level. Therefore Aquinas errs.

 

I'd like to know more about this. Below follows my try at a brief explanation. After that, I'm hoping that someone can suggest an answer.

 

What's at stake? Thomistic proofs of God.

 

Here's the issue. Aquinas adopts an Aristotelian conception of efficient causes. Aquinas holds that whatever is changing in respect to property X (location, quality, whatever), must be acted on by something else that causes it to change. While the leaf is moving, on Aristotelian physics, something has to keep moving it. But that something must be moving because something is in turn moving IT. All the way back to an Unmoved Mover, since Ari holds that there can't be an infinite number of movers all moving the X thing at once.

 

The above is a "per se ordered" series of movers/causes. The first mover in the series has to move all the lower movers in order that the last motion occur. 

 

This is different from a causal series ordered only "per accidens." In an accidental causal series, the movers don't have to be moving the "moved thing" at the same time. We can have Socrates' father cause Socrates to be born, and then die, but Socrates continues to exist. The causal relation between Sophroniscus and Socrates is accidental. But if Socrates is playing the lyre, the music will continue only as long as he plays. That's a per se causal relation.

 

I have read that if you reduce all causality down to the quantum level, the per se ordered series of causes just fades away, because there are no stable substances or causes or effects at the micro/nano level. There is no unitary Socrates playing a unitary lyre. There are only subatomic particles doing their thing. And on that level, we can't say A is moving B. We can only say there is flux.

 

Why does this matter? It matters because, if per se ordered causal series just collapse into causal series ordered per accidens ... Thomas' goose is COOKED! He has to have causal series ordered per se for his proofs to go through. Thomas himself allows that there can be an actual infinity of causes ordered per accidens. There can be one thing making another thing happen all the way back in time infinitely, as long as the outcome doesn't need its first cause to be acting in the present. This is why Aquinas rejected the Kalam cosmological argument. 

 

But if per se ordered series collapse into accidental ordered series, then there can be an actual infinite of causes of the universe, and Thomas' famous cosmological argument fails. So I'm intrigued by the idea that a per se ordered series of movers or causes might just collapse into a series ordered per accidens. If it did, that would be a useful outcome for atheists and a bad outcome for Thomistic apologists.

 

Big stuff and I don't know how to evaluate it.

 

Does anyone have any insights on this?

 

Cheers, f

[pantheory]

Howdy ficino,

 

Your quotes, and my replies in blue

 

"Here's the issue. Aquinas adopts an Aristotelian conception of efficient causes. Aquinas holds that whatever is changing in respect to property X (location, quality, whatever), must be acted on by something else that causes it to change. While the leaf is moving, on Aristotelian physics, something has to keep moving it. But that something must be moving because something is in turn moving IT. All the way back to an Unmoved Mover, since Ari holds that there can't be an infinite number of movers all moving the X thing at once."

 

Aristotelian physics is contradicted by present physics theory. Newton said that once an object is in motion it will stay in motion unless acted upon by an outside force. This is the opposite of "something else has to keep an object moving." Mach said that all motion is relative, meaning that all motion must be compared to a standard, and that that standard also has no absolute motion or lack thereof, except when compared to another standard, ad infinitum.

 

"The above is a "per se ordered" series of movers/causes. The first mover in the series has to move all the lower movers in order that the last motion occurs."

 

"I have read that if you reduce all causality down to the quantum level, the per se ordered series of causes just fades away, because there are no stable substances or causes or effects at the micro/nano level. There is no unitary Socrates playing a unitary lyre. There are only subatomic particles doing their thing. And on that level, we can't say A is moving B. We can only say there is"

 

Yes, this is true according to quantum theory but such theory does not consider a background field such as a Higgs field, dark matter, quantum foam, the zero point field, virtual particles, virtual and real photons, etc. etc. any or all of which could additionally influence a particle's motion. These influences, plus all observable and unobservable influences could be all that there is to determine a particles motion. Quantum Mechanics is a statistical theory, and for motion considers probabilities of motion or direction based upon known influences, the randomness of the "normal curve" of statistics, and quantum equations derived from about 90 years of such observations.

 

As to an original cause for everything, there are several views on this. The first is that an infinite series of cause and effect incidents exists which is proposed by infinite universe proponents, and multiverse proponents who believe that one universe is caused by another. The second idea is that there is an infinite background field, the zero point field, from which random spontaneous creation of universes can occur. This also relates to our universe in particular but can relate to multiverse theory as well. The third possibility is the explanation first proposed by Big Bang theorists. This theory proposes that matter itself perpetuates its own changes over time. Time and Space together as a forth dimension fits into this idea. Based upon this proposal a beginning entity, such as a big bang entity, had internal forces within it that caused it to change in form over time resulting in the universe as it now exists, with no need for an external cause or outside influences, or a prime mover other than the beginning entity.

 

"But if per se ordered series collapse into accidental ordered series, then there can be an actual infinite of causes of the universe, and Thomas' famous cosmological argument fails. So I'm intrigued by the idea that a per se ordered series of movers or causes might just collapse into a series ordered per accidents. If it did, that would be a useful outcome for atheists and a bad outcome for Thomistic apologists."

 

In quantum field theory this is the case; ordered series can first collapse into a statistically predictable series, and eventually into unpredictable actions. IMO unpredictable actions are only unpredictable because all of the unknowns involved could never be completely known, observed or calculated.  As far as religious arguments go, Pope Pius XII, and maybe the present pope from my readings, stated that the Big Bang model and evolution are consistent with an almighty god and creation -- so it must be true . The problem, of course,  is one thing being consistent with another does not mean that either of the things being considered is necessarily valid. 

 

 

 

[♦ ficino ♦]

Thank you for these responses. I'm mulling them over.

 

Later, f

[bornagainathiest]

On 09/10/2017 at 2:41 AM, ficino said:

Hello all, especially those who know much more about physics than I ... 

 

An important issue in Thomistic proofs of God is the appeal to series of causes that are ordered "per se." DON'T CLICK OFF YET!!

 

I read on another board that there are no "per se" ordered series of causes at the micro level. Therefore Aquinas errs.

 

I'd like to know more about this. Below follows my try at a brief explanation. After that, I'm hoping that someone can suggest an answer.

 

What's at stake? Thomistic proofs of God.

 

Here's the issue. Aquinas adopts an Aristotelian conception of efficient causes. Aquinas holds that whatever is changing in respect to property X (location, quality, whatever), must be acted on by something else that causes it to change. While the leaf is moving, on Aristotelian physics, something has to keep moving it. But that something must be moving because something is in turn moving IT. All the way back to an Unmoved Mover, since Ari holds that there can't be an infinite number of movers all moving the X thing at once.

 

The above is a "per se ordered" series of movers/causes. The first mover in the series has to move all the lower movers in order that the last motion occur. 

 

This is different from a causal series ordered only "per accidens." In an accidental causal series, the movers don't have to be moving the "moved thing" at the same time. We can have Socrates' father cause Socrates to be born, and then die, but Socrates continues to exist. The causal relation between Sophroniscus and Socrates is accidental. But if Socrates is playing the lyre, the music will continue only as long as he plays. That's a per se causal relation.

 

I have read that if you reduce all causality down to the quantum level, the per se ordered series of causes just fades away, because there are no stable substances or causes or effects at the micro/nano level. There is no unitary Socrates playing a unitary lyre. There are only subatomic particles doing their thing. And on that level, we can't say A is moving B. We can only say there is flux.

 

Why does this matter? It matters because, if per se ordered causal series just collapse into causal series ordered per accidens ... Thomas' goose is COOKED! He has to have causal series ordered per se for his proofs to go through. Thomas himself allows that there can be an actual infinity of causes ordered per accidens. There can be one thing making another thing happen all the way back in time infinitely, as long as the outcome doesn't need its first cause to be acting in the present. This is why Aquinas rejected the Kalam cosmological argument. 

 

But if per se ordered series collapse into accidental ordered series, then there can be an actual infinite of causes of the universe, and Thomas' famous cosmological argument fails. So I'm intrigued by the idea that a per se ordered series of movers or causes might just collapse into a series ordered per accidens. If it did, that would be a useful outcome for atheists and a bad outcome for Thomistic apologists.

 

Big stuff and I don't know how to evaluate it.

 

Does anyone have any insights on this?

 

Cheers, f

 

Hey Ficino.

 

I can make two points that might help.  First, imho the best person to ask is the RogueScholar.  Quantum mechanics is his thing. 

 

Second, re the paragraph I've highlighted, the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncertainty_principle ...prevents us from knowing anything for certain about causes at the quantum scale.  As you say... we can't say.  

 

And this alone is all that is necessary for the cosmological argument to fail.

If nobody can say anything with certainty about causes as small as the quantum scale, then how can anything be known with certainty about the singularity - which is infinitely smaller still?  This is not the only reason why the KCA fails, but it is the one that is relevant to this thread.

 

Thanks,

 

BAA.

[♦ ficino ♦]

Hello gentlemen, I think I've followed what you both have written. However, I want to reemphasize that I am asking about a series of causes ordered "per se", not "per accidens." That is, a series in which each member of the causal series is acting simultaneously or virtually so. 

 

Aquinas would be fine with a series of causes/movers going back into infinity if the members in the series need not all exert their causality at once. 

 

Series of causes ordered per accidens: example (in Aristotelian-Thomistic lingo) the efficient cause of your conception was your father. Your father dies, you still exist. The efficient cause of your father's conception was your grandfather. And so on. This series can go back to infinity for Aquinas because not all the members are acting at once. All but one or two of them are dead. So the series doesn't constitute an actual infinite.

 

The KCA trades on the above kind of series. So Aquinas rejected the KCA. the KCA has NO RELEVANCE WHATSOEVER to any cosmological argument advanced by Aquinas.

 

Think instead of a flute player playing a tune. The tune is caused by the flute player. When the flute player stops, the tune stops. But the flute player's action, producing motion/change in the column of air in the flute, must itself be caused by something behind it - like the sun, which keeps the flute player alive. All the way up to the Unmoved Mover. The first cause in the series of causes that produces the tune NOW is the UM; proximate cause is the column of air in the flute, and so on backwards all at once. This is a series of causes ordered "per se." This is the kind of series Aquinas brings into his cosmological argument. It's an argument by which no instance of change can occur if there is not some unchanged agent powering the whole series of intermediary causes now.

 

My question was, does the above construction fall apart because the notions of "flute player," "column of air," etc. are naive? That really these break down into an inscrutable zig-zag (I use metaphor) of quantum stuff at the quantum/nano level? That these events are not in an order, they're random, so the "per se" series actually just collapses on closer look into a series ordered "per accidens" - and thus, a series that can go back to infinity?

[pantheory]

ficino,

 

"Think instead of a flute player playing a tune. The tune is caused by the flute player. When the flute player stops, the tune stops. But the flute player's action, producing motion/change in the column of air in the flute, must itself be caused by something behind it - like the sun, which keeps the flute player alive. All the way up to the Unmoved Mover. The first cause in the series of causes that produces the tune NOW is the UM; proximate cause is the column of air in the flute, and so on backwards all at once. This is a series of causes ordered "per se." This is the kind of series Aquinas brings into his cosmological argument. It's an argument by which no instance of change can occur if there is not some unchanged agent powering the whole series of intermediary causes now.

 

My question was, does the above construction fall apart because the notions of "flute player," "column of air," etc. are naive? That really these break down into an inscrutable zig-zag (I use metaphor) of quantum stuff at the quantum/nano level? That these events are not in an order, they're random, so the "per se" series actually just collapses on closer look into a series ordered "per accidens" - and thus, a series that can go back to infinity?"

 

For cause and effect actions, motion of something is always involved. Stated otherwise, actions are the cause, and reactions are the effect. In the case of motion there needs to be just one initial force upon matter for it to react by a forever continuous motion in the same direction as the force applied. At first the matter reacts by pushing back -- for every action there is an equal but opposite reaction (Newton). Following this, internal forces within the matter react to this applied force by a new directional motion. In this scenario the flute player only needs to blow the flute once and the atmospheric molecules of the Earth would have to re-adjust their position, vibration, etc. in an almost infinite chain of events.

 

As far as the chain of events backward in time from the flute player, to the causes for his playing the flute based upon his brain activities and otherwise, also results in an almost infinite series of backward-in-time effects and causes. These causes too could never be completely summed or entirely explained. As to whether either series eventually involves randomness is based upon theory. Quantum mechanics is a theory of probabilities, probabilities based upon random reactions. This system can work whether a system has randomness within it or not. It is simply a matter of statistics and the "normal curve" of possibilities. If the results from initial actions can be measured and are distributed in accord with the normal curve, then the results have a random character to them whether they are ultimately random or not. The probability of subsequent events being one way or another can be calculated.

 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normal_distribution

 

If one has never taken statistics (mathematical theory) then explanations will be more difficult. But a simpler explanation, IMO, is this:

 

The normal curve (also called a histogram) is a bell-shaped curve showing the probability distribution over a full range of measured results, each of which is considered a random variable.

 

"It's an argument by which no instance of change can occur if there is not some unchanged agent powering the whole series of intermediary causes now."

 

**The argument falls on the above statement alone. There need not be any cause but an initial one to create an almost infinite unpredictable chain of events forward in time. In the same way one cannot trace, observe, or otherwise calculate all the events backward in time necessary to explain why the flute player played at all, or at any point in time.

 

If you would adhere to present theory you could say that there is a randomness in nature that is unpredictable.  Even considering that all events have exact causes, one could say that for all practical purposes these causes collectively, whether ordered or not, could never be determined or predicted in their entirety so they might as well be random.

 

"That these events are not in an order, they're random, so the "per se" series actually just collapses on closer look into a series ordered "per accidens" - and thus, a series that can go back to infinity?"

 

Have you heard of "chaos theory?"  Your idea fits well into chaos theory. Chaos Theory is a branch of mathematics that deals with "complex systems," whose conditions are highly sensitive to slight changes, so that small changes can give rise to strikingly great consequences.

 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaos_theory

 

I think that the bottom line to the Thomasian argument being wrong, is simply that the physics of his time was wrong. There need not be any cause but an initial one to create an almost infinite unpredictable series of, not necessarily ordered events going forward in time. In the same way one cannot trace, observe, or otherwise calculate all the events backward in time necessary to explain why the flute player played at any point in time.

 

 

[bornagainathiest]

15 hours ago, ficino said:

Hello gentlemen, I think I've followed what you both have written. However, I want to reemphasize that I am asking about a series of causes ordered "per se", not "per accidens." That is, a series in which each member of the causal series is acting simultaneously or virtually so. 

 

Aquinas would be fine with a series of causes/movers going back into infinity if the members in the series need not all exert their causality at once. 

 

Series of causes ordered per accidens: example (in Aristotelian-Thomistic lingo) the efficient cause of your conception was your father. Your father dies, you still exist. The efficient cause of your father's conception was your grandfather. And so on. This series can go back to infinity for Aquinas because not all the members are acting at once. All but one or two of them are dead. So the series doesn't constitute an actual infinite.

 

The KCA trades on the above kind of series. So Aquinas rejected the KCA. the KCA has NO RELEVANCE WHATSOEVER to any cosmological argument advanced by Aquinas.

 

Think instead of a flute player playing a tune. The tune is caused by the flute player. When the flute player stops, the tune stops. But the flute player's action, producing motion/change in the column of air in the flute, must itself be caused by something behind it - like the sun, which keeps the flute player alive. All the way up to the Unmoved Mover. The first cause in the series of causes that produces the tune NOW is the UM; proximate cause is the column of air in the flute, and so on backwards all at once. This is a series of causes ordered "per se." This is the kind of series Aquinas brings into his cosmological argument. It's an argument by which no instance of change can occur if there is not some unchanged agent powering the whole series of intermediary causes now.

 

My question was, does the above construction fall apart because the notions of "flute player," "column of air," etc. are naive? That really these break down into an inscrutable zig-zag (I use metaphor) of quantum stuff at the quantum/nano level? That these events are not in an order, they're random, so the "per se" series actually just collapses on closer look into a series ordered "per accidens" - and thus, a series that can go back to infinity?

 

Sorry Ficino,

 

But I'm struggling to understand. 

In classical physics all causes acting now depend on prior causes acting in the past and so on, backwards in time.  Classically, simultaneous action at a distance is forbidden.  In quantum physics simultaneous action at a distance is allowed, but we cannot know how it happens because of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle.  

 

In classical physics, when the flute player stops playing the tune stops.

What kept the flute alive up to that moment was a series of causes that depended on prior causes, going backward in time.  But quantum physics has nothing to say about such macroscopic events.  Quantum uncertainty only becomes a factor at or approaching the quantum scale.  It's currently unknown how to integrate classical determinacy with quantum indeterminacy.  The two great pillars of modern physics, classical General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics do not talk to each other.  One deals with the macroscopic and the other with the microscopic.  

 

If your Aristotelian-Thomistic per accidens involves simultaneous action at a distance then it's disallowed by classical physics and either irrelevant or unknowable in quantum physics.  Irrelevant if it's macroscopic or unknowable it it's microscopic. 

 

Does that help at all?

 

Thanks,

 

BAA.

 

[♦ ficino ♦]

yes, this Thomistic stuff gets very difficult even to discuss because of the Aristotelian framework in which it is couched. People like Edward Feser try to drop the Aristotelian physics, which they admit is outmoded, but keep the metaphysics. I've been trying to follow through on what look to me like contradictions in Thomism even from within an Aristotelian framework. I'm still not sure how well I've lined up what look like discrepancies to me.

 

Why do I bother? Well, partly because I "work on" ancient philosophy, and partly because I think the modern Thomistic apologists are wrong and dangerous but more persuasive to a certain class of educated person than are the typical Protestant apologists.

 

The Thomistic argument from motion uses "motion" in the Aristotelian sense of "change."  Change on that understanding can be locomotion, alteration, or growth/decay. 

 

Anyway, thank you everyone for explaining some of the physics. I can't write anymore now; if it seems it's worthwhile and not too much of a time waster, I'll add later.

[Guest]

On 10/8/2017 at 6:41 PM, ficino said:

Hello all, especially those who know much more about physics than I ... 

 

An important issue in Thomistic proofs of God is the appeal to series of causes that are ordered "per se." DON'T CLICK OFF YET!!

 

I read on another board that there are no "per se" ordered series of causes at the micro level. Therefore Aquinas errs.

 

I'd like to know more about this. Below follows my try at a brief explanation. After that, I'm hoping that someone can suggest an answer.

 

What's at stake? Thomistic proofs of God.

 

Here's the issue. Aquinas adopts an Aristotelian conception of efficient causes. Aquinas holds that whatever is changing in respect to property X (location, quality, whatever), must be acted on by something else that causes it to change. While the leaf is moving, on Aristotelian physics, something has to keep moving it. But that something must be moving because something is in turn moving IT. All the way back to an Unmoved Mover, since Ari holds that there can't be an infinite number of movers all moving the X thing at once.

 

The above is a "per se ordered" series of movers/causes. The first mover in the series has to move all the lower movers in order that the last motion occur. 

 

This is different from a causal series ordered only "per accidens." In an accidental causal series, the movers don't have to be moving the "moved thing" at the same time. We can have Socrates' father cause Socrates to be born, and then die, but Socrates continues to exist. The causal relation between Sophroniscus and Socrates is accidental. But if Socrates is playing the lyre, the music will continue only as long as he plays. That's a per se causal relation.

 

I have read that if you reduce all causality down to the quantum level, the per se ordered series of causes just fades away, because there are no stable substances or causes or effects at the micro/nano level. There is no unitary Socrates playing a unitary lyre. There are only subatomic particles doing their thing. And on that level, we can't say A is moving B. We can only say there is flux.

 

Why does this matter? It matters because, if per se ordered causal series just collapse into causal series ordered per accidens ... Thomas' goose is COOKED! He has to have causal series ordered per se for his proofs to go through. Thomas himself allows that there can be an actual infinity of causes ordered per accidens. There can be one thing making another thing happen all the way back in time infinitely, as long as the outcome doesn't need its first cause to be acting in the present. This is why Aquinas rejected the Kalam cosmological argument. 

 

But if per se ordered series collapse into accidental ordered series, then there can be an actual infinite of causes of the universe, and Thomas' famous cosmological argument fails. So I'm intrigued by the idea that a per se ordered series of movers or causes might just collapse into a series ordered per accidens. If it did, that would be a useful outcome for atheists and a bad outcome for Thomistic apologists.

 

Big stuff and I don't know how to evaluate it.

 

Does anyone have any insights on this?

 

Cheers, f

Philosophically, I have adopted the idea of emergence as an broad explanation for this problem of ontology, which asserts that ontology is localized and pluralistic in nature which can be told in narrative forms and through the theoretical outcomes of the natural sciences.  The quantum realm, where things themselves sort of disappear into almost nothingness seems to really mess with our concept of what reality really is, but I think this whole concept of scales has been essentially baked into the universe through the laws of thermodynamics and gravity to create the engines of more complexly organized matter, of which we are all made from.  

 

Completely on the scale of the theoretical here, I will give what I think could be the origins of the universe from this conception.  First of all, the Big Bang is a theistic conception which was given by a Catholic Monk which accurately articulated the empirical evidence we could evaluate at this time.  We didn't know about the quantum scale, which is only now becoming visible to us through these particle colliders.  We then frame the Big Bang as the boom, FIRST moment of the universe and then say it is 13.8 billion years old.  The quantum realm shows the story of the origin of the first protons, neutrons and electrons in the super hot singularity that lasted for about 17 minutes at the moment of this "Big Bang."  If what we know about the origins of this matter is, we have to think of a scale without the constraints of spacetime, which was itself created by the vacuum energies that led to the inflation and increasing density which would see the first essentially creative use of thermodynamics with the introduction of extremely hot temperatures, which would then disperse and not recombine together for 240,000 years later that light would be introduced into the universe and it was the gravitational and nuclear forces that made possible the planetary systems such as Earth.  Who knows how "long" if such a measurement is appropriate, is to say that this vacuum energy on the level of the quantum operated, perhaps the first "virtual particles" were barely anything, and you basically had a gigantic soup of nothingness that increased time and time again until the density eventually resulted in the singularity event.  This to me seems the most likely outcome of our research on quantum vacuums and the nature of subatomic particles.  We are shaving back the layers of the world to see what sub-components are really there, but our mathematics indicates that these scales don't work the same as more tenuous scales of atomic matter and exist more in "field" states.  If you don't just assume the laws of physics to be this eternal thing, and you simply adopt a more flexible pluralistic and ontological approach to matter, then you can see that the quantum realm is what predates matter and is also from which the essential energies arose to create said matter.  

 

Its pretty crazy for me to consider that the universe just kind of arose from an emergent chaos of vacuums and fields, but it seems far more likely than an anthropomorphic loving being who built this engine of entropy to create any kind of benign universe, this is a universe run by destruction and dissatisfaction, and mankind needs to get a hold of his cognitive nature from these fictions and mythologies in order to see reality as best we can.  The sciences are great, but I think you also need to know how to explore the realm of philosophy in order to work out the implications of how these scales interact with each other as well as work out possible solutions for these problems.  My bet is on a purely naturalistic explanation for the origin of the universe, essentially from nothingness on the scale of the quantum.  None of the theistic arguments contest this, because their assumptions about causation are totally irrelevant on these scales.  It is like trying to fit your brain into a different universe, when all the ideas about which came first, the chicken or the egg become arbitrary and meaningless.  Its a real mind f**k to me, as someone who used to believe in god, to wonder on the fact that it is most likely that this is all just an interaction of chaos, entropy and opportunity of which we are but a temporary part of, but have novel functionality and perspective in order to behold it.  Its a real pleasure, and I think putting a god into mix only dampens the beauty of truly seeing all these scales working together in this strange dance of chaos and order.  

[bornagainathiest]

5 hours ago, ficino said:

yes, this Thomistic stuff gets very difficult even to discuss because of the Aristotelian framework in which it is couched. People like Edward Feser try to drop the Aristotelian physics, which they admit is outmoded, but keep the metaphysics. I've been trying to follow through on what look to me like contradictions in Thomism even from within an Aristotelian framework. I'm still not sure how well I've lined up what look like discrepancies to me.

 

Why do I bother? Well, partly because I "work on" ancient philosophy, and partly because I think the modern Thomistic apologists are wrong and dangerous but more persuasive to a certain class of educated person than are the typical Protestant apologists.

 

The Thomistic argument from motion uses "motion" in the Aristotelian sense of "change."  Change on that understanding can be locomotion, alteration, or growth/decay. 

 

Anyway, thank you everyone for explaining some of the physics. I can't write anymore now; if it seems it's worthwhile and not too much of a time waster, I'll add later.

 

 

Ficino,

 

It doesn't matter what terms the Thomists use (motion, alteration, change, etc.) because in the classical physics of General Relativity NO causal influence can happen faster than c, the speed of light.  Causal influences that are too widely separated from the observer across the hypersurface of the present simply have no effect on that observer... or flute player.  Nor can recognition that the player has stopped playing travel outward from him faster than c.  The rigidity of classical physics excludes the possibility of simultaneity and ensures determinism.  

 

But in quantum physics the phenomenon of quantum entanglement allows quantum-scale entities like photons to causally influence each other faster than c.  

 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Action_at_a_distance

 

But as has already been mentioned, this action-at-a-distance is impossible for macroscopic entities like flute players.

Only quantum-scale entities can be entangled.  This doesn't help the Thomists because Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle prevents them from using the deterministic certainty of classical physics.  They are left in an indeterminate fog of probabilities.  

 

Thanks,

 

BAA.

[disillusioned]

I've been keeping an eye on this thread and meaning to comment, but work has been persistently getting in the way.

 

Ultimately, I think that the problem (one of the problems?) is that the Aristotelian metaphysics that the Thomistic arguments are based on is flawed. I'm not sure why one would insist on keeping a metaphysical framework when one has discarded the outmoded physics that it accompanies, except if one has a vested interest. I haven't read any of Feser's stuff (not really my usual oeuvre), but I'd be interested in looking at his reasoning for keeping Aristotelian metaphysics.

[♦ ficino ♦]

Thanks for your contributions, guys. I'll get back in several days. Cheers, f

[♦ ficino ♦]

Hello all, thank you for replying above on this thread. I said I'd be back in a few days, and it's almost two months. I apologize. I did not have much or anything of value to say, though. BAA, I am sorry that I don't quite know where to go with the cone diagram that you so generously posted.

 

I am really at a disadvantage on cosmological arguments because I only had one semester of college physics and really had to sweat it to eke out a B, har har. And that was longer ago than I care to say.

 

Having reread the above, I see I could explain the Thomistic-Feser concept of a "hierarchical series of causes ordered per se" more clearly.

 

First, Aquinas defines change as the actualization of a potentiality. A piece of wood has the potentiality to become hot; eventually it does become hot by a series of changes caused by the fire, which actualizes the wood's potentiality to be hot.

 

Second, Aquinas follows Aristotle in holding that something potential cannot actualize itself (or anything). Things cannot cause themselves. Something potential can only be brought to actuality by something that is actual in the relevant respect.  The fire is already hot, so it can actualize the wood's potency to be hot. A cup at the same temperature as the wood, placed next to the wood, is just as potential w/ respect to heat as the wood is, so the cup will not heat the wood; the cup is not actually hot so it doesn't have causal power/can't actualize heat.

 

But everything in our world is potential in some respect. So nothing can cause itself. Eventually, there must be something uncaused, which is wholly actual.

 

There are two basic kinds of causal series. A linear causal series, or a series ordered per accidens, is one in which each member derives its causal power only from the immediately preceding member. A guy lights a candle. A second guy comes and lights a second candle from the first. The causal power of the first man does not govern the lighting of the second candle. Another example: the efficient cause of Socrates is his father, and of his father, his father, going back as far in time as you want. Each man causes only his son/s; no man must be exerting causal power for his grandsons to be born. Aquinas allows an accidental series of causes can go to infinity.

 

In a hierarchical causal series, one ordered per se, all the subordinate causes, whether they operate simultaneously or nearly so, derive their causal power from the first cause. The subordinate causes do not have independent causal power. Feser likes the example, a man with a stick pushes a rock, which in turn pushes a leaf. the causal power of the stick and rock are wholly derived from the causal power of the man. They are instrumental causes only. 

 

Aquinas' First and Second Ways deal with hierarchical causal series ordered per se. Aquinas denies that a per se causal series can be infinite.  In a per se chain of causes, each subordinate agent is partly potential and partly actual. Each agent is instrumental. All the subordinate, instrumental agents operate simultaneously or nearly so. Since an actual infinite is impossible in A-T metaphysics, there has to be a first cause that itself is not caused. It's wholly actual. It's the First Uncaused Cause, Unmoved Mover, etc. i.e. God.

 

I've participated now on Feser's blog and on the classical theism forum that began as a discussion site for Feser's blog:

 

http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/

 

http://classicaltheism.boardhost.com/viewforum.php?id=2

 

There has been a lot of discussion lately of topics that came up in our thread here, and I don't know how to evaluate the discussion. One anti-Thomist fellow, StarDustyPsyche, is convinced that physics has exploded Aquinas' cosmological proofs. Other posters say that SDP doesn't understand physics, and they insist that Thomistic metaphysics are totally valid, even if details of the physics are not. They insist that basic A-T notions like "change is actualization of a potency by something actual," "things have essences that determine how they operate," or "essence is distinct from existence," are so basic that they underlie science, even if science uses different vocabulary. They insist that when properly understood, A-T cosmology is not refuted by modern physics anyway. That's because 1) some of the key terms, like "motion" or "cause" have different senses between the two systems; 2) other notions have been upheld by modern physics.

 

If anyone has the time to poke around on "Star Dusty Psyche's Thread" over there and offer an evaluation, I will appreciate hearing it! The followers of Feser insist that Star Dusty is all wrong about physics, and I have not way of deciding who is right on that score.

 

 

 

 

[♦ ficino ♦]

Here's an example, from a commentator called Mr. Green. Sorry it's kind of long:

 

"Ben: Ahmed's assertion that we don't need the act-potency distinction to explain the bounciness of a rubber ball when there is a perfectly respectable scientific alternative that makes reference to such a ball's "elasticity" was beside the point.

Ahmed made a few blunders, and that was one of them. I wish Ed had had time to dig into it, because it's not even beside the point, it actually illustrates Ed's point! "Elasticity" just IS potentiality — it's a specific kind of potential, that's all. "Potency" is simply the general term; if we are referring to a specific object, like a rubber ball, then obviously we can refer to its specific potencies (elasticity, deliquescence, rollability, etc.).

In fact, this is a pretty common mistake. You often hear people claiming that modern science "doesn't need" or "doesn't use" those old-fashioned Aristotelian notions like act and potency, substance and accident, those ghastly four causes!, etc. But of course science hasn't dispensed with any of it. Sometimes it uses different terminology, but for the most part it uses more specific terminology — because that's the whole point of science. Metaphysics is the study of being — any being, being in general; it uses completely general terminology. Physics is the study of particular beings, of this particular nature and that. Its whole job is to tell us what specific potencies an electron (say) has, what its formal and final causes are — and it does; form, matter, act, potency, the lot.

It gets worse: the specific sciences, like physics, chemistry, etc. do use the old-fashioned Aristotelian terms too. And not just in the sense that any physics textbook is of course occasionally going to use generic words like "cause"; I mean they use the actual technical terminology that comes from philosophy. Only someone who doesn't know physics could say that modern science doesn't have "potentials". The first physics textbook I have to hand (no, not written by Aristotle, it includes relativity and QM) has entries for "potential energy (elastic, electric, gravitational, vibrational)". Yes, "elastic": not only is elasticity a type of potentiality, it's one that actual physicists still talk about today using the literal word "potential". I'm not saying every such word is used in exactly the same sense ("species" in biology, and "substance" in chemistry have of course diverged from their obvious Aristotelian roots), but all that means is that maybe some of the connections are merely half-obvious instead of blatantly obvious.

Just for fun, let's see what our phusis textbook says about P.E.: "an object has the capacity or potential to do work even though it is not yet actually doing it. That is why we use the term 'potential' energy." (Oh, look, they used the word "actual" too! I won't bother looking up "activation energy", "capacitance", "causality", "efficiency", "formula", "matter", "motion", "radioactivity, artificial", "virtual", or "Aristotle" (p.1), etc.)

 

http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2017/12/feser-vs-ahmed-on-unbelievable.html#comment-form

[disillusioned]

I'm afraid I don't have a firm enough grasp of philosophy to state with authority that modern physics definitely does away with Aristotelian metaphysics. But my (rather uninformed) opinion is that Aristotelian metaphysics is seriously flawed. But I don't think that the major problem is with an act-potent distinction. I think it is with the statement that something potential cannot actualize itself.

 

Mr Green is correct in his assessment of potentials in physics. Potential energy is a vital concept. Without it, the law of energy conservation would be in very serious trouble, and with it, just about all of physics. But here's the thing: when there is potential energy in a system, that potential can be converted to "actual" energy without an external cause. As a simple example, consider a rock that is elevated above the surface of the Earth to a height h, and then dropped. At the height h, the rock has some gravitational potential energy. The moment it is released, that potential energy begins to become kinetic energy, which could be considered to be "actual" energy. What causes the rock to fall? Well, a naive interpretation is that the Earth is exerting a gravitational force upon the rock, and hence the Earth is causing the rock to fall. But this is incomplete. It is equally correct to say that the rock exerts a gravitational force upon the Earth. Indeed, it is equally correct to say that the rock is not initially at a height h above the Earth, but that the Earth is at a height h above the rock. So it is the Earth-rock system that experiences a change, and nothing external to the system causes the change.

 

I think that many more examples of change occurring within systems without an external cause can be given. This seems to me to be problematic for Aristotelian metaphysics. But, as I said before, this is not my area of expertise.

[♦ ficino ♦]

Hi Disillusioned, thanks for answering.

 

In your example of the rock, something was restraining the rock at height h and then took away the restraint. How does the release of restraint figure in the system of earth-rock? It seems as though the releaser would be outside that system. So isn't energy injected into the rock-earth system by the releaser?

 

On Aristotelian physics, FWIW, the rock's natural motion is toward the earth because the rock is made mainly of earth, and earth as the heaviest of the four natural bodies by nature moves toward the center of the cosmos, the earth. The rock is held by force above the earth, so that its natural motion is blocked. Something has to keep holding it there. Thus, its revolution or hovering or whatever above the earth is its potential to be located at height h. That potential is actualized by the restrainer. When the restraint is released, the rock's natural motion begins. Then its potential to be at rest at its proper place in the cosmos becomes actualized. But not directly by anything outside itself during the course of its motion toward the earth.  I think the natural motion of the simple bodies actually is more problematic for Aquinas than is, say, uniform rectilinear motion, because the natural motion of simple bodies comes close to self-motion. But I will not push Aristotelian physics today!

 

Anyway, defenders of Aquinas have different strategies. One is to deny a la Newton that uniform rectilinear motion counts as change. Then they fall back on acceleration or alteration or other sorts of changes, which they say do need to be carried through at every moment by a Mover that is wholly act.

 

I think you are right that a weak spot in the Thomistic account is the assumption that whatever is not completely "in act/actual" cannot initiate its own changes. The need for a First Uncaused Cause or Unmoved Mover is created by adhering to this principle that whatever is even partly potential cannot be the source of its own change.

[disillusioned]

1 hour ago, ficino said:

Hi Disillusioned, thanks for answering.

 

In your example of the rock, something was restraining the rock at height h and then took away the restraint. How does the release of restraint figure in the system of earth-rock? It seems as though the releaser would be outside that system. So isn't energy injected into the rock-earth system by the releaser?

 

Not necessarily. The rock could have been launched into the air by, say, a violent earthquake or a volcanic eruption. The cause of that disturbance could then be analysed, and that would lead us down a geophysical road rife with tectonic plates, stresses, strains, and various other forms of potential energy becoming actual in the event of the earthquake. But these causes, whatever they might turn out to be, exist within the earth-rock system. Nothing external to the system is necessary to enact the change that is the disturbance, or the subsequent change that is the rock's potential energy becoming kinetic energy.

 

1 hour ago, ficino said:

Anyway, defenders of Aquinas have different strategies. One is to deny a la Newton that uniform rectilinear motion counts as change. Then they fall back on acceleration or alteration or other sorts of changes, which they say do need to be carried through at every moment by a Mover that is wholly act.

 

I think you are right that a weak spot in the Thomistic account is the assumption that whatever is not completely "in act/actual" cannot initiate its own changes. The need for a First Uncaused Cause or Unmoved Mover is created by adhering to this principle that whatever is even partly potential cannot be the source of its own change.

 

The question in the OP was about the micro scale. So what if we leave motion on the macro scale behind and look at radioactivity? A given radioactive isotope decays at a known rate (statistically speaking), but it is impossible to predict when any given atom will undergo decay. Moreover, when an atom does decay, it does so without any outside prompting. For example, potassium-40 decays into calcium-40 about 89% of the time and into Argon-40 about 11% of the time. The half-life of potassium-40 is about 1.25 billion years. So if I have 100 atoms of potassium-40, in 1.25 billion years I will have only 50 left. But which 50 it will be is impossible to predict, as is the moment in time when any given atom will undergo decay. And when an atom does decay, it just does so apparently of its own accord. So each atom of potassium-40 intrinsically has the potential to become either calcium-40 or argon-40. But nothing in particular outside of the atom itself causes it to do so. It just does. Or doesn't, as the case may be. On my limited understanding of Thomistic metaphysics, this seems quite problematic.

[pantheory]

Howdy ficino, glad you followed through by coming back on your thread.

 

I will comment point for point of the parts of your new querry, that I think error of thinking may lie, concerning Mr. Green.

 

" First, Aquinas defines change as the actualization of a potentiality."

 

I think Thomas Aquinas (TA) hits the nail on the head with this quote, but maybe its not the entire story of change. More modern ideas might state that "change" is the alteration of relative position that involves motion and defines time. But its initiation certainly involves the actualization of potential energy, potential energy being a concept of classical physics, after TA's time.

 

So let's give TA an 'A' for his logic on this one.

 

His next (ideas) quote may be where the problem of logic fails. This possible error of thinking was also noted by Disillusioned above.

 

"Second, Aquinas follows Aristotle in holding that something potential cannot actualize itself (or anything). Things cannot cause themselves. Something potential can only be brought to actuality by something that is actual in the relevant respect." 

 

Something that has potential must already exist to start with, so its potential would not be actualizing itself, it's potential could change the nature of itself or the nature of something else by the actualization of part of its potential, but, or course, it could not create itself in the first place.

 

I will have to give TA and Aristotle a 'C' grade on this conclusion, although the statement is logical, the conclusion is not necessary valid and the logic can lead one astray. Although both were super-intellects of their time, neither had the background of observational and experimental evidence, as we do today, to have a firm foundation for their logic.

 

Next TA follows his logic by this......................."since an actual infinite (causal series) is impossible in A-T metaphysics, there has to be a first cause that itself is not caused. It's wholly actual. It's the First Uncaused Cause, Unmoved Mover, etc. i.e. God."

 

Putting TA's "God" conclusion aside, I would have to give him an 'A-" for this logic. I think many in modern physics do not truly understand the logical concept the TA was trying to convey.

 

In the original version of the Big Bang (BB), which many still adhere to, the Big Bang beginning entity had a finite size having 3 dimensions, and the potential to change which upon actualization of this potential created a forth dimension which we call change and define its extension as "time." I believe this is very good logic for a beginning entity of some kind, even though I don't  adhere to the BB theory in general.

 

In this logic there is a beginning entity, but there was no such thing as time before that entity. No need for a God to explain the beginning.

 

It would be impossible for a beginning entity, or the prime mover of the universe to have had an ultimate cause itself. The logic follows:

 

If it were possible for time to exist before the beginning of the known universe, then what would be the meaning of time? If time is change then there would have been a cause before the first cause which is a logical contradiction.  If the cause of this universe was physical, in our dimensions or not, the result would be an infinite series of cause-and-effect occurrences backward in time. By definition an infinite universe(s) backward in time would have had no beginning. On the other hand,   if the prime mover were a god of some kind,  such a god could have had no cause, otherwise there would be an infinite series going backward it time.

 

So bottom line is that it would be logically impossible for a beginning entity of any kind to have had a cause, since an infinite series backward it time, by definition could have no cause.

 

I think my paraphrased quote came from St Thomas but I couldn't find it in summaries of his quotes. If not from him but from somebody else, I think that it is appropriate for this thread.

 

Paraphrased "Ive often wondered what God did in the infinite time he had before creating the heavens and the Earth."

 

P.S.

Maybe this quote from Augustine of Hippus, is where I got the supposed quote above. It was about 800 years before St, Thomas.

 

Augustine was asked  “What was God doing before he made heaven and earth?” He answered, shrugging off the force of the question, “he was preparing hell for those who pry too deep.”

 

[♦ ficino ♦]

3 hours ago, disillusioned said:

 

And when an atom does decay, it just does so apparently of its own accord. So each atom of potassium-40 intrinsically has the potential to become either calcium-40 or argon-40. But nothing in particular outside of the atom itself causes it to do so. It just does. Or doesn't, as the case may be. 

Hi Disillusioned, I think yours above gets to the heart of what Thomists try to do. They would say, first, "Well, SOMETHING causes the atom to degrade either into calcium-40 or argon-40, even if we can't predict which way it will go." Second, they would say, "Aha! You are like all atheists in taking refuge in Brute Fact with your 'it just does.' Hold that something 'just does' and you are holding to a world-view that is at bottom irrational. The scientific enterprise depends on certain metaphysical assumptions, and if stuff just happens w/ no cause, then science is overthrown. If causality disappears on the micro level, there is no causality on the macro level. That's why atheism is a dead-end."

 

My experience and thoughts so far lead me to say it makes more sense to postulate that the universe or multiverse is eternal, always undergoing change, shit happens, a lot of the time it holds together, sometimes it doesn't. I wouldn't be so inclined to involve myself if it weren't for the continual efforts of traditional Catholics to force all of society to adhere to their taboos.

 

 

[disillusioned]

14 hours ago, ficino said:

Hi Disillusioned, I think yours above gets to the heart of what Thomists try to do. They would say, first, "Well, SOMETHING causes the atom to degrade either into calcium-40 or argon-40, even if we can't predict which way it will go." Second, they would say, "Aha! You are like all atheists in taking refuge in Brute Fact with your 'it just does.' Hold that something 'just does' and you are holding to a world-view that is at bottom irrational. The scientific enterprise depends on certain metaphysical assumptions, and if stuff just happens w/ no cause, then science is overthrown. If causality disappears on the micro level, there is no causality on the macro level. That's why atheism is a dead-end."

 

Right. I can see how that response might be made. But it would seem to me to be begging the question. What is being contested is whether or not things can happen without a cause, and the counter argument is, basically, "stuff can't happen without a cause!!!!!". Not the strongest of arguments.

 

Also, I think it's worth pointing out that it does remain possible that there is some sort of an unknown cause in the scenario described above. But if there is one, we don't know what it is, and we don't have any direct evidence of its existence or of its influence on the potassium atom in question. In other words, it seems very much as if there is no cause. We can insist that there must be one if we like, but that would be just a baseless assertion. I'm also not sure that no causality on the micro level implies no causality on the macro level. This just doesn't seem to follow. There are lots of phenomena that exist on the macro level but not on the micro level.

 

14 hours ago, ficino said:

My experience and thoughts so far lead me to say it makes more sense to postulate that the universe or multiverse is eternal, always undergoing change, shit happens, a lot of the time it holds together, sometimes it doesn't. I wouldn't be so inclined to involve myself if it weren't for the continual efforts of traditional Catholics to force all of society to adhere to their taboos.

 

I agree with this.

[♦ ficino ♦]

7 hours ago, disillusioned said:

 

I'm also not sure that no causality on the micro level implies no causality on the macro level. This just doesn't seem to follow. There are lots of phenomena that exist on the macro level but not on the micro level.

 

 

Hmm... this sounds promising. Can you elaborate? I can hear someone replying, "Well, let's say the moon is made of green cheese. And green cheese is made of molecules that are made of etc etc all the way down to subatomic particles we'll call Cheezies. But Cheezies do not exist. Good night, Moon."

[♦ ficino ♦]

I invite anyone who's interested to check out this thread, where the Argument from Motion is being disputed. I have no clue how to decide people's claims about the physics. The arg is really about the existence of the "god of classical theism," not the truth of Christianity as such.

 

http://classicaltheism.boardhost.com/viewtopic.php?pid=8407#p8407

[disillusioned]

On 10/12/2017 at 7:51 PM, ficino said:

Hmm... this sounds promising. Can you elaborate? I can hear someone replying, "Well, let's say the moon is made of green cheese. And green cheese is made of molecules that are made of etc etc all the way down to subatomic particles we'll call Cheezies. But Cheezies do not exist. Good night, Moon."

 

Well, I have to confess that I hardly know where to begin here. I think it would be untenable to hold that nothing which does not exist on the micro level can exist on the macro level. Take, for example, temperature. Without getting too technical, temperature is a measure of the average kinetic energy of the particles in a substance. It is a quantity that no serious person contends does not exist. But, if we go from the macro to the micro, it fades away. Let's say, for example, that I have 10 billion oxygen atoms. Each atom has some kinetic energy. The temperature of all the oxygen atoms is a measure of the average kinetic energy of these atoms. But if I decrease the number of atoms to one, it no longer makes sense to talk about temperature. We might speak of the kinetic energy of that one atom, but that is a different thing. Nobody speaks of the temperature of a single atom. It just doesn't make sense to do so. In order to speak of temperature, we need a statistical ensemble, and for that we need considerably more than one atom.

 

Perhaps a better example is to consider atoms themselves. Just about everyone I know would agree with me if I said that everything is made of atoms. But, if we get right down to it, atoms themselves are made of protons, neutrons, and electrons. And protons and neutrons are made of quarks. And quarks may be made of strings. Or not. No one really knows. So, it is not, strictly speaking, correct to say that everything is made of atoms. Atoms themselves fade away if we go down far enough.

 

Why should causality be any different? When we look at the world around us, we see causality all the time. B occurs. It was caused by A. And A is not B. Everyone knows that this is true. But everyone also knows that temperature is real, and everything is made of atoms. 

 

I'm not much of a philosopher. Mainly, I try to be pragmatic. I think that it is generally a useful idea that something potential cannot actualize itself. It helps us to make sense of what we observe around us every day. But the question that I want to ask is whether this is a principle which actually underlies nature, or whether it is merely a notion that we have contrived to help us understand what we observe. It is conceivable, at least to my mind, that what we commonly call causality is not actually fundamental to nature, but is merely a phenomenon which arises out of a confluence of various other factors. This is not to say that causality is definitely not fundamental to nature; I can't assert that with any sort of authority. But my limited knowledge of physics has led me to question whether or not we can say with certainty that it is. And if we can't say with certainty that causality is fundamental to nature, then it seems to me that the conclusions of Thomistic "proofs" of God do not need to be accepted.

 

I've looked briefly at the link you provided. I found it interesting, if somewhat beyond my depth. I plan on revisiting it over the next few days. I'm not sure that any comments of mine would really lend clarity to these issues, but who knows? In any case, these are deep and interesting matters and I appreciate the opportunity to learn more about them.