Negative And Positive Claims And Burden Of Proof

[mymistake]

 

I see what you're saying, but I think we could theoretically find evidence to give a lot of confidence in the mythical Jesus proposition. Imagine we found a letter where Paul is asking for advice on whether he should have Jesus crucified or stoned or executed in some other way? That would be strong evidence if it could be shown to be an authentic letter of Paul, and then we would know that Paul invented Christianity from scratch as some people have suggested.

 

I think the default should be "I'm not convinced the Jesus of the gospels was based on historical person, but I'm also not convinced of the opposite".

 

 

With all due respect such a letter would not prove that James did not have a brother name Jesus.  It would only demonstrate what we already know - that Paul was making up his gospel.  If we found official Roman census records (which probably don't exist because as I understand it no census was taken) that list the family of James and no Jesus was mentioned that still doesn't prove that such a brother didn't exist.  It is incredibly difficult to prove a negative regarding something that happened so long ago.

 

When I tell you that I have a pet dragon, he lives in my garage, he can be completely silent and he can make himself invisible . . . is your first thought "that might be true or it might be false"?  If my friend Bob then told you that I was lying about the dragon would you doubt Bob?  Bob is making the negative claim and it would be impossible for Bob to prove that he is right.  If you check my garage well perhaps my dragon went for an invisible flight around the neighborhood and doesn't want to come back while you are in his home.

 

Now of course we would apply Occam's razor and cut through that problem but Occam's razor isn't proof.  It only tells us what is more likely.

[♦ ficino ♦]

 

 

Would a pseudoproposition be something subjective like "I feel good"? I probably don't understand what you're suggesting on pseudopropositions.

 

 

 

I pulled the term "pseudoproposition" out of my butt.  It may well be a good term, though.

 

You're familiar with a pseudo-question?  It's an utterance in the form of a question but one that in principle does not admit of an answer under any accepted methodology.  E.g. "how many imperceptible ghosts are there in this room?"  Probably even just "ghosts" without "imperceptible" since we have no methodology for detecting ghosts.

 

"I feel good" may be vague, but it's not what I was thinking of with "pseudoproposition." I'd consider it an assertion that conveys a proposition that can be true or false.  The judge of its truth is you.  Everyone's sensory and emotional presentations are true for them, I should think.

 

By a pseudoproposition I was thinking of the content of an utterance that is in the form of an assertion but that does not have a truth value.  Aristotle's famous example, "there will be a sea battle tomorrow," was in his view neither true nor false because the conditions under which truth values can be satisfied don't exist yet.  Another example would be a nonsensical sentence.  Logicians have different views on whether certain weird sentences are meaningless or just false, but perhaps "This figure is a square triangle" would count as nonsensical (I don't know whether some would say, given a particular figure, that it's just false).

 

If there's a proposition, the truth of which can't in principle be established under any methodology, I'd call them pseudopropositions.  In religious talk, obviously, then we get into the problem, what methodology is to be used.  Just thinking off the top of my head, I'd consider some shit in the bible true, a lot of shit in the bible false, and other shit pseudo-props.  Perhaps some of the prophecies in the NT about the End Times would count as pseudo-props.

[directionless]

 

Would a pseudoproposition be something subjective like "I feel good"? I probably don't understand what you're suggesting on pseudopropositions.

I pulled the term "pseudoproposition" out of my butt.  It may well be a good term, though.

 

You're familiar with a pseudo-question?  It's an utterance in the form of a question but one that in principle does not admit of an answer under any accepted methodology.  E.g. "how many imperceptible ghosts are there in this room?"  Probably even just "ghosts" without "imperceptible" since we have no methodology for detecting ghosts.

 

"I feel good" may be vague, but it's not what I was thinking of with "pseudoproposition." I'd consider it an assertion that conveys a proposition that can be true or false.  The judge of its truth is you.  Everyone's sensory and emotional presentations are true for them, I should think.

 

By a pseudoproposition I was thinking of the content of an utterance that is in the form of an assertion but that does not have a truth value.  Aristotle's famous example, "there will be a sea battle tomorrow," was in his view neither true nor false because the conditions under which truth values can be satisfied don't exist yet.  Another example would be a nonsensical sentence.  Logicians have different views on whether certain weird sentences are meaningless or just false, but perhaps "This figure is a square triangle" would count as nonsensical (I don't know whether some would say, given a particular figure, that it's just false).

 

If there's a proposition, the truth of which can't in principle be established under any methodology, I'd call them pseudopropositions.  In religious talk, obviously, then we get into the problem, what methodology is to be used.  Just thinking off the top of my head, I'd consider some shit in the bible true, a lot of shit in the bible false, and other shit pseudo-props.  Perhaps some of the prophecies in the NT about the End Times would count as pseudo-props.

 

I've never studied logic or philosophy, so I don't understand Aristotles issue with the proposition "there will be a battle at sea tomorrow". Is his issue that tomorrow hasn't happened yet so the proposition is uncertain today?

 

If the universe is deterministic then I would argue that future events are already true or false even if it is too complicated for human minds to predict with certainty.

 

Also, science is all about predicting the future. For example, we want to know that a spacecraft will reach its destination. We want to know about climate change. ...

[♦ ficino ♦]

Hi D, as for Ari, yes, it's because tomorrow hasn't happened yet. 

 

As to your remarks that in a deterministic universe, "future events are already true or false," I would suggest that in logic, we restrict the application of "true" and "false" to propositions and the statements that express them.  It's confusing to talk about events that are true.  Better to talk about true and false propositions about events.

 

Note too, BTW, that usually logicians distinguish a proposition from sentences that express it.  For example, these are two different sentences:

 

"It rains only if there are clouds."

"If it's raining, then there are clouds."

 

But both of these sentences express the same proposition:  where P = it is raining and Q = there are clouds, these sentences express the proposition that can be written in logical notation as P ⊃ Q.  ⊃ is translated as "if ... then" or "implies".  There are other symbols used for the same logical relation.

 

I don't know whether a proposition about the future has a truth value now, before the conditions are met under which its truth value is satisfied.  When I was in college we learned about a medieval Hebrew philosopher who followed Ari's view and argued that God's omniscience does not extend to future events because no true statement can be made about them.  I have never succeeded in remembering or finding out that guy's name - Levi ben Gerson, maybe?  I think that people who argue that God's omniscience extends to future events AND that God does not cause or determine those events, at least as the originator of a chain of causes, argue incoherently.  I agree with you that if the truth about a future event can be known, even if not by us, then it implies that the event has been determined.  But I haven't worked through all the arguments about this point, and there are many in the literature.

 

As to science, then you get into inductive vs. deductive arguments.  Usually an inductive argument is held to be one that uses at least one premise not known to be true.  My understanding of reasoning about science is that it's inductive.  I'm sure we agree that a scientific theory is abandoned when its predictive power is surpassed by that of another theory.  The knowledge we get is not absolutely certain, right?  But as you suggested earlier, if the probability is very strong, the conclusion counts as knowledge in at least a practical sense.

[directionless]

Hi D, as for Ari, yes, it's because tomorrow hasn't happened yet. 

 

As to your remarks that in a deterministic universe, "future events are already true or false," I would suggest that in logic, we restrict the application of "true" and "false" to propositions and the statements that express them.  It's confusing to talk about events that are true.  Better to talk about true and false propositions about events.

 

Note too, BTW, that usually logicians distinguish a proposition from sentences that express it.  For example, these are two different sentences:

 

"It rains only if there are clouds."

"If it's raining, then there are clouds."

 

But both of these sentences express the same proposition:  where P = it is raining and Q = there are clouds, these sentences express the proposition that can be written in logical notation as P ⊃ Q.  ⊃ is translated as "if ... then" or "implies".  There are other symbols used for the same logical relation.

I vaguely remember that from math classes. I probably need to buy a book about logic for dummies, so I can use the right terminology.

 

I don't know whether a proposition about the future has a truth value now, before the conditions are met under which its truth value is satisfied.  When I was in college we learned about a medieval Hebrew philosopher who followed Ari's view and argued that God's omniscience does not extend to future events because no true statement can be made about them.  I have never succeeded in remembering or finding out that guy's name - Levi ben Gerson, maybe?  I think that people who argue that God's omniscience extends to future events AND that God does not cause or determine those events, at least as the originator of a chain of causes, argue incoherently.  I agree with you that if the truth about a future event can be known, even if not by us, then it implies that the event has been determined.  But I haven't worked through all the arguments about this point, and there are many in the literature.

 

As to science, then you get into inductive vs. deductive arguments.  Usually an inductive argument is held to be one that uses at least one premise not known to be true.  My understanding of reasoning about science is that it's inductive.  I'm sure we agree that a scientific theory is abandoned when its predictive power is surpassed by that of another theory.  The knowledge we get is not absolutely certain, right?  But as you suggested earlier, if the probability is very strong, the conclusion counts as knowledge in at least a practical sense.

It's interesting when I think about some of these ideas in detail that I realize I don't understand them. This reminds me of something I read about Zen Buddhism in a book by Alan Watts. He said a Zen master can show you that anything you claim to be true isn't so true as you thought. Probably if a person was smart enough they would realize they know nothing at all.

 

Here is a link to a wikipedia article about a mathematical theory of inductive inference. I don't understanding the article, but it looks interesting because Occam's razor is hard for me to define.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solomonoff's_theory_of_inductive_inference

[♦ ficino ♦]

Here's a link to a helpful summary of some basics of logic.

 

http://forums.philosophyforums.com/threads/very-basic-terms-of-logic-6816.html

[directionless]

Here's a link to a helpful summary of some basics of logic.

 

http://forums.philosophyforums.com/threads/very-basic-terms-of-logic-6816.html

Thanks. Question is will I actually educate myself? I wish I could say I read the post, but so far I look at it and think "hmmm, that looks complicated." You can take the horse to water but you can't make him drink.

[Neverlandrut]

Just read your original post ficino. That's a good description of the difference between assertive claims and possitions of doubt casting. I agree. I don't go around claiming to know god does not exist. I obviously don't KNOW that. Many believers point that out to strengthen their possition which is a bit of a straw man tactic because no one really KNOWS anything. I do not believe in god because all of the evidence there is highly suggests to me that all god concepts are man made and not based on anything objectively real. It is in the realm of possibility that a god could exist, but what is a god exactly? Debating whether or not some general god concept is true is a moot point because the concept is so ill defined. I would say that claiming god does not exist is a bit different than saying "I see no evidential reason to think a god does exist." Would you say this is the same as saying, "There is a difference between not believing and believing not?" I can reject the claim without possitively believing the opposite. However, when it comes to existence claims, lack of evidence leaves us with no other option but to assume it does not exist. If the concept can not be shown to have any demonstrable effect, then that absence of evidence is, to a degree, evidence of absence. The default assumption of non-existence is the only reasonable possition regarding unevidenced existence claims. When it comes to Jesus claims, we know that the character of Jesus exists and is consistent with the character of other first century rabbis. He is described as a human doing very human things that are consistent with other things we know about people in that time period, so it is plausible that Jesus was a real person. The fact that there are no other records of him also makes it plausible that he was made up or based on someone else. Which is more likely depends on what evidence there is to examine. If there is not enough evidence to examine, then it is a big "I don't know."

 

P.S. When it comes to "god" as a general concept, I suppose we cannot meaningfully say it exists or does not exist, becsause "god" is so ill defined. Without a coherent working definition of "god," we can't say yes, no, or even I don't know with any meaning. Because we don't even know what the hell we are talking about! The only meaningful response we can give to "Does god exist," is to ask "What is a god?" So far, all definitions of god I have heard are either logically flawed, unsubstantiated, refuted, dripping with religious superstition, or some combination of those. If the concept is based on any of what I just listed, it is highly likely not to be an accurate description of anything objectively real.