Bart Ehrman - Jesus Interrupted

[LNC]

But I disagree that God is above morality. If God is above morality, then I don't see why we as humans should be expected to follow a hypocrite who simply changes his mind as to what counts as morality arbitrarily. For LNC to argue that God is above morality to me would be like a parent is above morality and so they have a right to rape their own child if they want to just because the parent gave birth to the child. Besides, if God was supposedly perfect and all-loving like Christians say, then we would expect God to rise above petty human emotions, but the bible God seems to act more like a childish brat half the time than a loving god. Even Jesus acts ten times better than his own dad does. And even if God is above morality, God doesn't even follow that right half the time, as God just seems to do whatever he wants and can't go a single page without contradicting himself. And if God is above morality, then wouldn't whatever God says is moral be about as relevant to us as whatever Hitler says is morality? I just don't get this argument from xtians that our morals come from God yet they admit God is not moral. How do you get morals from a being that isn't moral?

 

I have never argued that God is above morality as I believe he is the basis of morality. Morality is grounded in God's nature and apart from that grounding, we have no basis of objective morality as I have argued in the past. In fact, when I put out the challenge for those on this site to give me a basis of objective morality apart from God, no one was able to produce one. I simply think that those on this site may be missing what God was doing or jumping the gun in judgment of God for these events while not knowing fully the situation as an omniscient God would. You stand in judgment of God, which implies that you have some higher moral standard by which you are judging him and I simply ask on what you base that moral standard and why is it objective in nature allowing you to stand in such judgment?

 

So, you are simply left with a subjective standard by which you have no basis on which to judge, or you are the standard and that standard is subjective to you and you alone - not binding upon anyone else, in which case your judgment of God also fails. I don't see how you have a basis to stand in judgment of God. Maybe you could help me out and explain why you think you do.

[LNC]

Yes, I know. And that's a point I disagree with, and I know mostly everyone here is on your side on that one.

 

I base it on the concept of what "morality" is. It's a system of mores, based on human values, that apply to human action only.

 

When it comes to the question of animals who have moral behavior, I agree, they have it. They have agreed concepts of behavior. And we could call it "animal moral." But overall, the word itself "moral" contains the idea of how humans interact with other humans, and how humans interacts with nature.

 

Take this as an example:

 

Lets say I wrote a computer program with artificial intelligence. In that program I have created 5,000 small "entities", all "living" in a virtual world.

 

I apply certain rules how these entities should act and interact, just to create a stable system where they just don't go extinct within five minutes. One of these rules are: an entity can not erase the memory of a particular "apple" item.

 

Does that rule apply to me? Would I be breaking the morals on this system by erasing an apple item myself?

 

I think the problem lies in how wide or narrow we define the word "moral."

 

Han, I would agree with your line of thinking here overall. The only difference is that God, by definition, has an immutable and good nature (again, by definition of who God is as defined by philosophers and theologians), so if he exists, then he would be bound by his nature to do only good. You or I, on the other hand, with our virtual world, would not have this binding force on our lives and decisions. We are not inherently good as our actions often show.

 

There is a third option: amoral. Where the word/term/definition of "moral" doesn't apply. It's the "null" state.

 

That is certainly a possibility; however,the fact that we have consciences and know of right and wrong would seem to dictate against that possibility. Morals, if they are objective, and I believe they are, had to have an objective source.

 

On another note, here's an interesting debate between Ehrman and Craig (I'm not sure this has been posted already before): http://www.bringyou.to/apologetics/p96.htm#EhrmanClose

 

I agree that this is an interesting debate and encourage all to read it. You can watch it here, although the audio is not the greatest, or read it here.

[LNC]

I agree that certain animals besides humans have consciousness and are social; however, that doesn't mean that they are conscious in the same way that we are. Animals may have a degree of self-awareness, but it has not been shown that they are aware of their self-awareness. In other words, animals have thoughts, but not thoughts about their thoughts as do humans.

 

...

 

Scientists will not prove dualism to be false since that question falls outside the realm of science and into the realm of philosophy. You can't make that conclusion that without neurons firing there can be no thoughts as that is not scientifically provable. All you can conclude scientifically is that there are no neurons firing, but that is where the science stops. Your conclusion is actually a religious conclusion, not a scientific one.

 

Is your statement that animals do not have thoughts about their thoughts a religious conclusion, or a philosophical conclusion?

 

Phanta

 

It is the conclusion to which scientists and philosophers have come based upon empirical testing. Philosopher Fred Dretske from Duke wrote, "animals and small children are conscious without believing that they are -- without even (in the case of animals) the capacity to believe they are." So, I would say that it involves both science and philosophy.

[LNC]

I am very concerned about people being killed and sent to hell, that is why I am on this site pleading with you to investigate Jesus and to find in him your hope of eternal life. I don't want any of you to have to suffer this fate, and you don't have to.

 

It seems to me a necessary part of how God created the social human, that some must fall away. Without me, in my unbelieving state, other Eves would inevitably step forward to see for themselves--Eve's who, with my living example of what not to do, would otherwise remain faithful. Isn't a certain balance of unbelievers (and thus souls crushed or burned or evaporated or whatever at death) necessary for sustaining and growing the pool of believers?

 

Phanta

 

No, I don't think that is the case or even logically necessary. I don't believe it is necessary to see consequences to know that one wants to avoid them. As well, I don't think a person needs to see someone rewarded to know that it is good to be rewarded. We are people who have the capacity to understand concepts without personally experiencing them in the first or second person. So, I don't think you necessarily have to serve as an example, either for the good or the bad, for the sake of others; although, I do think it is good to serve as a good example and never good to serve as a bad example. Two of my brothers were bad examples for me, although, I think that God would have dealt the same with me even if they would have turned out differently. I wish that their lives hadn't turned out as tragically as they did.

[Ouroboros]

I will answer you out of courtesy to another member who thinks I've been too rude to you. So here goes nothing...

 

One of the gods in the pantheon of Canaanite gods was Moloch and it is known that child sacrifices were made to Moloch. You cite one source, but a cursory Google search turns up plenty of sources that say that child sacrifice was likely performed by the Canaanites. I know that there has been some recent debate about this topic; however, to conclude that it didn't happen seems to be against the weight of the evidence.

1. Do you know what the word "likely" means? It doesn't mean a fact.

 

2. Most of the sites you find are Christian apologetic sites, or amateurs, but the one I gave you had references to good sources:

 

1. Curtis, Adrian. Ugarit (Ras Shamra). William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1985, p. 94-5; Pardee, Dennis. Ritual and Cult at Ugarit. Society of Biblical Literature, Atlanta, Georgia. 2002, p. 233. 


2. Clemens, David M. Sources for Ugaritic Ritual and Sacrifice, Volume I: Ugarit and Ugarit Akkadian Texts. Ugarit-Verlag, Münster , Germany , 2001, p.54. 


3. Dever, William. Did God Have a Wife?: Archaeology and Folk Religion in Ancient Israel. William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., Grand Rapids, MI, 2005, p. Dever 217-8.

Don't dismiss the sources because they don't agree with your a priori assumptions.

 

 

I think that your argument only works if morals are somehow above God. In other words, if morals derive from God and his immutable nature (which by definition is the standard of good), then he cannot command something that is evil as that would violate his nature.

"His nature," what is that? It is in his nature to not do evil, but only good? Where did he get that nature from? It can't just exist. You can't just have a good nature. Someone must have created it.

 

And how is "immutable nature" equal to "good standard?" It doesn't follow.

 

However, as was said, God's nature by definition is immutable (unchanging and unchangeable), therefore, he cannot command something that would violate his nature. So, if God commanded the Israelites to slaughter the Canaanites, then he had to have a just reason for doing so and therefore, it would not be committing murder on the part of the Israelites. Murder is the taking of innocent life and for some reason, God deemed the lives of the Canaanites to be guilty.

"And for some reason," meaning, whatever God says is good, is good because God says it. Not because it's good in itself. You can't give a good reason to why it was good what God did.

 

To slaughter innocent children is considered evil, even by modern Christians (look at anti-abortion movement). If it's not evil to kill preventively, then abortion is not evil if we kill babies which possibly could become evil. So abortion is approved by God, since he does it, and it's good.

 

People don't become morally corrupted by religion, people morally corrupt religion because we are morally contaminated.

In other words, religion does not make immoral people more moral. Religion has no effect or function then. Then why do you promote religious morality if immoral people corrupt religion? Shouldn't religion be the answer to fix the immoral people, so they can become moral? If religion is the answer to morals, then why can it be corrupted? How can I know if you are a moral or immoral agent for religion? According to your statement, there is a risk that you are corrupt and try to persuade me into your corrupt religion. How would I know you are not just another charlatan?

 

If God is immoral, as you seem to imply, then by what moral standard to you judge?

Actually, I have correct my view on God's morality a bit. I consider God (if he/she/it exists) to be amoral. In other words, beyond and above morality, and without reproach. Or to put it this way, what God does or does not do, can not be judged or measured as good, evil, nice, pretty, or ugly. God just acts, for whatever reasons he/she/it might have, and nothing else. To put a sticker on it and call it good, is a misuse of the word "good".

 

From where do morals come and on what basis do you judge God by them?

Where does God's good nature come from, and by what basis do you judge them to be good?

 

Wouldn't they have to be objective in nature?

What is good? Define "good," then we can see if it's objective or not.

 

How do you come by objective morals in the absence of an objective reference point or source?

If morals are objective, then why have they changed? Why does Christians change their views on certain morals if they are objective? Why was rape justified and a lesser crime in the OT than working on the Sabbath? Why do Christians turn on and off light switched on Sundays? Why do they drive a car? And yet they are (rightly so) outraged about rape?

 

How do you get the objective morals? What objective fact do you form your morals? What are your objective values? What are you objective mores? How, what, where?

 

If you can't answer what the objective morals are, then how can you claim they exist? You are making a claim about a fictitious product, without even describing what they are!

 

Your argument seems to work against you as you try to work it in your favor. Maybe you could explain these things to me.

I'd say that your arguments are rather weak, and do not have any foundation at all. You make claims about something, but you refuse to explain what that "something" really is. You're talking about the abdominal snowman, but you've never seen it. So lets her it. Describe some "objective morals" to me.

[Ouroboros]

Han, I would agree with your line of thinking here overall. The only difference is that God, by definition, has an immutable and good nature (again, by definition of who God is as defined by philosophers and theologians), so if he exists, then he would be bound by his nature to do only good.

He's bound by a nature which exists independent of God. God is depending on the nature which drives him to do good. So where did this nature come from?

 

You or I, on the other hand, with our virtual world, would not have this binding force on our lives and decisions. We are not inherently good as our actions often show.

If we acted "evil" on the virtual world, it would be based on the level of judgment from the perspective of the virtual beings. It would be "evil" or "good" to them. But my actions, in this world, would not be evil or good. We would act from whatever our perspective would be. In other words, our actions would not be good or evil, if the virtual beings realized we are in a different moral system, in other words, amoral to them.

 

That is certainly a possibility; however,the fact that we have consciences and know of right and wrong would seem to dictate against that possibility. Morals, if they are objective, and I believe they are, had to have an objective source.

If we know how to act right and wrong, then what purpose does religion have? What is the purpose to even argue where morality comes from or not? It doesn't matter if Bob gave us morality, since it is automatic.

 

On the other hand, if we automatically can know right and wrong because God knows what is right and wrong, does that mean we all have God's nature? Does it mean I am of the same spirit as God? I am in other words good and know how to do good? Then why are we judged?

 

And also, what about sociopaths who (according to psychiatry) can't relate or feel remorse. They have a hard time understanding the difference between right and wrong. Why do they not have the same function in their brain as the "normal" person? If we all have it, then what are they?

[Ouroboros]

Is your statement that animals do not have thoughts about their thoughts a religious conclusion, or a philosophical conclusion?

 

Phanta

 

It is the conclusion to which scientists and philosophers have come based upon empirical testing. Philosopher Fred Dretske from Duke wrote, "animals and small children are conscious without believing that they are -- without even (in the case of animals) the capacity to believe they are." So, I would say that it involves both science and philosophy.

Then I think your knowledge is outdated. Scientists DO believe animals have thoughts, even self-consciousness to some degree and identity (experiments with whales and dolphins), and rational thinking and predictions of behavior (rats who could rationalize best outcome), and even a primitive form of morals and ethics (apes). No, seriously. That's what scientists say today (based on empirical testing).

 

One thing I have learned about philosophers is that they do a lot of armchair thinking. If they don't stay on top on what scientific research shows as facts (in the real world), and today, then their thought processes go astray.

 

I have three dogs, and each dog has different personality. I have seen behavior in them which shows a certain level of reasoning. They are not dumb. They are not robots. They can do some thinking. It's not a high-level reasoning as we can, and that's because they have a more limited brain capacity, but also they lack the ability of communicating advanced thoughts. Language is the key to our intelligence. (Also proven through observations of real cases in something called real life)

 

But why should I even bother explaining these things to you? Why should I? Give me a reason to why I should continue giving you the benefit of me wasting my time explaining what the real world, out there, outside your religious campus, really know, think, and do?

[mwc]

I have seen this analysis applied to the NT data and it stand up. Maybe you could run it through and show us why you believe it would not hold up. I would be interested in seeing your analysis and reasoning.

This topic is old and stale. I have no intention of writing an "analysis" of this as historical method simply doesn't allow for the supernatural. If you want to know why seek your answers outside of apologist literature.

 

However, I will share a rather old, but I think interesting, set of quotes from an article that relates to this with the class:

 

Historical Method in the Study of Religion

Author(s): Morton Smith

Source: History and Theory, Vol. 8, Beiheft 8: On Method in the History of Religions (1968), pp. 8-16

Published by: Blackwell Publishing for Wesleyan University

 

Historical thought, as applied to the study of religion, has often concentrated attention on two questions which history is incapable of answering - those of the origin and nature of religion. The only thing history can tell us about the origin of religion is that it occurred in prehistoric times. As for the nature of religion, I should agree, of course, that the definition of the term is an historical question. Nothing is more wearisome than to have some philosopher invent his own meaning for the word religion and then go through history, either distinguishing "true religion," which fits his definition, from "religion falsely so called," which does not, or, even worse, trying to force all religion whatever into his own mold. [p.8]

...

This supposition, in classical terms, is "atheism." I say "in classical terms" because the adjective "atheist" was regularly used in classical times to de- scribe, for instance, the Epicureans, who insisted that there were gods, but denied that they ever descended to any special intervention in the world's affairs. It is precisely this denial which is fundamental to any sound historical method. Whether or not supernatural beings exist is a question for meta- physics. Even if they exist and exercise some regular influence on the world, some influence of which the consequences are taken to be part of the normal course of natural events - let us say, for instance, that they determine the motion of the sphere of fixed stars, or that the whole of nature, including its regular operation, is a manifestation of some unchanging divine nature or will - even this is of no concern to history, since it is not history's task to inquire into the causes of the normal phenomena of nature. But the historian does require a world in which these normal phenomena are not interfered with by arbitrary and ad hoc divine interventions to produce abnormal events with special historical consequences. This is not a matter of personal preference, but of professional necessity, for the historian's task, as I said at the beginning, is to calculate the most probable explanation of the preserved evidence. Now the minds of the gods are inscrutable and their actions, consequently, incalcu- lable. Therefore, unless the possibility of their special intervention be ruled out, there can be no calculation of most probable causes - there would always be an unknown probability that a deity might have intervened.

 

In all this I am, of course, contradicting the recent statement of Professor Thorkild Jacobsen, that when writing the history of religion we are only concerned to determine what ancient beliefs were, not whether or not they were true. This is false, because a great many ancient beliefs concerned supposed cases of divine intervention in history, and these are questions of historical fact. Whether Joshua's defeat of the Amorites at Gibeon was or was not prolonged by his stopping of the sun in mid heaven for the space of a day is just as much an historical question as whether a recent congressman's defeat of his opponents was or was not affected by tampering with the voting machines. In both cases, the historian must collect the evidence and try to discover the most likely explanation. [p.12]

...

To make it clearer, let me conclude with a legal example. Shortly after a recent accident the police, arriving on the scene, found two cars in the ditch on the right hand side of the road. One car was overturned and its left side was mashed in; both persons in it were dead. The other car, its nose mashed in, was piled on top of the first. The driver's ribs were broken and he was uncon-scious, but alive; he smelled strongly of whiskey. It seemed evident that he had come out of the side road to the left, which there adjoined the main road, without stopping, and had hit the first car (which was traveling along the main road) in the side. When the driver recovered and was faced with the charges he explained the evidence as follows: "It's true I'd had a little drink, but I wasn't drunk, 'n' I wasn't goin' fast at all, 'n' I meant to stop when I come to the main road, but the ol' Devil, he's always out to get me; so when I come up to that corner he come up right behin' me 'n' g'me a shove slam into that other car. There jus' wa'n't nothin' I could do about it."

 

This explanation is irrefutable. It accords perfectly with the traditional beliefs of both Christianity and Judaism, the major religions of our culture; therefore it cannot be said to describe a course of events which, by the tradi- tional standards of our culture, could be called impossible. But the traditional standards of our culture are not its present, practical standards. For practical purposes we now work by the presuppositions common to history and science, among which, as I have argued, is one to the effect that supernatural inter- vention does not alter the normal course of physical events. Anyone who doubts that this presupposition is common might be asked to undertake the legal defense of this driver. I think he would be well advised to defend him on the ground of insanity. No jury would swallow that story. For a jury's task is essentially one of historical criticism - to determine whether or not the evidence presented establishes a probability strong enough to be taken as proof that the accused is guilty as charged. And the ordinary jury's refusal to accept accounts of supernatural intervention as explanations of historical evidence is an example of common sense which historians of religion would do well to follow.

 

I hope this conclusion seems a truism scarcely worth stating, because I now propose to give evidence of the need for stating it. I shall draw my evidence from the most authoritative work by the most eminent and competent general historian of religion now teaching in the United States, that is to say, from Professor Mircea Eliade's book, Shamanism, in its recent English edition (Bollingen Series, LXXVI, New York, 1965). In discussing shamanic initia- tion Eliade makes practically no distinction between initiations performed by men, in which there can be deliberate communications of traditional teachings and techniques previously unknown to the candidate, and initiation by sickness and hallucination, in which any unknown material must emerge from the candidate's subconscious. Thus he writes (p. 253 ff.), "Most of the (Chuck- chee) shamans . . . claimed to have had no masters, but this does not mean that they did not have superhuman teachers. The meeting with 'shamanic animals' itself indicates the kind of teaching that an apprentice might receive"[pp.13,14]

...

These are serious faults of historical analysis. Equally serious is Eliade's acceptance of the stories about feats of the shamans of the good old days; for instance, in Shamanism, 254, 290: "The Eskimo remembers a time when the angakut were far more powerful than they are today. 'I am a shaman myself,' one of them told Rasmussen, 'but I am nothing compared with my grandfather Tiqatsaq. He lived in the time when a shaman could go down to the mother of the sea beasts, fly up to the moon,' " and so on - that is to say, the old man either had more fantastic hallucinations, or was a less inhibited liar; or, most likely of all, the stories of his feats had grown with time. It would be a matter of some historical interest to know which, or what combination, of these possibilities was the correct explanation. If hallucinations have actually become less ad- venturous as primitive groups have come into contact with civilization, or, if the influence of higher cultures has produced conscious caution in the in- ventions of primitive religious personnel, we should like to know more about the changes. But Eliade simply swallows the stories whole (Shamanism, 299, 500, etc.). What is worse, he goes on to make them into evidence for an historical process, an actual decline in shamanic powers, which makes it im- possible for shamans now to fly through the air as they used to! (Loc. cit.) If by this he means an actual change in the content of the hallucinations to which shamans are subject, let him say so and let the question be investigated - if there is adequate evidence for an investigation. But it is worth remarking in this connection that both Homer and the Old Testament picture a world in which the powers of men in general have far declined from what they were in the good old days. Perhaps Eliade would accept their picture, too, but the fifth century B.C. author of the Battle of Frogs and Mice could already parody such stories in the spirit of historical criticism, making his hero frog lift a great mud ball "which not nine frogs of these degenerate days" could hope to move. [p.15]

...

[...]For good observation it is of course necessary to study with sympathy. But for good judgment it is necessary to regain objectivity. The study of religion is in this respect like the study of poetry. One must come to the material with what Coleridge called "that willing suspension of disbelief which constitutes poetic faith," or one will never feel the moving power which the material has, and one will never, therefore, be able to understand what the believers are talking about. But neither religions, nor even poems, exist in vacuo. Therefore, having experienced what the ceremony or the composition has to offer, the historian, like the critic, must then be able to return from the world of imagination to that of fact, and to determine the relation of the poetic or religious complex to its environment in the historical world. [pp15,16]

I realize that's a lot of quotes. Sorry about that. But it's necessary to get the point across since most people can't access some of these essays.

 

Hopefully that will provide you with enough information.

 

mwc

[oddbird1963]

I have seen this analysis applied to the NT data and it stand up. Maybe you could run it through and show us why you believe it would not hold up. I would be interested in seeing your analysis and reasoning.

This topic is old and stale. I have no intention of writing an "analysis" of this as historical method simply doesn't allow for the supernatural. If you want to know why seek your answers outside of apologist literature.

 

However, I will share a rather old, but I think interesting, set of quotes from an article that relates to this with the class:

 

<. . . Snipped . . .>

I realize that's a lot of quotes. Sorry about that. But it's necessary to get the point across since most people can't access some of these essays.

 

Hopefully that will provide you with enough information.

 

mwc

 

Thanks for the quotes, mwc!

[Ouroboros]

But mwc, you know that Morton Smith can't be a real historian™ like Habermas. Only Habermas and Craig are the Real Ones. All other are just fake.

[Neon Genesis]

Maybe you could help me out and explain why you think you do.

Please get it through your thick head. I am not speaking to you anymore, so bugger off already.

[NotBlinded]

The events that happened in the cave are historical (since being historical doesn't require independent attestation) but he doesn't have to deal with them since they are non-falsifiable (since there is no independent attestation).

 

So the events in the cave are non-falsifiable historical events that do not have to be dealt with.

 

If you had a whole bunch of these types of events you could practically build a religion on them.

 

mwc

huh?

 

 

That just caused my brain to implode.

 

[NotBlinded]

I have never argued that God is above morality as I believe he is the basis of morality. Morality is grounded in God's nature and apart from that grounding, we have no basis of objective morality as I have argued in the past. In fact, when I put out the challenge for those on this site to give me a basis of objective morality apart from God, no one was able to produce one. I simply think that those on this site may be missing what God was doing or jumping the gun in judgment of God for these events while not knowing fully the situation as an omniscient God would. You stand in judgment of God, which implies that you have some higher moral standard by which you are judging him and I simply ask on what you base that moral standard and why is it objective in nature allowing you to stand in such judgment?

 

So, you are simply left with a subjective standard by which you have no basis on which to judge, or you are the standard and that standard is subjective to you and you alone - not binding upon anyone else, in which case your judgment of God also fails. I don't see how you have a basis to stand in judgment of God. Maybe you could help me out and explain why you think you do.

All of what you are saying is based on your "a priori presupposition" that people are inherently sinful and bad. Take that away and you will realize that you don't need an objective standard for morality.

 

Of course morality is subjective per individuals and societies. People will often make subjective morals objective through society but they originated with the person. How hard is that to grasp? People must have been completely immoral before the carving of the 10 - 200 or so commandments...

 

(Where's that head slap emoticon??)

 

[NotBlinded]

The only difference is that God, by definition, has an immutable and good nature (again, by definition of who God is as defined by philosophers and theologians), so if he exists, then he would be bound by his nature to do only good.

I find it horribly presumptious, limiting, idolatrous, and faithless that people claim to know the nature of God.

 

We are not inherently good as our actions often show.

We are not inherently bad either. Do you think it is an either or situation?

[Ouroboros]

The only difference is that God, by definition, has an immutable and good nature (again, by definition of who God is as defined by philosophers and theologians), so if he exists, then he would be bound by his nature to do only good.

I find it horribly presumptious, limiting, idolatrous, and faithless that people claim to know the nature of God.

 

We are not inherently good as our actions often show.

We are not inherently bad either. Do you think it is an either or situation?

YOU TOO! I do too! If God really did exist, as they believe, I find it extremely arrogant to claim attributes to God, or to claim that they know what "good" is or not. I'm still waiting to hear one example of an absolute, irrefutable, objective moral, and explained why it is so, and how LNC knows this.

 

If God is bound to do only good, then only good should come out of God. But since God kills humans left and right, we should assume killing by God is good. In other words, killing isn't in itself good or bad, but can be good in the hands of God. If God commands human sacrifice, it is also good, even if it's sacrificing someones children (examples in the Bible). Even offering your children to be raped (read the story about the "righteous" Lot and his daughters) or incest, is considered the acts and thoughts of a good man. Lot was spared, even with these deviant thoughts and actions. What we consider moral today, was obviously not moral back then. I need an explanation to why these things are good?

[NotBlinded]

HA! Thanks Hans!

[NotBlinded]

The only difference is that God, by definition, has an immutable and good nature (again, by definition of who God is as defined by philosophers and theologians), so if he exists, then he would be bound by his nature to do only good.

I find it horribly presumptious, limiting, idolatrous, and faithless that people claim to know the nature of God.

 

We are not inherently good as our actions often show.

We are not inherently bad either. Do you think it is an either or situation?

YOU TOO! I do too! If God really did exist, as they believe, I find it extremely arrogant to claim attributes to God, or to claim that they know what "good" is or not. I'm still waiting to hear one example of an absolute, irrefutable, objective moral, and explained why it is so, and how LNC knows this.

 

If God is bound to do only good, then only good should come out of God. But since God kills humans left and right, we should assume killing by God is good. In other words, killing isn't in itself good or bad, but can be good in the hands of God. If God commands human sacrifice, it is also good, even if it's sacrificing someones children (examples in the Bible). Even offering your children to be raped (read the story about the "righteous" Lot and his daughters) or incest, is considered the acts and thoughts of a good man. Lot was spared, even with these deviant thoughts and actions. What we consider moral today, was obviously not moral back then. I need an explanation to why these things are good?

I'm pretty sure that it is the mixture of good and "evil" that makes life meaningful. I think the reason we are usually happy and feel good when something good happens to us is because we know in the back of our minds that there is its opposite out there that could have happened. That opposite is Kali in Hinduism. Of course it's Satan is Christianity. Hinduism knows to appreciate the opposing force for what it is.

[Ouroboros]

NBBTB, agree. Good can't exist without bad. You can't feel happiness unless you can feel sadness. Experience is the motion of relative states. Something going from A to B, is an experience. A fixed state, without motion, a state of "A" only, doesn't give experience. God, being only "good", can't experience being good, happy, or alive, because he doesn't know evil, sadness, or pain.

[NotBlinded]

NBBTB, agree. Good can't exist without bad. You can't feel happiness unless you can feel sadness. Experience is the motion of relative states. Something going from A to B, is an experience. A fixed state, without motion, a state of "A" only, doesn't give experience. God, being only "good", can't experience being good, happy, or alive, because he doesn't know evil, sadness, or pain.

That's an excellent explanation Hans. I never thought of it as not giving experience in the manner of motion. That just ties it all together even better in my head. Thanks!

[Ouroboros]

That's an excellent explanation Hans. I never thought of it as not giving experience in the manner of motion. That just ties it all together even better in my head. Thanks!

I heard a lecture once about the temporality of experience, thought, and consciousness. We can't think without the time factor, nor can we think without the ability of "something" moving from one point to the next. And the same goes with memory. And it leads to that consciousness, identity of who we are (a lot based one our ability to recollect the long past, and the immediate past), also being tethered to time and space. In other words, if God can think, he must be bound by time and space, in my opinion. Awareness and consciousness arise from the finite, not from the infinite.

[NotBlinded]

That's an excellent explanation Hans. I never thought of it as not giving experience in the manner of motion. That just ties it all together even better in my head. Thanks!

I heard a lecture once about the temporality of experience, thought, and consciousness. We can't think without the time factor, nor can we think without the ability of "something" moving from one point to the next. And the same goes with memory. And it leads to that consciousness, identity of who we are (a lot based one our ability to recollect the long past, and the immediate past), also being tethered to time and space. In other words, if God can think, he must be bound by time and space, in my opinion. Awareness and consciousness arise from the finite, not from the infinite.

Cool...although, could you imagine being able to actually see that there is really nothing that is not moving? It all seems to be an illusion in order to experience. OMFG, the Hindus are right!

[Ouroboros]

Cool...although, could you imagine being able to actually see that there is really nothing that is not moving? It all seems to be an illusion in order to experience. OMFG, the Hindus are right!

Yup. Can't argue with you there.

[NotBlinded]

Cool...although, could you imagine being able to actually see that there is really nothing that is not moving? It all seems to be an illusion in order to experience. OMFG, the Hindus are right!

Yup. Can't argue with you there.

Hans, I can't tell you how much that just slapped my "soul" so-to-speak. I didn't realize the implications of what you said until I responded and typed it. Not that I'll start worshipping anything, it's just another piece of the multi-faceted chain coming together.

 

Thank you again.

[Neon Genesis]

 

I find it horribly presumptious, limiting, idolatrous, and faithless that people claim to know the nature of God.

 

 

And why do xtians claim it's impossible for God to create moral relativism? For a god that's supposedly all-powerful, their god sounds very limited to me in what it can and cannot do. How do they know God's morals aren't relative?

[NotBlinded]

 

I find it horribly presumptious, limiting, idolatrous, and faithless that people claim to know the nature of God.

 

 

And why do xtians claim it's impossible for God to create moral relativism? For a god that's supposedly all-powerful, their god sounds very limited to me in what it can and cannot do. How do they know God's morals aren't relative?

That's a good question.

 

Maybe it has something to do with they way they view reality. Reality and everything in it is created and meaning (and probably morals) can't arise in artifacts. They see reality as pointing towards something else as if reality itself is a symbol of something greater. This leads them to wait for the day when they find meaning in something that wasn't created, such as God. If they realize that reality itself is self created then morality and meaning would be right here and arise from itself. Maybe?