The Kalam Cosmological Argument

[agnosticator]

I like strawberry flavored Pi, that's how I feel. Even though it's unnatural, even irrational, it is still something real.

 

You mean there's no Pi in the sky by and by?

[Ouroboros]

You mean there's no Pi in the sky by and by?

Neither is the imaginary i.

But e is all so real and natural,

and all fractions are rational,

Still the domain of (f o g)(x) is a bit foggy.

[Shyone]

You mean there's no Pi in the sky by and by?

Neither is the imaginary i.

But e is all so real and natural,

and all fractions are rational,

Still the domain of (f o g)(x) is a bit foggy.

I wonder how many here know that log_e(x) is a natural log, and that e is an irrational constant.

[Ouroboros]

You mean there's no Pi in the sky by and by?

Neither is the imaginary i.

But e is all so real and natural,

and all fractions are rational,

Still the domain of (f o g)(x) is a bit foggy.

I wonder how many here know that log_e(x) is a natural log, and that e is an irrational constant.

I do, but had to make it rhyme. Creative freedom, you know.

 

Perhaps this would suit better:

Neither is the imaginary i.

But e is real and ln so natural,

and all fractions are rational,

Still the domain of (f o g)(x) is a bit foggy.

 

 

But hey, what do you expect from someone who is in on his third beer and have to press backspace for each word to fix the spelling...?!

 

(Btw log_e(x) is normally written as ln x. )

[bornagainathiest]

Hello LNC.

 

Yes, put simply I'm confused and most likely misinterpreting something here. That's why I'm asking for your help in explaining this topic. Perhaps the sticking point is the language used by Wikipedia and Stanford? They seem to be mutually exclusive. Or maybe there's a whole raft of assumptions that I'm making that need to be reviewed? Anyway, I'll try and put it more accurately below.

 

1. Earlier I listed six instances where Wikipedia has attributed various observable effects to the actions of various types of virtual particle. Are there any inaccuracies, misrepresentations or ambiguities in any of these listed instances?

(The content of this question rests upon the assumption that observable effects only apply to real entities, not abstract, conceptual ones. If this assumption is flawed, please say how and why. Thank you.)

 

2. If virtual particles are real entities, but can never be observed, how do they then qualify as 'real', when, presumably, real entities have physical attributes that can be observed?

(The content of this question is based upon the assumption that your words, highlighted in red, mean that if they are not abstract, they are therefore, real. If this is a misreading, I apologize and earnestly request that you clarify the status of the particles in question. Real? Abstract? Something else?)

 

3.Perhaps I'm stuck in a false dichotomy here? E.g., that which is real is therefore observable and that which is not observable is therefore abstract. Is that too simplistic? Once again, any help given to explain would be appreciated.

 

Thanks,

 

BAA.

 

p.s.

While I understand that your time may be limited and that you are busy with other things, I believe that the action of referring me back to prior quotes and informing me that I'm mistaken and/or misinterpreting things, does not qualify as adequately meeting the criteria of answering my questions or explaining the topic under discussion. I have no wish for this paragraph to sound peevish or difficult, but I am trying to understand, learn and grow here. If you feel that my future comprehension would be better served by asking others, then please say so and I'll gladly accept your decision and follow that new path. Thanks again.[/color]

 

Hey BAA,

 

I still don't understand how you read this article to say that virtual particles are abstract. It is clear that the author is discussing real particles and not abstract particles in the sense of being non-real entities. He gives his explanation as to why we cannot observe them and it has to do with relational properties of real entities, not with the idea that they are abstract as we commonly think of the word. Even the Wiki article says that we cannot observe virtual particles, so I'm not sure why that is a problem either. In fact, the term "abstract" is never used in his explanation, so you will have to explain where you come up with that concept from his explanation. There is a difference between seeing observable effects of virtual particles and seeing the particles themselves. It sounds as if we are arguing semantics rather than real differences. I hope that helps clear things up.

 

LNC

 

Well thanks for the input LNC, but I'll be the first to admit that I get major brain-fry when trying to surround these concepts. So I'm going to back off from Virtual Particles and leave them be (or not be? whatever!).

 

However, perhaps my Homer Simpson-sized neocortex can deal with the answers I hope to get from the following question about the KCA.

 

The opening premise reads, "Everything that begins to exist has a cause."

 

My question is (hopefully) quite simple. Does 'a cause' mean just-one-and-only-one-cause?

 

Actually, I'd like to throw this one open to all contributors please LNC, ok?

 

(Whoops! That's two questions. Sorry! )

 

Thanks.

 

BAA.

[agnosticator]

You mean there's no Pi in the sky by and by?

Neither is the imaginary i.

But e is all so real and natural,

and all fractions are rational,

Still the domain of (f o g)(x) is a bit foggy.

I wonder how many here know that log_e(x) is a natural log, and that e is an irrational constant.

I do, but had to make it rhyme. Creative freedom, you know.

 

Perhaps this would suit better:

Neither is the imaginary i.

But e is real and ln so natural,

and all fractions are rational,

Still the domain of (f o g)(x) is a bit foggy.

 

 

But hey, what do you expect from someone who is in on his third beer and have to press backspace for each word to fix the spelling...?!

 

(Btw log_e(x) is normally written as ln x. )

Both of you go to the head of the math class! And Hans, don't try to write poetry when you're well on your way to inebriation.

[Ouroboros]

Both of you go to the head of the math class! And Hans, don't try to write poetry when you're well on your way to inebriation.

That's when they're the best!

[agnosticator]

Both of you go to the head of the math class! And Hans, don't try to write poetry when you're well on your way to inebriation.

That's when they're the best!

 

You sure can handle your alcohol!

[Ouroboros]

You sure can handle your alcohol!

Not all the time.

 

It's weird. Sometimes I have two glasses and feel a lot, other times I have a bunch, and it barely affects me.

 

Anyway... back to the normal program... Or, perhaps there is some kind of The Alcoholic Argument for God we can discuss? When you drink a lot, even impossible things are possible. God is an impossible thing. Therefore God exists when you're drunk.

[agnosticator]

You sure can handle your alcohol!

Not all the time.

 

It's weird. Sometimes I have two glasses and feel a lot, other times I have a bunch, and it barely affects me.

 

Anyway... back to the normal program... Or, perhaps there is some kind of The Alcoholic Argument for God we can discuss? When you drink a lot, even impossible things are possible. God is an impossible thing. Therefore God exists when you're drunk.

 

And I become immaterial when a drink affects me, or at least I feel like a floating, immaterial non-being!

[Shyone]

The opening premise reads, "Everything that begins to exist has a cause."

 

My question is (hopefully) quite simple. Does 'a cause' mean just-one-and-only-one-cause?

 

Actually, I'd like to throw this one open to all contributors please LNC, ok?

 

(Whoops! That's two questions. Sorry! )

 

Thanks.

 

BAA.

You're quite right that sometimes two or more causes are required to make some things begin. Dawkins has an interesting passage regarding an experiment with bacteria in which two spontaneous mutations were required to allow the bacteria to begin to use citrate for metabolism.

 

Sometimes I even wonder about the definition of "begin."

 

The causal loop paradox suggests that if an event precedes a cause and the cause acts in retrograde fashion (or simultaneously) then two things can cause each other. sort of. It uses the Lorentz transformation for speeds of light > c (presumably in a time dilated system - as in an expanding universe).

 

In a bidimensional Minkowski diagram having space in abscissae and time in ordinates, the line of arguments as the use of superluminal signal velocities leads to a violation of the Einstein causality.

[Ouroboros]

You're quite right that sometimes two or more causes are required to make some things begin. Dawkins has an interesting passage regarding an experiment with bacteria in which two spontaneous mutations were required to allow the bacteria to begin to use citrate for metabolism.

And just think about babies.

 

It takes two persons to "cause" it.

 

Besides that, what does it really mean that "something causes something"? To what extent and level are we talking about? Is it the sperm that causes the fetus? Or is it the egg? Or is it the DNA? Or is it the individual proteins? Or is it the... Which part, and how, does one thing cause anything? I feel the whole "cause" argument is rather obscure in general. And it becomes even worse that the Kalam is making a warrant (major premise) based on a generalization about causation in OUR world, in this universe, and then use it to conclude about a causality out of this world.

 

To make myself a bit more clear, the major premise is based on a induction about the relationship between causality and inception of an objects existence. This induction is built upon the framework of time, space, matter, and energy. Those are required in the first premise. But when we get to the conclusion, we're to assume that none of the pieces of the framework that established the major premise are require anymore, but now we're supposed to accept a causality outside that framework. There's an obvious disconnect between the major premise and the conclusion. It's obvious to me at least...

 

Sometimes I even wonder about the definition of "begin."

Agree. That one too.

 

The zygote doesn't being to exist in the sense that it pops into existence from nowhere. It's a reformation and transformation of existing parts. It's a continuation of a uninterrupted process. The new "thing" is just all the old things in a new shape. So cause-to-inception is a matter of transformation of existing things, not ex nihilo. On the other hand, the inception of the universe is argued to be an ex nihilo inception (by the religious), so again, the cause-to-inception link doesn't connect between premises and conclusion.

[Shyone]

 

The zygote doesn't being to exist in the sense that it pops into existence from nowhere. It's a reformation and transformation of existing parts. It's a continuation of a uninterrupted process. The new "thing" is just all the old things in a new shape. So cause-to-inception is a matter of transformation of existing things, not ex nihilo. On the other hand, the inception of the universe is argued to be an ex nihilo inception (by the religious), so again, the cause-to-inception link doesn't connect between premises and conclusion.

In essence, nothing really "begins." Transform is a good word for what we see as "beginning."

 

I like your explanation of the cause problem as well. When we refer to causing, we assume a natural world with laws governing causation. It is then inappropriate to take those principles and apply them to some existence without the framework of a natural universe.

[agnosticator]

Besides that, what does it really mean that "something causes something"? To what extent and level are we talking about? Is it the sperm that causes the fetus? Or is it the egg? Or is it the DNA? Or is it the individual proteins? Or is it the... Which part, and how, does one thing cause anything? I feel the whole "cause" argument is rather obscure in general. And it becomes even worse that the Kalam is making a warrant (major premise) based on a generalization about causation in OUR world, in this universe, and then use it to conclude about a causality out of this world.

 

To make myself a bit more clear, the major premise is based on a induction about the relationship between causality and inception of an objects existence. This induction is built upon the framework of time, space, matter, and energy. Those are required in the first premise. But when we get to the conclusion, we're to assume that none of the pieces of the framework that established the major premise are require anymore, but now we're supposed to accept a causality outside that framework. There's an obvious disconnect between the major premise and the conclusion. It's obvious to me at least...

 

 

The zygote doesn't being to exist in the sense that it pops into existence from nowhere. It's a reformation and transformation of existing parts. It's a continuation of a uninterrupted process. The new "thing" is just all the old things in a new shape. So cause-to-inception is a matter of transformation of existing things, not ex nihilo. On the other hand, the inception of the universe is argued to be an ex nihilo inception (by the religious), so again, the cause-to-inception link doesn't connect between premises and conclusion.

 

Memorable post, Hans.

[Ouroboros]

Thanks to both of you.

 

I recommend for anyone who is interested in arguing to look into the Toulmin model, instead of Aristotle's syllogism. Deductions often fail because the major premise is an inductive inference, and the only way to really support an argument is to find common ground in our warrants, without them, we're lost in different worlds.

 

I wish we were standing in front of a whiteboard instead, right now, because it would be so much easier to draw it out. (When you draw the ideas, you draw out the ideas out from the ideosphere, yes, it's a word... kind'a... just like noosphere.)

[LNC]

The best way to show that consciousness requires some physical substrate is that there are no examples of anything conscious that is "nonphysical." This is what we know. If there is an exception to this rule, you may provide it and the evidence for it.

 

The second best way is to show that "nonphysical" in the sense of immaterial without energy is the same as nothing. A vacuum. Consciousness requires order, and there is no order in nothing.

 

I would posit God as a immaterial mind which shows that mind does not necessarily require a physical substrate. I'm sure however, you will take exception to that example, but can you do it without presupposing physicalism? The evidence for God includes the origin of the universe, which is the origin of the physical world (unless you can show that physical matter can somehow be past eternal), the existence of objective morality, and the resurrection of Jesus (an event we are in the midst of celebrating).

 

Your second point does not follow, it is circular logic. Because an immaterial entity is not material (i.e. possesses energy (a physical construct), it does not exist. Why do you assume that order requires matter? Cannot we have order of abstract numbers? I think we can, yet abstract numbers are not physical things. Cannot we not have order in logic? And yet, logic is not a physical thing.

 

LNC

[LNC]

Claptrap. And what 'arguments?' Honestly, do you really read what you write, and do you seriously believe it? If so, it's just sad.

 

The Kalam cosmological argument (the one we are here discussing)

The Leibnizian cosmological argument

The Ontological argument

The Moral argument

The Resurrection of Jesus

Argument from Consciousness

 

I could list many more, but this should give you something to ponder. Yes, I do read and believe what I write, seriously. I am not sad - he is risen!

 

LNC

[LNC]

Those are pretty vague definitions really.

 

What exactly do you mean by "all knowing"? What exactly do you mean by "all powerful"?

 

These are quite well defined words. All knowing - knows all true propositions. All powerful - the maximally greatest powerful being.

 

LNC

[Shyone]

The best way to show that consciousness requires some physical substrate is that there are no examples of anything conscious that is "nonphysical." This is what we know. If there is an exception to this rule, you may provide it and the evidence for it.

 

The second best way is to show that "nonphysical" in the sense of immaterial without energy is the same as nothing. A vacuum. Consciousness requires order, and there is no order in nothing.

 

I would posit God as a immaterial mind which shows that mind does not necessarily require a physical substrate. I'm sure however, you will take exception to that example, but can you do it without presupposing physicalism? The evidence for God includes the origin of the universe, which is the origin of the physical world (unless you can show that physical matter can somehow be past eternal), the existence of objective morality, and the resurrection of Jesus (an event we are in the midst of celebrating).

 

Your second point does not follow, it is circular logic. Because an immaterial entity is not material (i.e. possesses energy (a physical construct), it does not exist. Why do you assume that order requires matter? Cannot we have order of abstract numbers? I think we can, yet abstract numbers are not physical things. Cannot we not have order in logic? And yet, logic is not a physical thing.

 

LNC

The universe is physical. It exists. We know it exists because of the properties which we can deduce from examination - sight, touch, sound, and indirectly from measurement of energies outside of the human sensory experience. You want an exception to the rule for God.

 

Everything in the universe has a physical cause. You exist because of physical principles involved in reproduction and metabolism, caused by your parents etc. The sun's energy causes the earth to become hot. You want to have an exception to the rule.

 

Morality, as you should know, is a societal construct. We determine through consensus what we consider moral and immoral, and the existence of different moralities in different cultures should indicate that morality, in any sense, is not absolute. Your own book of Jewish fairy tales shows the development of morality to an extent, despite the horrible morals of the people of those times. I needn't elaborate. Hell, even Jesus wasn't too happy with stoning a woman for infidelity. WE sure as hell aren't. Absolute morality is a fantasy. Let's not let this degenerate to the least common denominator - one crime that is universally immoral. Take abortion as an example if you wish to discuss morality. Or the death penalty. Or war. Does everyone agree on the morality of these human activities?

 

Everyone that dies stays dead. Their bodies decompose. That is universal, and I'm a doctor. I assure you it is true, but you should know this from reading, or common sense. You want your "god" to be an exception to the rule.

 

And the proof you accept is ludicrous. Credulous uneducated people that believe in demons told tales of dead people coming back to life? Really, you should know better. And the disagreements in the texts of the NT about what happened are beyond reason. My favorite is Matt. 27:52-53. Not only does not one other gospel mention this, but the whole idea is silly!

 

No, I'm afraid to bust your bubble. The dead stay dead. "As the cloud is consumed and vanishes away, so he that goeth down to the grave shall come up no more."

 

Now your choice of numbers and logic as "things" that are immaterial is interesting. These are ideas and thoughts that do not exist objectively outside of the mind of man. I agree that God is an idea that does not exist objectively outside of the mind of man.

 

We finally agree on something. God as an abstraction.

[Ouroboros]

Oh hai!

 

Pruf of Ceiling Cat

 

Fiwst Cawse (Cawsmolawgicle Awgooment)

 

Evewythin need a cawse, cuz, um, dat is how it is. We mew an hoomins gif us fud. Hoomins go in noysy box an go awayz an dey com bak wif fud. Dis is cawse an effekt. Who gifs teh hoomins fud? Oder hoomins cant gif hoomins fud so Ceiling Cat mus be givin dem fud for us and dem. See, Ceiling Cat bless teh hoomins wif fud for feedin us, how niec of Ceiling Cat! Hoomins must be pettin him awl teh tiem!

 

Ceiling Cat maed teh fiwst mew, an he maed fud for awl hoomins and kittehs. Der be no utta way to maek fud, srsly. So Ceiling Cat stawteded it awl!

Source: http://www.lolcatbible.com/index.php?title=Proof_of_Ceiling_Cat#Fiwst_Cawse__.28Cawsmolawgicle_Awgooment.29

 

Pet teh Ceiling Cat awl teh tiem! Or he pwn u. kthanx.

[skepticalme]

The best way to show that consciousness requires some physical substrate is that there are no examples of anything conscious that is "nonphysical." This is what we know. If there is an exception to this rule, you may provide it and the evidence for it.

 

The second best way is to show that "nonphysical" in the sense of immaterial without energy is the same as nothing. A vacuum. Consciousness requires order, and there is no order in nothing.

 

I would posit God as a immaterial mind which shows that mind does not necessarily require a physical substrate.

 

You are begging the question by assuming that a god exist.

 

I'm sure however, you will take exception to that example, but can you do it without presupposing physicalism?

 

Whats funny is that you can't present that as an example without presupposing supernaturalism.

 

The evidence for God includes the origin of the universe,

 

I feel we have busted Kalam ten ways to Sunday.

 

which is the origin of the physical world (unless you can show that physical matter can somehow be past eternal),

 

Matter/energy have indeed existed for all of time in one form or another. This is evidenced by the laws of conservation of matter/energy. Matter/energy can not be created or destroyed.

 

the existence of objective morality,

 

I see no evidence that objective morality exist. Feel free to present some

 

and the resurrection of Jesus (an event we are in the midst of celebrating).

 

I see no evidence that this event actually took place. Again, feel free to present some.

 

Your second point does not follow, it is circular logic. Because an immaterial entity is not material (i.e. possesses energy (a physical construct), it does not exist. Why do you assume that order requires matter? Cannot we have order of abstract numbers? I think we can, yet abstract numbers are not physical things. Cannot we not have order in logic? And yet, logic is not a physical thing.

 

Yet numbers and logic only exist so long as there are physical entities to perceive them. Abstract concepts are constructs of humans that describe physical order. If you take away humans you take away the abstract even though the physical things that the abstract attempts to describe still persist.

[LNC]

When your whole definition depends on the absolute negation of another definition, it has no intrinsic meaning. It's like describing God as "non-water".

 

Again, you are being cryptic here. You need to explain what you mean here.

 

Your description of "god" as "necessary being" is, by your own description, a tautology. You defined the concept as a "necessary being" and I do not accept that it is necessary or a being. You have not established existence by declaring that it exists - and it becomes no more meaningful to say it exists necessarily. Unicorns have the same criteria for existence as god does. Deny one, deny the other.

 

That is not my definition, that is the accepted definition of what God is. It gives us a basis on which to argue as to whether such a being exists. Some skeptics argue that Theists don't define who or what God is, and this is foundational to that definition. It is not, by the way, a tautology and you have not understood what the concept of "necessity" is by your objections. Necessity means that God exists independent of any other existing thing. In other words, God is not contingent on the existence of anything or anyone else. Therefore, a necessary being cannot not exist as it is not contingent in existence. You may not accept that definition; however, that just means that you are arguing against a philosophically accepted definition of God. Unless we have a definition of who or what God is, we cannot then proceed to determine whether God exists as we need to know who or what it is that we are arguing for or against. To make a definition is different than to argue as to whether that entity exists. For example, I could define a "Glorb" as a purple creature with fourteen eyes, wings and six feet measuring approximately 28' in length and 10' in height. I am not arguing that such a creature exists, I am merely defining what a Glorb would be if it did exist. It is then incumbent upon me, should I decide to do so, to prove that such a creature exists.

 

Now, you bring up unicorns and we understand what a unicorn would be by definition as a creature much like a horse with a single horn in the middle of its forehead and usually white. Now, to define a unicorn does not mean that I believe that they exist, but I have simply defined what a unicorn is.

 

With that cleared up, I do believe that there are good arguments that a necessary being that we call God exists. One argument is that without a necessary being there would be no contingent beings like ourselves, lest we end up in an infinite regression of contingent beings. But that is logically problematic, if not impossible. I can show why if you question this assertion.

 

If it weren't for the bible, you wouldn't know about Yahweh. Even Aquinas says that "God" is not self-evident. The revelation via the bible, however, is disgusting and the treatment of the "chosen people" of the "people that aren't chosen" is typical for bronze age civilizations whose gods are as cruel as their people. If that's your idea of a god, then you might ask yourself why you don't even believe what is written about how to please your god.

 

Are you as dedicated to your god as Jephthah was?

 

People knew about Yahweh before we had a Bible, so your assertion does not necessarily follow. Abraham didn't have a Bible and he knew Yahweh. Aquinas may say that the existence of God is not self evident to us, a point on which I and the Scriptures would disagree with him (see Romans 1); however, Aquinas also believes that we have ways of demonstrating that God exists and since you agree with him on the former point, can I assume that you agree with him on this latter point as well?

 

In what way do you consider revelation to be "disgusting"? I would agree that God's chosen people were often mistreated, as was demonstrated by their years of captivity in Egypt; however, they often brought on much of their ill treatment through their rebellion against God (read Judges for a quick example). Still through it all God was faithful to save them when they called upon him in humility. I would also agree with you that most of the Gods of that time period were cruel and demanding, requiring child sacrifices and other types of human sacrifices. The God of the Bible never required these and, in fact, called such practices an abomination. So, no, the idea that the Canaanites had for Gods is not my idea of what God should be like. I do try to follow (although I am not perfect) what the Bible says about pleasing God. It is clearly spelled out in the NT. As for Jephthah, a simple reading of Judges (which I just did again last week) would show you that he was a foolish man who made a foolish vow. He was not acting according to God's command in making this vow and it was not that vow that won him the battle. It was God alone who delivered Israel in that battle. So, no, hopefully I will not act as foolishly as Jephthah.

 

LNC

[LNC]

Love is not "independent of me." It is an emotion I feel based on personal experience. It is not a "being". It does not exist outside of me, and if I die, my "love" dies too.

 

Omniscience is incoherent and self contradictory. If God knows, then he can't change his mind, or he didn't know he would change his mind. Your "Middle Knowledge" makes omniscience much less that what you would want it to be. "What is important to see here is that “omniscience” has been whittled down bit by bit until there is very little left of the original concept. Arguably, you and I are “omniscient” under some of these “refined” conceptions which have become so weak. Any conception of omniscience which could allow us to argue that we are also omniscient has become irrelevant, especially when combined with the observation that we are capable of knowing a great many things well outside the ability of this allegedly omniscient god." For more on the incoherence of omniscience, see this link.

 

Great, I'm glad you changed your definition of love; however, I would argue that love has to be more than an emotion as we can love even when our emotions tell us to do otherwise. We could get into more discussions about whether love makes sense given materialism, but I will leave it here for now.

 

Again, you are incorrect in your assessment of omniscience; however, you are correct in saying that God cannot change his mind and he doesn't (see Numbers 23:19). Middle knowledge is a different concept philosophically from omniscience, the latter does not necessarily require the former. I am not arguing for middle knowledge, per se. I know of no circumstances in which either you or I could be omniscient. There are no degrees of omniscience, one is or one is not omniscient, there is no such thing as being partially omniscient. So, you are arguing a straw man case. BTW, the definition given in your link is fallacious in that it says that God would know absolutely everything and that is not the definition of omniscience. Here is a more precise definition. Precision is very important when discussing these topics as a faulty understanding will lead to all sorts of errors.

 

If you would like to wrestle with Anselm on this issue, I would be glad to help you work through it; however, it is not in any way, as you say, a self-contradictory concept.

 

LNC

[LNC]

Nevermind. I found the man that invented the concept, and as usual, he starts with the conclusion and tries to fit science to his conclusion. Just like you!

 

Do you know the name of the man who came up with the concept?

 

Hubble sphere.

 

Would you care to show your work? Anyone can make blind assertions, but it is more effective for everyone if you actually describe to what you are referring and how you can prove that this person starts with a conclusion and tries to fit science to that conclusion. I have already given examples that this is a commonly used term in science, so your statement does not fit as, if you are correct, these scientists, who are not necessarily theists by the way, wouldn't use the term if you were correct.

 

Hubble spheres are also known as Hubble volumes (if what you meant to do was to correct me, I'm not sure why you put that in your post).

 

LNC

[LNC]

Omnipresent, but no where. Outside of time. Doesn't take up space. Immaterial.

 

Matter is something, energy is something. The universe is something. The negation of all of these is - nothing.

 

God is nowhere, nothing, never. No contradiction at all. We agree that god doesn't exist. You just define his nonexistence very precisely.

 

Omnipresent and everywhere (that is the definition). Outside of time - not within this time/space dimension.

 

Logic is something, at least you seem to be trying to employ it here; can you tell me how much it weighs? How much space it requires? Where I can physically locate it? Oh well, I guess it must be nothing since it is not material (according to your definition.) Sorry, either logic doesn't exist (according to your definition) and your post is pure nonsense (as it would be without logic), or logic does exist and your post has failed in its application of it. Either way, it seems that your argument is moot.

 

Again, God is omnipresent, which by definition means present everywhere (omni - Etymology: Latin, from omnis: all : universally). Simply mis-defining words won't help you to make a logically fallacious argument. Nor will the application of faulty logic.

 

LNC